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THE

CHARACTERISTICS

OF

THE PRESENT AGE.

BY

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE.

Translated from the German,

By WILLIAM SMITH.

"The End of the Life of Mankind on earth is this,—that in this Life they may order all their relations with FREEDOM according to REASON."—*Page* 5.

"RELIGION consists in regarding and recognising all Earthly Life as the necessary development of the One, Original, Perfectly Good and Perfectly Blessed, Divine Life."—*Page* 256.

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THE present volume is published in partial fulfilment of a pledge given by the Translator, on another occasion, to place within the reach of the British Public some of the later and more popular works of the great German Transcendentalist. The Lectures of which it is composed were delivered in Berlin during the winter of 1804-5, to an audience comprising many of the most distinguished men who surrounded the throne of FREDERICK-WILLIAM at that eventful period, and to whose patriotic exertions Prussia is indebted for political independence, as well as for that system of Popular Education which is her proudest distinction among the Nations of Europe. The topics to which FICHTE directed the attention of his auditory embrace everything which belongs to the History of the Progress of the Human Race; and the principles which are brought to bear upon the elucidation of this vast problem are the same which he has elsewhere applied to the individual relations of Man, and which form the grand and distinguishing peculiarities of his Philosophy.

In forming the resolution to bring some of FICHTE's later writings within the reach of English readers, by as-

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suming the humble office of Translator, the present writer was actuated by two motives: The one,—the desire that the opinions of a great and genuine Thinker upon the greatest subjects of Thought, should be *truly* understood and appreciated among us; the other,—the conviction that the intrinsic excellence of these writings was such as to render them an acquisition of no mean importance to any Literature, however rich in native treasures.

That FICHTE's doctrines, and indeed the doctrines of Transcendentalism generally, should have hitherto been but little known, or rather not known at all, to the people of this country, is by no means surprising. Almost the only intimations which formerly reached us of Transcendentalism and its Teachers were either vague and obscure hints, scattered here and there throughout the writings of the few of our own learned men who devoted themselves to Pure Speculation, or else the perverted statements of mere ignorance; while even among those of whom, in an especial manner, it might have been expected that their knowledge of German Literature, and their acquaintance with this particular department of Thought, would have preserved them from error, we still find instances of the most glaring misconception. In this respect FICHTE has been peculiarly unfortunate. His writings have been but partially studied, even by our best Thinkers; the text-books of his students have been mistaken for the completed institute of his Philosophy, and the initiatory steps of the pupil accepted as the matured results of the master. The consequence has been that his Philosophy has been grossly misunderstood by those who alone had the means and opportunity of examining it directly,

and the errors of the learned have been of course communicated to those whose only knowledge of the subject rested on their testimony.

One of the most notable instances of this learned ignorance occurs in the *Biographia Literaria* of the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge, an author from whom a more just and discriminating estimate of FICHTE's Transcendentalism might not unreasonably have been expected. Speaking of our author, Mr. Coleridge says — "His theory degenerated into a crude *egoismus*, a boastful and hyperstoic hostility to Nature, as lifeless, godless, and altogether unholy: while his religion consisted in the assumption of a mere *ordo ordinans*, which we were permitted *exoterice* to call GOD; and his *ethics* in an ascetic, and almost monkish, mortification of natural passions and desires." Such is the testimony borne by Samuel Taylor Coleridge to the character of FICHTE's Philosophy, and sent forth to the English Public as the sole result of his inquiries into that matter. It is not too much to affirm that no statement so entirely unfounded, so utterly devoid of truth and justice, could readily be found even among the fallacies of that brilliant but delusive writer. FICHTE's theory could only be termed a crude '*egoismus*' by one who was ill acquainted with his works; for whatever excuse might have been afforded for such a misconception by the subjective terminology in which the theory naturally clothed itself in its earlier stages, while the point of view was still that of the individual understanding, yet in no form of its mature development, nor in any of its ultimate applications, does the author fail to set forth and establish, with unequalled clearness and

most convincing power of thought, the unchangeable relations which subsist, and must always continue to subsist, between the Individual Mind and the Supreme and Universal Intelligence. If proof of this were needed, it might be found in overflowing abundance in every page of the present volume, one great purpose of which is to exhibit the absolute nothingness of the Individual Life, when separated from, or opposed to, the All-embracing Source of Life. In such a theory, it is impossible that Nature can be regarded as "lifeless, godless, and altogether unholy,"—for in it Nature, for the first time, becomes interpenetrated with Intelligence, and, from being a mere dead mass of material forces, is elevated into a Living and Sacred manifestation of the One Eternal Divine Life. Again, with reference to the assertion that FICHTE's Religion "consisted in the assumption of a mere *ordo ordinans*, which we were permitted *exoterice* to call God,"—the charge may be either denied or admitted according to the meaning we attach to the phraseology employed. To the vast majority of English readers, Mr. Coleridge's assertion will convey this meaning:—that, in FICHTE's theory, the Divinity is degraded into a mere *Established Order*, or *Law*, according to the commonly received acceptation of these terms among us; and in this sense the assertion is wholly untrue. Those who declaim so loudly, in our own day, against Pantheism and its fearful train of evils, would do well to consider whether there be not a broad distinction between the *Material* Pantheism which degrades the Divinity into a mere Plastic Force, and the *Spiritual* Pantheism (if we may be allowed the expression) which ennobles Man and Nature by drawing them into more intimate union with the Supreme and Living Intelli-

gence. The one rules in desolate supremacy in the arid desert of Utilitarianism; the other has been the Religion of all Earnest Thinkers and Poets since the world began:—let us add, it is the Religion of Christianity. In this higher signification, it may indeed be freely admitted that FICHTE regarded the Divinity as the *ordo ordinans* of the Universe; but that Universe was to him one of free and voluntary activity; hence its Principle is necessarily possessed of Freedom and Intelligence, or rather *is* Absolute Freedom and Intelligence;—and if he abstained from clothing the Divine Nature with the sensuous imagery and personal nomenclature which belong to the finite understanding, and rather reverently fell back on the Inconceivable and Unnameable 'I AM' of Ancient Religion, it was for a reason the very reverse of what is here attributed to him. In the third place, if his Ethics had been "monkish" or "ascetic," we might have expected to see them manifested in a life of estrangement and isolation from his fellow-men, heedless of their errors and untouched by their miseries, without sympathy in their struggles or effort for their improvement. The answer to this charge, FICHTE has recorded in deeds, not in words.

It is much to be regretted that such misrepresentations as these should have hindered the reception among us of a writer so full of genuine nobleness and dignity as he of whom we now speak. If the labours of the Translator shall contribute in some degree to remove these hindrances, he will be amply rewarded.

But apart from any considerations connected with the

author personally, these writings possess an independent value which alone would be sufficient to entitle them to a favourable reception on the part of the English reader. They abound in searching and vigorous thought on the highest topics of human speculation. The present volume contains the only attempt, with which the Translator is acquainted, to apply the principles of the Transcendental Philosophy to the elucidation of the vast domain of History. That such an application is possible,—or in other words, that there is a Plan in the Divine Government of the World, and that this Plan is recognisable by the human mind,—is a principle which cannot be doubted by any one who has in reality cast off the vain theories of mere Chance and Necessity, and has truly accepted the belief in an Intelligent Principle of the Universe. But although the existence of such a Plan must be acknowledged by every serious Thinker, and even lies at the root of all Earnestness and all Religion, it requires a mind of no ordinary stamp to rise to the conception of this Plan, and to trace its progress throughout the mysterious course of events. This Fichte has attempted to do,—with what success, it must be left to the judgment of the reader to determine for himself. The Student of History will gladly avail himself of the light which Divine Philosophy can shed upon the dim and often trackless path of his inquiry; and the Philosopher will joyfully emerge, for a while, from the retirement of formula, to gaze with delight upon the living current of History, irradiated by the same Light which has guided his secret studies, and has been to him a pillar of fire amid the desert of narrow opinions and grovelling theories. And every genuine Thinker will receive with an earnest welcome these words of one who, amid

no ordinary difficulties and discouragements, ranked second to none in his unswerving devotion to Truth, and his noble championship of Philosophy.

It is the purpose of the writer to follow up this publication, at a future period, by a translation of the "Anweiſung zum Seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre" (the Doctrine of Religion.) This work forms the completion of a course of popular writings, of which the "Nature of the Scholar" (already published) and the present volume constitute other other portions, and, as containing the highest development of Fichte's Philosophy, will form an appropriate close to this series of translations from his more popular works.

Edinburgh, *September* 1847.

ERRATA.

Page 8, line 6 from bottom, *dele* "a"
„ 20, „ 10 „ „ *for* "comhension" *read* "comprehension."
„ 34, head line, *for* "Lecture II." *read* "Lecture III."
„ 105, line 2 from bottom, *for* "cultivated" *read* "constituted."
„ 192, „ 7 „ „ *for* "treasures" *read* "treasuries."

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PREFACE.

THE true purpose and object of the following Lectures is, I believe, sufficiently obvious of itself; and should any one stand in need of a clearer index thereto, I would advise him to take the Seventeenth Lecture as a Preface. In the same way, the determination to print them, and to communicate them to the General Public, must also speak for itself; and should it not do so, any other recommendation of them would be thrown away. Thus, with respect to the appearance of this work, I have nothing further to say to the Public, than that I have nothing to say.

Fichte.

BERLIN, *March* 1806.

LECTURE I.

IDEA OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY.

We now enter upon a series of meditations which, nevertheless, at bottom contains only a single thought, constituting of itself one organic whole. If I could at once communicate to you this single thought in the same clearness with which it must necessarily be present to my own mind before I could begin my undertaking, and with which it must guide me in every word which I have now to address to you, then from the first step of our progress, perfect light would overspread the whole path which we have to pursue together. But I am compelled gradually, and in your own sight, to build up this single thought out of its several parts, disengaging it at the same time from various modifying elements: this is the necessary condition of every communication of thought, and only by this its fundamental law does that, which in itself is but one single thought, become expanded and broken up into a series of thoughts and meditations.

Such being the case, and especially as I am not here to repeat what has been already known of old, but to give forth new views of things,—I must request of you at the outset not to be surprised if our subject do not at first manifest that clearness which, according to the laws of all communication of thought, it can only acquire through

subsequent development; and I must entreat you to look for perfect light only at our conclusion, when a complete survey of the whole shall have become possible. Nevertheless it is the duty of every man who undertakes to propound any subject whatever, to take care that each separate thought assume its proper place in his arrangement, and be produced there with all the distinctness which it is possible to throw around it in that place,—at least for those who are accustomed to refined language, and capable of following a connected discourse; and I shall use my most earnest efforts to fulfil this duty.

With this first and only premonition, let us now, without farther delay, proceed to our subject.

A philosophical picture of the Present Age is what we have promised in these lectures. But that view only can be called philosophical which refers back the multiform phenomena which lie before us in experience to the unity of one common principle, and, on the other hand, from that one principle, can deduce and completely explain those phenomena. The mere Empiricist, who should undertake a description of the Age, would seize upon some of its most striking phenomena, just as they presented themselves to casual observation, and recount these, without having any assured conviction that he had understood them all, and without being able to point out any other connexion between them than their coëxistence in one and the same time. The Philosopher who should propose to himself the task of such a description, would, independently of all experience, seek out an Idea of the Age (which indeed in its own form, —*as Idea*,—cannot be apparent in experience), and exhibit the mode in which this Idea would reveal itself under the forms of the necessary phenomena of the Age; and in so doing he would distinctly exhaust the circle of these phenomena, and bring them forth in necessary connexion with each other, through the common Idea which lies at the

bottom of them all. The first would be the *Chronicler* of the age; the second would have made a *History* of it a possible thing.

In the first place, if the Philosopher must deduce from the Unity of his presupposed principle all the possible phenomena of experience, it is obvious that in the fulfilment of this purpose he does not require the aid of experience; that in following it out he proceeds merely as a Philosopher, confining himself strictly within the limits which that character imposes upon him, paying no respect whatever to experience, and thus absolutely *a priori*, as this method is termed in scientific phraseology;—and in respect to our own subject it is clear that he must be able *a priori* to describe Time as a whole, and all its possible Epochs. It is an entirely different question whether the *present time* be actually characterized by the phenomena that are deduced from the principle which he may lay down, and thus whether the Age so pictured by the speaker be really the present Age,—should he maintain such a position, as we, for example, shall maintain it. On this part of the subject every man must consult for himself the experience of his life, and compare it with the history of the Past, as well as his anticipations of the Future; for here the business of the Philosopher is at an end, and that of the Observer of the world and of men begins. We, for our part, intend to be no more than philosophers in this place, and have bound ourselves to nothing more; and thus the final judgment, so soon as you are in a position to pass such a judgment, must devolve upon you. It is now our business, in the first place, strictly to settle and define our theme.

Thus then: Every particular Epoch of time, as we have already hinted above, is the fundamental Idea of a particular Age. These Epochs and fundamental Ideas of particular Ages, however, can only be thoroughly understood by and through each other, and by means of their relation to Universal Time. Hence it is clear that the Philosopher, in order

to be able rightly to characterize any individual Age, and, if he will, his own, must first have understood *a priori*, and thoroughly penetrated into the signification of Universal Time, and all its possible Epochs.

This comprehension of Universal Time, like all philosophical comprehension, again presupposes a fundamental Idea of Time; an Idea of a fore-ordered, although only gradually unfolding, accomplishment of Time, in which each successive period is determined by the preceding;—or, to express this more shortly and in more common phraseology,—it presupposes a *World-plan*, which, in its primitive unity, may be clearly comprehended, and from which may be correctly deduced all the great Epochs of human life on Earth, so that they may be distinctly understood both in their origin, and in their connexion with each other. The former,—the World-plan,—is the fundamental Idea of the entire life of Man on Earth; the latter,—the chief Epochs of this life,—are the fundamental Ideas of particular Ages, from which again the phenomena of which we have spoken are to be deduced.

We have thus, in the first place, a fundamental Idea of the entire life of Man, dividing itself into different Epochs, which can only be understood by and through each other; each of which Epochs is again the fundamental Idea of a particular Age, and is revealed in manifold phenomena therein.

The life of Mankind *on this Earth* stands here in place of the *One Universal Life*, and *Earthly Time* in place of *Universal Time;*—such are the limits within which we are confined by the proposed popular character of our discourses, since it is impossible to speak at once profoundly and popularly of the Heavenly and Eternal. Here, I say, and in these discourses only, shall this be so; for, strictly speaking, and in the higher flights of speculation, Human Life on Earth, and Earthly Time itself, are but necessary Epochs of the One Time and of the One Eternal Life;—and this Earthly

Life with all its subordinate divisions may be deduced from the fundamental Idea of the ETERNAL LIFE already accessible to us here below. It is our present voluntary limitation alone which forbids us to undertake this strictly demonstrable deduction, and permits us here only to declare the fundamental Idea of the Earthly Life, requesting every hearer to bring this Idea to the test of his own sense of truth, and, if he can, to approve it thereby. Life of MANKIND on Earth, we have said, and Epochs of this Life. We speak here only of the progressive Life of the *Race*, not of the *Individual*, which last in all these discourses shall remain untouched,—and I beg of you never to lose sight of this, our proper point of view.

The Idea of a World-Plan is thus implied in our inquiry, which, however, I am not at this time to deduce from the fundamental Idea indicated above, but only to point out. I say therefore,—and so lay the foundation of our rising edifice,—*the End of the Life of Mankind on Earth is this,—that in this Life they may order all their relations with* FREEDOM *according to* REASON.

With FREEDOM, I have said;—their own Freedom,—the Freedom of Mankind in their collective capacity,—*as a Race:*—and this freedom is the first accessory condition of our fundamental principle which I intend at present to pursue, leaving the other conditions, which may likewise need explanation, to the subsequent lectures. This Freedom becomes apparent in the collective consciousness of the Race, and it appears there as the proper and peculiar Freedom of the Race;—as a true and real fact;—the product of the Race during its Life and proceeding from its Life, so that the absolute existence of the Race itself is necessarily implied in the existence of this fact and product thus attributed to it. (If a certain person has done something, it is unquestionably implied in that fact that the person has been in existence prior to the deed, in order

that he might form the resolution so to act; and also during the accomplishment of the deed, in order that he might carry his previous resolution into effect; and every one would accept the proof of *non-existence* at a particular time, as equivalent to the proof of *non-activity* at the same time. In the same way,—if Mankind, as a Race, has done something, and appeared as the actor in such deed, this act must necessarily imply the existence of the Race at a time when the act had not yet been accomplished.)

As an immediate consequence of this remark, the Life of Mankind on Earth divides itself, according to the fundamental Idea which we have laid down, into two principal Epochs or Ages:—the one, in which the Race exists and lives without as yet having ordered its relations with FREEDOM according to REASON; and the other, in which this Voluntary and Reasonable arrangement has been brought about.

To begin our farther inquiry with the first Epoch;—it does not follow, because the Race has not yet, *by its own free act*, ordered its relations according to Reason, that therefore these relations are not ordered by Reason; and hence the one assertion is by no means to be confounded with the other. It is possible that Reason of itself, by its own power, and without the coöperation of human Freedom, may have determined and ordered the relations of Mankind. And so it is in reality. Reason is the first law of the Life of a Race of Men, as of all Spiritual Life; and in this sense and in no other shall the word 'Reason' be used in these lectures. Without the living activity of this law, a Race of Men could never have come into existence; or, even if it could be supposed to have attained to being, it could not, without this activity, maintain its existence for a single moment. Hence, where Reason cannot as yet work by Freedom, as in the first Epoch, it acts as a law or power of Nature; and thus may be visibly present in consciousness and

active there, only without insight into the grounds of its activity; or in other words, may exist as mere feeling, for so we call consciousness without insight.

In short, to express this in common language: — Reason acts as *blind Instinct*, where it cannot as yet act through Free Will. It acts thus in the first Epoch of the Life of Mankind on Earth; and this first Epoch is thereby more closely characterized and more strictly defined.

By means of this stricter definition of the first Epoch we are also enabled, by contrast, more strictly to define the second. Instinct is *blind;* — a consciousness without insight. Freedom, as the opposite of Instinct, is thus *seeing*, and clearly conscious of the grounds of its activity. But the sole ground of this free activity is Reason; — Freedom is thus conscious of Reason, of which Instinct was unconscious. Hence between the dominion of Reason through mere Instinct, and the dominion of the same Reason through Freedom, there arises an intermediate condition, — *the Consciousness or Science of Reason.*

But further: — Instinct as a blind impulse excludes Science; hence the birth of Science presupposes a liberation from the compulsive power of Instinct as already accomplished; and thus between the dominion of Reason as Instinct and that of Reason as Science there is interposed a third condition, — *that of Liberation from Reason as Instinct.*

But how could humanity free itself, or even wish to free itself, from that Instinct which is the law of its existence, and rules it with beloved and unobtrusive power? — or how could the *one* Reason which while it speaks in Instinct, is likewise active in the impulse towards Freedom, — how could this *same* Reason come into conflict and opposition with itself in human life? Clearly not directly; and hence a new medium must intervene between the dominion of Reason as Instinct, and the impulse to cast off that dominion. This medium arises in the following way: — the

results of Reason as Instinct are seized upon by the more powerful individuals of the Race;—in whom, on this very account, that Instinct speaks in its loudest and fullest tones, as the natural but precipitate desire to elevate the whole race to the level of their own greatness, or rather to put themselves in the room and place of the Race;—and by them it is changed into an *external ruling Authority*, upheld through outward constraint; and then among other men Reason awakes in another form—*as the impulse towards Personal Freedom*,—which, although it never opposes the mild rule of the inward Instinct which it loves, yet rises in rebellion against the pressure of a stranger Instinct which has usurped its rights; and in this awakening it breaks the chains,—not of Reason as Instinct itself,—but of the Instinct of foreign natures clothed in the garb of external power. And thus the change of the individual Instinct into a compulsive Authority becomes the medium between the dominion of Reason as Instinct, and the liberation from that dominion.

And finally, to complete this enumeration of the necessary divisions and Epochs of the Earthly Life of our Race:—We have said that through liberation from the dominion of Reason as *Instinct*, the *Science* of Reason becomes possible. By the laws of this Science, all the relations of Mankind must be ordered and directed by *their own free act*. But it is obvious that mere cognizance of the law, which nevertheless is all that Science of itself can give us, is not sufficient for the attainment of this purpose, but that there is also needed a peculiar knowledge of action, which can only be thoroughly acquired by practice,—in a a word, *Art*. This Art of ordering the whole relations of Mankind according to that Reason which has been already scientifically comprehended, (for in this higher sense we shall always use the word Art when we employ it without explanatory remark)—this Art must be universally applied to all the relations of Mankind, and manifested therein,—

until the Race become a perfect image of its everlasting archetype in Reason;—and then shall the purpose of this Earthly Life be attained, its end become apparent, and Mankind enter upon the higher spheres of Eternity.

Thus have we endeavoured to pre-figure the whole Earthly Life of Man by a comprehension of its purpose;—to perceive *why* our Race had to begin its Existence here, and by this means to describe the whole present Life of humankind:—this is what we wished to do,—it was our first task. There are, according to this view, *Five* Principal Epochs of Earthly Life, each of which, although taking its rise in the life of the individual, must yet, in order to become an Epoch in the Life of the Race, gradually lay hold of and interpenetrate all Men; and to that end must endure throughout a long period of time, so that the great Whole of Life is spread out into Ages which sometimes seem to cross, sometimes to run parallel with each other:—1*st*, The Epoch of the unlimited dominion of Reason as Instinct:—*the State of Innocence of the Human Race.* 2*d*, The Epoch in which Reason as Instinct is changed into an external ruling Authority;—the Age of positive Systems of life and doctrine, which never go back to their ultimate foundations, and hence have no power to convince, but on the contrary merely desire to compel, and which demand blind faith and unconditional obedience:—*the State of progressive Sin.* 3*d*, The Epoch of Liberation,—*directly* from the external ruling Authority—*indirectly* from the power of Reason as Instinct, and *generally* from Reason in any form;—the Age of absolute indifference towards all truth, and of entire and unrestrained licentiousness:—*the State of completed Sinfulness.* 4*th*, The Epoch of Reason as Science;—the Age in which Truth is looked upon as the *highest*, and loved before all other things:—*the State of progressive Justification.* 5*th*, The Epoch of Reason as Art;—the Age in which Humanity with more sure and unerring hand builds itself up into a fitting image and

representative of Reason:—*the State of completed Justification and Santification.* Thus, the whole progress which, upon this view, Humanity makes here below, is only a retrogression to the point on which it stood at first, and has nothing in view save that return to its original condition. But Humanity must make this journey on its own feet; by its own strength it must bring itself back to that state in which it was once before without its own coöperation, and which, for that very purpose, it must first of all leave. If Humanity could not of itself re-create its own true being, then would it possess no real Life; and then were there indeed no real Life at all, but all things would remain dead, rigid, immoveable. In Paradise,—to use a well-known picture,—in the Paradise of innocence and well-being, without knowledge, without labour, without art, Humanity awakes to life. Scarcely has it gathered courage to venture upon independent existence, when the Angel comes with the fiery sword of compulsion to good, and drives it forth from the seat of its innocence and its peace. Fugitive and irresolute it wanders through the empty waste, scarcely daring to plant its foot firmly anywhere, lest the ground should sink beneath it. Grown bolder by necessity, it settles in some poor corner, and in the sweat of its brow roots out the thorns and thistles of barbarism from the soil on which it would rear the beloved fruit of knowledge. Enjoyment opens its eyes and strengthens its hands, and it builds a Paradise for itself, after the image of that which it has lost;—the tree of Life arises; it stretches forth its hand to the fruit, and eats, and lives in Immortality.

This is the delineation of Earthly Life, as a whole and in all its various Epochs, which is necessary for our present purpose. As surely as our present Age is a part of this Earthly Life, which no one can doubt;—and farther, as surely as there are no other possible Epochs of the Earthly Life but the five which we have announced,—so surely

does our Present Age belong to one of these. It shall be my business to point out, according to my knowledge and experience of the world, to which of these five it belongs, and to unfold the necessary phenomena in which the principles above stated must manifest themselves;—and it will be yours to consider and observe whether you have not encountered these phenomena during your whole life both internal and external, and do not still encounter them;—and this shall be the business of our future lectures.

The Present Age considered *as a whole*, I mean;—for since, as I have remarked above, different Ages may, in perfect accordance with their spiritual principle, coëxist in one and the same chronological Time, and even cross or run parallel to each other in different individuals,—so it may be anticipated that such will be the case in our own Age, and hence that the application of our *a priori* principle to the present condition of the world and of humanity may not embrace all men alive in the present Time, but only those who are truly products of the Age, and in whom it most completely reveals itself. One may be behind his Time, because in the course of his culture he has not come into contact with a sufficiently extensive mass of his fellow-men, but has been trained in some narrow circle, which is only a remnant of a former Age. Another may be in advance of his Age, and bear in his breast the germs of a new Time, while that which has become old to him still rules around him in true, actual, present and efficient power. Finally,—Science raises itself above all Ages and all Times, embracing and apprehending the One Unchanging Time as the higher source of all Ages and Epochs, and grasping that vast idea in its free, unbounded comprehension. None of these three can be included in the picture of *any* present Age.

The object of our lectures in this course, during the present winter, is now strictly defined, and, as it seems to me, clearly enough set forth and announced;—and such

was the purpose of to-day's address. Allow me, further, a few words on the external form of these discourses.

Whatever may be our judgment upon the Present Age, and in whatever Epoch we may feel ourselves compelled to place it, you are to expect here neither the tone of lamentation nor of satire, particularly of a personal description. Not of lamentation:—for it is the sweetest reward of Philosophy that, looking upon all things in their mutual dependence, and upon nothing as isolated and alone, she finds all to be necessary and therefore good, and accepts that which is, as it is, because it is subservient to a higher end. Besides, it is unmanly to waste in lamentation over existing evil, the time which would be more wisely applied in striving, so far as in us lies, to create the Good and the Beautiful.—Not of satire:—an infirmity which affects the whole race, is no proper object for the scorn of an individual who belongs to that race, and who, before he could expose it, must himself have been its slave. But individuals disappear altogether from the view of the philosopher, and are lost in the one great commonwealth. His thought embraces all objects in a clear and consequential light, which they can never attain amid the endless fluctuations of reality;—hence it does not concern itself with individuals, and never descending to portraits, dwells in the higher sphere of idealized conception. As to the advantages derivable from considerations of this kind, it will be better to leave you to judge for yourselves after you have gone through some considerable portion of them, than to say much in praise of them beforehand. No one is further than the philosopher from the vain desire that his Age should be impelled forward to some obvious extent through his exertions. Every one, indeed, to whom God has given strength and opportunity, should exert all his powers for this end, were it only for his own sake, and in order to maintain the place which has been assigned to him in the ever-flowing current of existence. For the rest, Time rolls on in the steadfast

course marked out for it from eternity, and individual effort can neither hasten nor retard its progress. Only the co-operation of all, and especially of the indwelling Eternal Spirit of Ages and of Worlds, may promote it.

As to my present labours, it will be to me a flattering reward, if a cultivated and intelligent audience shall pass a few hours of this half year in an agreeable and worthy manner, raised above the business and pleasures of every-day life into a freer and purer region, — a more spiritual atmosphere. Above all, should it happen that, upon some young and powerful mind, a spark may fall which shall dwell and live there, and perhaps develope my feeble thoughts into better and more perfect results, and kindle a vigorous determination to realize them, — then would my reward be complete.

In this spirit, I have been induced to invite you to such lectures as the present; in this spirit, I now take my leave of you, and leave it to your own judgment whether you desire to proceed further in my company.

LECTURE II.

GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE THIRD AGE.

In the first place, let him who desires to be met with the same honest purpose which I presume leads him here, cast back a kindly glance upon our former lecture. Many individuals in this assembly have not been able altogether to follow the greater part of that which I said at the beginning of my former address. In so far as this may have any other cause than want of acquaintance with the style, voice, and manner of the lecturer, and the novelty of the whole situation,—all of which must be overcome at once by a few minutes' custom,—allow me, as some consolation should the like happen again, to add the following:—That which these individuals have been unable thoroughly to comprehend, does not so much belong to the subject itself, as to the practice of the art which we now employ,—the art of philosophizing. It is serviceable to us in finding an introduction and commencement in the circle of other knowledge, from which to set forth our subject, and in strictly defining our point of separation from this system of knowledge; it is a part of the account which we teachers and masters must render of our manner of working. Every other art,—as poetry, music, painting,—may be practised without the process showing forth the rules according to which it is conducted;—but in the self-cognizant art of the philosopher, no step can be taken without declaring the grounds upon which it proceeds; and in it theory and

practice go hand in hand. It was necessary for me to proceed in this way on the former occasion, and in similar circumstances I must proceed in the same way again. But if any one choose to admit beforehand, and without farther proof, that I proceed correctly and according to the rules of my art, and will calmly and candidly test that which I have laid down as the foundation of the edifice by his own natural sense of truth, such an one will lose nothing essential by thus avoiding the scientific explanation; and it will be perfectly sufficient for our present purpose if, out of that which we laid down in our former lecture, he has thoroughly understood and accepted the following propositions, and has retained them in his memory, so that he may connect with them what we have further to lay before you.

He must, I say, thoroughly understand, accept, and keep in mind the following:—The life of the Human Race does not depend upon blind chance, nor is it, as is often superficially pretended, everywhere alike; so that it has always been as it is now, and will always so remain; but it proceeds and moves onward according to a settled plan which *must* necessarily be fulfilled, and therefore *shall* certainly be fulfilled. This plan is—that the Race shall in this Life *and with freedom* mould and cultivate itself into a pure and express Image of Reason. The whole Life of Man is divided —I am now supposing that the strict derivation of this has not been thoroughly understood, or has been forgotten,—the whole Life of Man is divided into *five* principal Epochs:— that in which Reason governs in the form of blind Instinct; —that in which this Instinct is changed into an external ruling Authority; that in which the dominion of this Authority, and with it that of Reason itself, is overthrown; that in which Reason and its laws are understood with clear scientific consciousness; and finally, that in which all the relations of the Race shall be directed and ordered by perfect Art and perfect Freedom according to Reason:—and in order to impress these different Epochs firmly upon your memory

by means of a sensuous representation, we made use of the universally known picture of Paradise. Further, he must understand that our Present Age, to which especially our present purpose refers, must fall within one or other of these five Epochs; that we have now to set forth the fundamental Idea of this Epoch, distinguishing it from the other four, which, except for the purposes of illustrating our own, we may here lay out of view; and that from this fundamental Idea we must deduce the peculiar phenomena of the Age as its necessary consequences. At this point our second lecture begins.

And so let us set forth with declaring at what point of the whole Earthly life of the Race we place our Present Age. I, for my part, hold that the Present Age stands precisely in the middle of Universal Time; and as we may characterize the two first Epochs of our scheme (in which Reason rules first *directly* as Instinct, and then *indirectly* as Instinct through Authority) as the one Epoch of the dominion of *blind or unconscious Reason;*—and in like manner the two last Epochs in our scheme (in which Reason first appears as Science, and then, by means of Art, enters upon the government of Life) as the one Epoch of the dominion of *seeing or conscious Reason;*—so the Present Age unites the ends of two essentially different Worlds,—the World of Darkness and that of Light,—the World of Constraint and that of Freedom,—without itself belonging to either of them. In other words, the Present Age, according to my view of it, stands in that Epoch which in my former lecture I named the THIRD, and which I characterized as *the Epoch of Liberation—directly from the external ruling Authority,—indirectly from the power of Reason as Instinct, and generally from Reason in any form; the Age of absolute indifference towards all truth, and of entire and unrestrained licentiousness:—the state of completed sinfulness.* Our Age stands, I think, in this Epoch, taken with the limitations which I have already laid down, namely, that

I do not here include all men now living in our time, but only those who are truly products of the Age, and in whom it most completely reveals itself.

Let this then be now said, and said once for all. It was needful that I should say this once, for this my declared opinion is the only ground why I select for investigation that Epoch which I now take up, leaving the other four out of view;—otherwise I must have entered upon all five, or at least selected some other one for consideration. But I can here only announce this opinion, not prove it. The proof lies out of the domain of the Philosopher, and belongs to that of the observer of the world and of men;—and this character I do not wish to assume here. I have said this now once for all.—I now proceed calmly and without restriction, as becomes a philosopher, to that higher principle which we have already laid down as the fundamental principle of any Age whatsoever, not as something of our own devising, but as deduced from the primitive conception of an Earthly Life; and from thence infer whatever may justly be inferred as to the form and phenomena of a life founded upon this principle. Whether the life which now exists before your eyes resemble that which I, guided only by the laws of syllogistic reasoning, shall deduce *a priori* from that principle,—this inquiry, as I have already said, belongs to you;—you must resolve it upon your own responsibility, and whatever you may or may not say on the subject, I shall have no part in it. If, according to your judgment, I have hit the mark, it is well;—if not, we shall at least have philosophized; and philosophized, if not upon the present, yet upon some other possible and necessary Age;—and so our labour not be wholly lost.

The Present Age, I have said, without further explanation; and it is sufficient at the outset if, without any stricter definition, these words shall be understood to mean the time in which we, who now live and think and speak to each other, do actually exist and live. It is by no means my

purpose at present to mark out the centuries, or even cycles, which may have elapsed since that which I call the present Age first appeared in the world. Obviously, an Age can only be judged and understood by observation of those nations who stand at the head of the civilization of their time: but as civilization has wandered from people to people, so, with this civilization, an Age too may have wandered from people to people, remaining unchangeably one and the same in principle amid all variety of climate and of soil; and so likewise, in virtue of its purpose of uniting all nations into one great commonwealth, may the idea of some important portion of chronological Time be arrested and detained upon the stage, and thus, as it were, the Time-current be compelled to a pause. Especially may this be the case with an Age like that which we have to describe, throughout which adverse worlds meet and struggle with each other, and slowly strive to attain an equilibrium, and thereby to secure the peaceful extinction of the elder time. But, it is only after we have acquired a more intimate knowledge of the *principle* of the Age, and have learned at the same time how history is to be questioned, and what we have to seek from her, that it will be useful or proper for us to adduce, from the history of the actual world, whatever may be necessary for our purpose, and may serve to guard us from error. Not whether our words, had they been uttered centuries ago, would then have depicted reality,—nor whether they shall picture it forth after centuries have passed away,—but only whether they *now* represent it truly, is the question which is proposed for your final decision.

So much by way of preface to our first task,—to unfold the principle of the Age;—now to the solution of this problem. I have laid down this principle as *Liberation from the compulsion of the blind Authority exercised by Reason as Instinct;—Liberation* being understood to mean the state in which the Race *gradually* works out its own Freedom,—now in this, now in that individual,—now from this, now from

that object with respect to which Authority has hitherto held it in chains;—not that in which it already *is free*, but at most only that in which those who stand at the head of the Age, and seek to guide, direct, and elevate the others, are, or imagine themselves to be, free. The instrument of this liberation from Authority is Understanding; for the characteristic of Instinct as opposed to Understanding consists in this,—that it is blind; and the characteristic of Authority, by means of which Instinct has governed in the preceding Age, is this,—that it demands unquestioning faith and obedience. Hence the fundamental maxim of those who stand at the head of this Age, and therefore the *principle* of the Age, is this,—*to accept nothing as really existing or obligatory, but that which they can understand and clearly comprehend.*

With regard to this fundamental principle, as we have now declared and adopted it without farther definition or limitation, this *third* Age is precisely similar to that which is to follow it,—the *fourth*, or age of Reason as Science,—and by virtue of this similarity prepares the way for it. Before the tribunal of Science, too, nothing is accepted but the Conceivable. Only in the *application* of the principle there is *this* difference between the two Ages,—that the *third*, which we shall shortly name *that of Empty Freedom*, makes its fixed and previously acquired conceptions the measure of existence; while the *fourth—that of Science*—on the contrary, makes existence the measure, not of its acquired, but of its desiderated beliefs. To the former there *is* nothing but what it already *comprehends:* the latter strives to *comprehend*, and does comprehend, all that *is*. The latter —the Age of Science—penetrates to all things without exception;—to the Conceivable, as well as that which still remains absolutely Unconceivable:—to the first, the Conceivable, so as thereby to order the relations of the Race;—to the second, the Unconceivable, in order to assure itself that all the Conceivable is exhausted, and that it is now in posses-

sion of the limits of the Conceivable. The former—the Age of Empty Freedom—does not know that man must first through labour, industry, and art, learn *how to know;* but it has a certain fixed standard for all conceptions, and an established *Common Sense of Mankind* always ready and at hand, innate within itself and there present without trouble on its part;—and those conceptions and this Common Sense are to it the measure of the efficient and the real. It has this great advantage over the Age of Science, that it knows all things without having learned anything; and can pass judgment upon whatever comes before it at once and without hesitation,—without needing any preliminary evidence:—'That which I do not immediately comprehend by the conceptions which dwell within me, is nothing,'—says Empty Freedom:—'That which I do not comprehend through the Absolute, Self-comprehensive Idea, is nothing,'—says Science.

You perceive that this age is founded upon an actually present conception,—an inborn Common Sense, which pronounces irrevocably upon its whole system of knowledge and belief; and if we could thoroughly analyze this inborn conception or sense, which is thus to it the root of everything else, we should then, undoubtedly, be able to take in the whole system of the beliefs of the Age at a single glance, perceive the inmost spirit beneath all its outward wrappings, and bring it forth to view. Let it be now our task to acquire this knowledge;—and for this purpose I now invite you to the comhension of a deep-lying proposition.

This namely:—The third Age throws off the yoke of Reason as Instinct ruling through the imposition of outward Authority. This Reason as Instinct, however, as we have already remarked, embraces only the relations and life of the Race as such, not the life of the Individual. In the latter the natural impulse of self-preservation and personal well-being alone prevails;—this assertion follows from our first. Hence an Age which has thrown off the former, or in other words Reason as Instinct, without accepting Reason in any

other form in its stead, has absolutely nothing remaining except the life of the Individual, and whatever is connected with or related to that. Let us further explain this weighty conclusion, which is of essential importance to our future inquiries.

We have said that Reason as Instinct, and generally that Reason in any form, embraces only the life and relations of the Race. To wit,—and this is a principle the proof of which cannot be brought forward here, but which is produced only as an axiom borrowed from the higher philosophy, where the strict proof of it may be found,—there is but ONE LIFE, even in reference to the existing subject; *i. e.* there is everywhere but ONE animating power, ONE Living Reason;—*not*, as we are accustomed to hear the unity of Reason asserted and admitted, that Reason is the one homogeneous and self-accordant faculty and property of reasonable beings, who do nevertheless exist already upon their own account, and to whose being this property of Reason is only superadded as a foreign ingredient, without which they might, at any rate, still have been;—*but*, that Reason is the only possible independent and self-sustaining Existence and Life, of which all that seems to us to exist and live is but a modification, definition, variety, and form. To you this principle is not altogether new, for it was already contained in the definition of Reason which I laid before you in our first lecture, to which I then particularly directed your attention, and besought you to fix it in your mind. And now to explain this principle somewhat further, so that I may at least make it historically clear to you, although I cannot prove it in this place:—it is the greatest error, and the true ground of all the other errors which make this Age their sport, that each individual imagines that he can exist, live, think, and act for himself, and believes that he himself is the thinking principle of his thoughts; whereas in truth he is but a single ray of the ONE universal and necessary Thought. I shall not by any means be sur-

prised if it should appear to you that in making this assertion I have uttered a monstrous paradox. I know too well that such an opinion must arise, because we can only speak *of* the present Age *to* the present Age;—and, if I do not err, the fundamental character of the Age consists in this, that it knows not the principle of which I have spoken, or holds it, when announced, in the highest degree incredible and absurd. This principle is, however, absolutely incontrovertible upon any other ground than that of the mere feeling of personality; the existence of which as a fact of consciousness we by no means deny, since we ourselves experience it as well as others. But we do most earnestly deny the validity of this feeling when the question respects truth and real existence, in the firm conviction that such questions must be decided upon quite other grounds than the deceptive revelations of consciousness; and we are perfectly able, in the proper time and place, to justify this our denial upon decisive grounds. Here, however, we can only announce this principle, and historically communicate it to you; and it is necessary to do this, because only by means of it can we separate ourselves from the Age and rise superior to it, and no one can truly characterize the Age nor comprehend its characteristics, who does not so raise himself above it. Hence I must entreat you to accept this principle in the meantime upon trust, until I shall be able to lead you, in a popular way, to at least a tacit admission of it, which I shall do in my next lecture.

It is only by and to mere Earthly and Finite perception, that this one and homogeneous Life of Reason is broken up and divided into separate individual persons; the ground of which division, as well as its form and mode, are to be found in the higher philosophy;—which individual persons exist and are in no other way than in this Earthly and Finite perception, and by means of it;—not at all in themselves, or independent of Earthly and Finite perception. You see here the origin of the division of the One Life of

Reason into individual life, and the ground of the necessity which there is, for all who have not raised themselves by Science above mere Earthly and Finite perception, to continue in the faith of this personal existence.

(In order that this principle may not be misunderstood in a sense entirely opposed to my meaning, I add the following;—but merely in passing, and without any connexion with my present subject:—The Earthly and Finite perception, as the outwork and scaffolding of the Eternal Life, endures, at least in memory, in the Eternal Life itself, as well as all that is contained therein,—and therefore, all the individual persons into whom the One Reason is divided by this Earthly and Finite perception. Hence, far from anything arising out of my principle against the continuation of personal existence, this principle furnishes the only sufficient proof of it. And—to express it briefly and distinctly—persons endure through Eternity as they exist now, *i.e.* as the necessary phenomena of Earthly and Finite perception; but in all Eternity they can never become,—what they never were nor are,—independent beings.)

After this short digression, let us return to our task. The One and homogeneous Life of Reason of which we have spoken, dividing itself, to mere Earthly and Finite perception, into different individual lives, and hence assuming the form of the collective life of a Race, is, as above stated, founded at first upon Reason as Instinct, and as such regulated by its own essential law;—and this continues until Science steps in and clearly comprehends this law in all its varied aspects, demonstrates and establishes it, and so makes it evident to all men;—and after Science has done its part, then by Art is it built up into Reality. In this fundamental law lie all those higher Ideas which belong to the One Life, or to the form which the One Life here assumes,—viz. the Race:—which Ideas altogether transcend Individuality, and indeed radically subvert it. Where this fundamental law does not prevail under one form or another,

there can Humanity never attain to the One Life,—to the Race; and hence nothing remains but Individuality as the only actual and efficient power. An Age which has set itself free from Reason as Instinct, the first principle of the Life of the Race, and does not yet possess Science, the second principle of that Life, must find itself in this position;—with nothing remaining in it but mere naked Individuality. The Race, which alone possesses real existence, is here changed into a mere empty abstraction which has no true life except in the artificial conceptions of some individual, founded only on the strength of his own imaginings; and there is no other Whole, and indeed no other conceivable Whole, except a patchwork of individual parts, possessing no essential and organic Unity.

This individual and personal life, which is thus all that remains in such an Age, is governed by the impulse towards self-preservation and personal well-being; and Nature goes no further in Man than this impulse. She bestows upon the animals a special Instinct to guide them to the *means* of their preservation and well-being, but she sends forth Man almost wholly uninstructed on this point, and refers him for guidance to his Understanding and his Experience; and therefore it could not fail that this latter should in the course of time, during the first two Epochs, assume a cultivated form, and gradually become an Established Art;—the Art, namely, of promoting to the utmost self-preservation and personal well-being. This form of Reason,—this mass of Conceptions,—the results, present in the general consciousness of the Time, of the Art of Being and Well-Being, is what the third Age encounters at its advent;—this is the universal and natural Common Sense, which it receives without labour or toil of its own, as its hereditary patrimony; which is born with it like its hunger and its thirst, and which it now applies as the undoubted standard of all existence and all worth.

Our first problem is solved;—the significance of the

Third Epoch is, as we promised that it should be, dragged forth from its concealment and brought forward into open day, and we cannot now fail in likewise reproducing its systems of faith and practice with as much accuracy and sequence as it could itself exhibit in their construction. In the first place,—the fundamental maxim of the Age, as already announced, is now better defined, and it is clear that from its asserted principle 'What I do not comprehend, that *is* not,' there must necessarily follow this other:—'Now I comprehend nothing whatever except that which pertains to my own personal existence and well-being;—hence there *is* nothing more than this, and the whole world exists for nothing else than this,—that I should *be*, and *be happy*. Whatever I do not comprehend as bearing upon this object, *is* not,—does not concern me.'

This mode of thought is *either* operative only in a practical way, as the concealed and unconscious, but nevertheless true and real, motive of the ordinary doings of the Age, —*or* it elevates itself to theory. So long as it only assumes the first form, it cannot easily be laid hold of and compelled to avow its real nature, but generally retains a sufficient number of lurking holes and ways of escape; it has not yet become a specific Epoch, but is only in the early stages of its development. So soon, however, as, having become theory, it understands itself, admits its own proper significance, and loves, approves, and takes pride in itself, and indeed accounts itself the highest and only truth, then does it assume the distinct Epochal character, reveal itself in all the phenomena of the Age, and may now be thoroughly comprehended by its own admissions.

We have already remarked that Nature has not bestowed upon Man, as it has upon Animals, a particular instinct whereby he may be led to the means of his preservation and well-being. This being the case, and also because nothing can be learned upon this subject from *a priori* Ideas, which only relate to the One and Everlasting Life of

the Race, it follows, that in this province nothing remains for man but to try, or to let others try at their own proper cost, what is good for him and what evil, and to note the result for his guidance at some future time. Hence it is quite natural and necessary that an Age whose whole theory of the world is exhausted in the means of personal existence, should value Experience as the only possible source of Knowledge, since those very means, which are all that such an Age can or will recognise, are only to be recognised through Experience. In mere Experience,—from which however we must carefully distinguish scientific *Observation* and *Experiment*, with which an *a priori* Idea is always associated, that, namely, of the object of inquiry,—in *mere* Experience there is contained nothing but the means of physical preservation, and on the other hand these means can only be recognised by Experience:—hence it is Experience alone from which this Age derives its views of the world; and the world again, as seen by it, points to Experience as its sole original;—and thus both react upon each other with the same result. Therefore such an Age is obliged to deny and deride all the knowledge which we possess *a priori* and independent of Experience, and the assertion that from knowledge itself, without intermixture of any sensuous element, new knowledge may arise and burst forth. Did it possess Ideas of a higher world and its order, then it would easily understand that these are founded on no Experience whatever, since they transcend all Experience; or if, on the other hand, it had but the fortune to possess a nature wholly animal, it would then not be obliged laboriously to seek, by means of Experience, its knowledge of the world,—that is, the means of its physical preservation,—but it would possess these *a priori* in the animal instinct; since in fact the ox grazing on the meadow leaves untouched those grasses which are hurtful to his nature, without ever having tasted them and discovered by experience their pernicious qualities; and in like manner partakes of those which are healthful to him without

previous trial; and consequently, if we were to ascribe knowledge to him, possesses a knowledge absolutely *a priori* and independent of all Experience. Only in the middle state between Humanity and Animalism is Experience,— that wherein our race ranks below the animals, and in its superiority to which the meanest insect, although destitute of our *a priori* convictions of an Eternal World, may be an object of envy to man,—only in this middle state, I say, is Experience elevated to be the crown and standard of Humanity, and such an Age steps boldly forward and asks,— 'Might it but know then how any knowledge whatever is possible except by Experience?' as if by this question, indeed, every one would be frightened, retreat within himself, and give no other answer than the desired one.

In so far as this Age admits the possibility of some of the knowledge which lies beyond the confines of the mere science of the physical world, although it does so in a somewhat inconsequential manner, and only because such things are also present in Experience, and on account of such Experience are taught in the Schools, it becomes its highest wisdom to doubt of everything, and in no matter to take a part either on the one side or the other. In this neutrality, this immoveable impartiality, this incorruptible indifference to all truth, it places its most excellent and perfect wisdom; and the charge of having a system appears to it as a disgrace by which the reputation of a man is irretreivably destroyed. Such scientific cobwebs are only devised in order that young people of the lower classes, who have no opportunity of seeing the great world, may, by amusing themselves with them, develope their capacities for active life. For this purpose every opinion and every proposition, affirmative as well as negative, are equally available; and it is a contemptible blunder to mistake jest for earnest, and to interest oneself for any side of such a controversy, as if it were something of importance.

With respect to the influence which it exerts upon Nature and its employment of her powers and products, such

an Age looks everywhere only to the immediately and materially *useful*,—to that, namely, which is serviceable for dwelling, clothing, and food,—to cheapness, convenience, and, where it attains its highest point, to fashion; but that higher dominion over Nature whereby the majestic image of Man as a Race is stamped upon its opposing forces,—I mean the dominion of Ideas, in which the essential nature of Fine Art consists,—this is wholly unknown to such an Age; and even when the occasional appearance of men of more spiritual nature may remind it of this higher sovereignty, it only laughs at such aspirations as mere visionary extravagance; and thus Art itself, reduced to its most mechanical forms, is degraded into a new vehicle of fashion, the instrument of a capricious luxury, alien to the Eternities of the Ideal world. With respect to the legislative constitution of States and the government of Nations, such an Age either, impelled by its hatred to the old, constructs political fabrics upon the most airy and unsubstantial abstractions, and attempts to govern degenerate men by means of high-sounding phrases without the aid of firm and inflexible power; or, restrained by its idol Experience, it hastens, on every emergency whether of great or small importance,—being convinced beforehand of its own utter inability to determine upon a course of action for itself,—to consult the chronicles of the Past, to read there how others have formerly acted under similar circumstances, and takes from thence the law of its own conduct;—and in this way constructs its political existence out of a confused patchwork gathered from many different Ages long since dead, thereby openly displaying a clear consciousness of its own utter nothingness. With respect to Morality, it proclaims this as the only Virtue,—that we should pursue our own individual interests, at furthest adding thereto those of others (either as bound in honour so to do, or else from mere inconsequence) so far as they are not inconsistent with our own; and this as the only Vice,—to fail in the pursuit of our

own advantage. It maintains, and—since it can have no difficulty in discovering an ignoble motive for every action, inasmuch as it is quite unacquainted with aught that partakes of nobleness,—it even pretends to prove, that all men who live or have ever lived, have actually thought and acted in this way, and that there is absolutely no other motive of action in man than Self-Interest;—compassionating those who assume the existence of any other, as silly fools who are as yet ignorant of the world and of men. Lastly, with respect to Religion, it also is changed into a mere Doctrine of Happiness, designed to remind us that man must be temperate in enjoyment, in order that his enjoyments may be lasting and varied; a God is deemed necessary only in order that he may care for our welfare, and it is our wants alone which have called him into existence, and determined him to be. Whatever it may chance to retain of the super-sensual elements of any already existing system of Religion, owes this forbearance only to the need there may be of a curb for the unbridled populace, which however the cultivated classes do not require; and to the want of a legitimate means of supplying the deficiencies of political Art, or of judicial Evidence. In short,—and to express the matter in one word,—such an Age has reached its highest point of development when it has attained a clear conviction that Reason, and with Reason all that lies beyond mere sensuous personal Existence, is only an invention of certain idle individuals called Philosophers.

So much for the general delineation of the Third Age, the individual features of which we shall bring forward and examine in detail in our future addresses. One only characteristic we shall notice at present, which inasmuch as it affects the form of the whole Epoch, cannot be passed over here;—this, namely,—that this Age, in its best representatives, is so confident, so firmly assured of the truth of its views, that in this respect it is not surpassed even by the certainty of scientific conviction. It looks down

with unspeakable pity and compassion upon those earlier Ages in which men were still so weak-minded as to allow themselves to be seduced from pleasures which were offered to their immediate enjoyment by a spectre which they named Virtue, and by a dream of a super-sensual world;—upon those Ages of darkness and superstition, when they, the representatives of a new Age, had not yet appeared,—had not yet fathomed and thoroughly laid open the depths of the human heart,—had not yet made the great and astounding discovery, and loudly proclaimed and universally promulgated it,—that this heart is at bottom nothing but a base puddle. It does not oppose, but only compassionates and good-naturedly smiles at those who, living in it, yet reject its opinions; and calmly settles itself in the philanthropic hope that they too may one day raise themselves to the same point of view, when they have been matured by age and experience; or when they have studied, as thoroughly as its own representatives have done, that which it calls History. It is only here, although this is lost upon those representatives, that it is surpassed by Science itself, inasmuch as the latter perfectly comprehends its opponents' mode of thought, can reconstruct it from its separate parts, is able to restore it, should it unfortunately be lost to the world, and even finds it to be perfectly just when considered from its proper point of view. Thus, were we to speak in the name of Science, the supposed impregnability of the mode of thought which we have now described arises precisely in this way;—that, considered from the point of view where its advocates are placed, it is perfectly just; and however frequently they may re-examine the chain of their conclusions they will never discover any break in its sequence. If there be absolutely nothing but the sensuous existence of Individuality, without any higher life of the Race; then there can be no other source of knowledge but Experience, for we are obviously informed concerning this sensuous existence only by Experience; and just on that account every other pretended

source of knowledge, and whatever may flow therefrom, must of necessity be a mere dream and phantom of the brain;—whereby indeed is left unexplained the actual possibility of such dreaming, and of so conjuring out of the brain what in reality the brain does not contain; from which explanation, however, our representatives wisely abstain, satisfied with the experience that such dreams *are*. And that there actually is nothing except this sensuous individual existence, they know very well from this;—that however often and deeply they have fathomed the abysses of their own being, they have never been able to discover therein aught but the feeling of their own personal and sensuous existence.

And thus it follows from all that has been said, that this manner of thinking is by no means founded upon an error of reasoning or of judgment, which may be remedied by pointing out to the Age the mistake into which it has fallen, and reminding it of the rules of logic which it has transgressed; but it is founded upon the altogether defective character of the Age itself, and of those in whom this character most distinctly shows itself. While it and they are what they are, they must necessarily think as they now think; and if they are to think otherwise than they do think, they must first of all become something different from what they are.

To close our lecture with the only consoling view which the subject affords:—It is a happiness that even the most inveterate champions of this manner of thinking are always, against their own wish and will, something better than their speech proclaims them; and that the spark of a higher life in Man, however it may be concealed, is yet never extinguished, but gleams on with silent and secret power until material is presented to it at which it may kindle and burst forth into bright and steady flame. To fan this spark of a higher life, and as far as possible to furnish it with materials for its activity, is also one of the objects of these lectures.

LECTURE III.

THE LIFE ACCORDING TO REASON.

It is only by degrees that clearness can spread itself over our inquiry;—only step by step can light penetrate its deeper recesses; until at length the end reveal itself before us in undivided brightness. This condition of our inquiry lies, as we said in our first lecture, in the unchangeable laws which regulate all communication of thought. Beyond the duty incumbent on the speaker to arrange his thoughts in their proper order, and to set each in its proper place, his art can do nothing to modify the condition of which we have spoken, except this,—heedfully to pause at each brighter point which presents itself in the course of his communication, and from thence to send forth rays of light upon what has gone before and what is to follow.

In our last lecture we arrived at one of these brighter points in the inquiry which we have undertaken; and it is fit and proper that we should to-day more fully develope this point. *That the Human Race should order all its relations with Freedom according to Reason;*—this was set forth as the end and purpose of the Earthly Life of our Race; and the characteristic peculiarity of the Third Age, which it is our business to describe, was declared to be, that it had thrown off the yoke of Reason in every shape. But what Reason itself is, and in what a Life according

to Reason consists, and what are the relations which are ordered by Reason in a life so governed by it;—these things are indeed indicated in many ways, but not yet anywhere placed in a clear light. In our last lecture, however, we said—'*Reason embraces only the* ONE *Life, which manifests itself as the Life of the Race. Were Reason taken away from human life, there would remain only Individuality and the love of Individuality.*' Hence the Life according to Reason consists herein,—that the Individual forget himself in the Race, place his own life in the life of the Race, and dedicate it thereto;—the Life opposed to Reason, on the contrary, consists in this,—that the Individual think of nothing but himself, love nothing but himself and in relation to himself, and set his whole existence in his own personal well-being alone:—and since we may briefly call that which is according to Reason *good*, and that which is opposed to Reason *evil*, so there is but One Virtue,—to forget one's own personality;—and but One Vice,—to make self the object of our thoughts. Hence the view of Morality depicted in our last lecture as that of the Third Age, here as everywhere precisely reverses the fact, and makes that its only Virtue which is in reality the only Vice, and that its only Vice which is in truth Virtue itself.

These words are to be understood strictly as we have spoken them, in their most rigorous sense. The mitigation of our principle which might be attempted here, namely—that it is only our duty not to think of ourselves *exclusively*, but *also* upon others,—is precisely the same Morality as that which we have represented as belonging to the Third Age, only that here it is inconsequential, and seeks to disguise itself, not having yet altogether triumphed over shame. He who but thinks *chiefly* of his own person and personal gratification, and desires any kind of life or being, or any joy of life, except *in* the Race and *for* the Race, with whatever vesture of good deeds he may seek to hide his

deformity, is nevertheless, at bottom, only a mean, base, and therefore unhappy man. Hence our principle, as we ourselves have expressed it in all its rigour,—it and nothing else,—is our meaning, against which it is, and always will be, impossible to bring forward any essential objection.

Whatever has been urged against this principle hitherto since mankind had a being, or can be urged so long as it shall have a being, is grounded upon the bold assertion that man *cannot* forget himself, and that personal self-love has grown up in such intimate union with his nature, that it is now inextricably interwoven with it. I ask such assertors, Whence then have they obtained their knowledge of what man can do, and what he cannot? Obviously this assertion of theirs can be founded on nothing else than observation of themselves;—and it may indeed be true that they for themselves, since they have become what they are and wish to remain so, may never be able to forget their own personal welfare. But by what right do they make the standard of their ability or non-ability the measure of the capacity of the Race? The noble mind can indeed understand the thought of the ignoble, for we are all born and fashioned in Egoism, and have all lived in it, and it needs struggle and effort to destroy this old nature within us; but the ignoble cannot know the thoughts of the noble, because he has never entered the world to which they belong, nor traversed it, as his world has been traversed in all its extent by the noble. The latter surveys both worlds, the former only that which holds him captive;—as the Waker may in his waking understand the Dreamer, and the Seer conceive of Darkness; but the Dreamer cannot in his dream comprehend the Waking, nor the Blind-born imagine Light. Only when they have attained to this higher world, and have taken possession of it, shall they be able to do that which they now declare they cannot do, and only by acquiring this ability for themselves can they learn that Man is capable of acquiring it.

Herein, therefore, have we placed the True Life,—the Life according to Reason,—that the personal life of Man be dedicated to that of his Race,—that the one be forgotten in the other. To forget oneself in others:—not in others regarded likewise in a personal character, where there is still nothing but Individuality;—but in others regarded as the Race. Understand me:—the sympathy which prompts us to mitigate the sorrows of others, and to share and exalt their joys; the attachment which binds us to friends and relatives; the love that entwines us with our families;—all these, being frequently attended with considerable sacrifices of our own personal convenience and enjoyment, are the first secret and silent movements of Reason as Instinct, gently breaking down the harshest and coarsest forms of Egoism, and so laying the foundation for the development of a wider and more comprehensive love. But as yet this love, far from comprehending Humanity as a whole, without distinction of person, and considered as the Race, embraces only individual persons; and although it is thus assuredly the vestibule to the higher Life, and no one can obtain entrance to the latter, who has not first been consecrated thereto in this realm of gentler impulses;—still it is not in itself that higher Life. That embraces the Race itself, *as a Race.* But the Life of the Race is expressed only in Ideas;—the fundamental character of which, as well as their various forms, we shall come to understand sufficiently in the course of these lectures. Thus the formula which we laid down,—'*That the life of Man be dedicated to that of his Race,*'—may also be expressed thus,—'*That the life of Man be dedicated to Ideas;*'—for Ideas embrace the Race as such, and its Life; and thus the Life according to Reason, or the only good and true Life, consists in this,—that Man forget himself in Ideas, and neither seek nor know any enjoyment save in Ideas, and in sacrificing all other enjoyments for them.——Thus far for our explanation. Let us now proceed to another matter.

This, namely:—If you yourselves, compelled by an inward power, should feel it impossible to withhold your approval, your admiration, and your reverence from a Life such as we have described, and were even compelled to reverence it the more profoundly the greater and more evident the sacrifices made at the shrine of Ideas,—so surely, I say, would it be obvious, from this your approval, that there is a principle, indestructibly rooted in your minds, which proclaims that the personal life *ought to be* brought a sacrifice to the Idea, and that the Life in which it is so offered up is the only true and upright Life;—hence, if we regard the matter strictly,—that the individual life has no real existence, since it has no value of itself, but must and *should* sink to nothing; while, on the contrary, the Race alone exists, since it alone *ought to be* looked upon as really living. In this way we shall keep the promise which we gave in our former lecture, to show you in a popular way, and by your own knowledge of yourselves, that the principle which we then announced, and which at first sight seemed so paradoxical, was in truth already well known and admitted by you, and indeed was the constant director and guide of your judgment, although you might not be clearly conscious of it;—and we shall thus attain both the objects which I had in view in the present lecture.

That you should actually be necessitated to approve, admire, and reverence such a Life as we have described, was the first step in our argument, upon which all else depended, and from which all else necessarily followed;—and this we must commit entirely to your own reflection, without interference on our part. Hence it is only my task to make an experiment on you and within you, and should this succeed, as I expect it will, then we shall have proved our position.

I shall make this experiment upon your minds, unquestionably with the view of producing a certain effect upon you, but by no means with the design of taking you by surprise, or of producing such an effect only that I may

thereby be enabled for the moment to move you to my purpose, as the orator does; but, on the contrary, I shall aim at producing this effect with clear and distinct consciousness and concurrence on your part, so that the influence may be perfectly obvious to you, and its operation not the result of mere passive endurance, but the subject of your own observation, and in consequence of this observation attain a more fixed and permanent character.

The philosopher is compelled, by the rules of his art, to deal with perfect openness and honesty; and in return he acquires a power which lies far beyond the sophistries of mere eloquence;—he is able to declare to his hearers beforehand the emotion which he desires to excite within them, and, provided they rightly understand him, to attain his object notwithstanding the disclosure.

This free and open announcement of the purpose which we have in view, lays me under an obligation to describe more particularly the nature of the effect which I shall attempt to produce within you; and in order to maintain the clear, intelligible position which we have now attained, I shall at once proceed to this description. I have only to ask your indulgence for a few expressions and phrases which may not as yet be entirely distinct to you, but which shall be made perfectly clear in the sequel.

The Life according to Reason must necessarily love itself; for every form of life, as its own perfect result and fulfilment, is enjoyment of itself. As surely as Reason can never be entirely extinguished among men, so surely can this love of Reason for itself never be utterly destroyed; nay, this love, as the deepest root of all rational existence, and as the sole remaining tie which keeps men within the circle of rational existence, is precisely that whereby we may most surely attain and comprehend the Life according to Reason, if we will only be honest and unprejudiced.

Now the Life opposed to Reason,—that of mere Individuality,—likewise loves itself; since it too is life, and all

life necessarily loves itself. But as these two forms of life are thoroughly opposed to each other, so also are the kinds of love and satisfaction which they have in themselves quite opposed to each other,—wholly and specifically different;—and in this specific difference they are easily recognised and distinguished from each other.

To begin with the love which the Life according to Reason entertains for itself. Towards this Life we may stand in a double relation:—*either*, we may possess it only in conception, in a feeble and imperfect representation, and only as received from others;—*or*, we may ourselves truly and in reality be and live this Life.

That mankind cannot at the present day stand in the latter relation,—since, in that case, there would be not only no Egoism and no Third Age of the world, but also no true Freedom,—this has already been admitted; nay more,—that we have been all fashioned and born *out of* this relation, and can only by labour and toil place ourselves therein. Hence it must be the first relation, namely, the possession, or the capacity of possessing, the Life according to Reason *in conception*, which is never wholly extinguished among men, which all have the power to attain, and by which all may at least comprehend the Life according to Reason.

The love which the Life opposed to Reason bears to itself, with which indeed we are all better acquainted, and to which our language more easily accommodates itself, manifests itself in its specific character, both in general and in particulars,—as delight in its own sagacity, petty pride in its own cleverness and importance, and,—to designate an ignoble thing by a befitting ignoble expression,—as self-satisfied chuckling over its own cunning. Thus in the former lecture it was represented as a fundamental characteristic of the Third Age, that it looked down with haughty self-complacency on those who suffer themselves to be defrauded of present enjoyment by a dream of Virtue, congratulating itself that it is far above such delusions, and therefore secure from

being imposed upon;—its true character being admirably expressed in a single phrase, — would-be-Enlightenment. Thus the highest and most refined enjoyment which he who cares best for his own advantage, and successfully pursues it through many difficulties, can attain, is the satisfaction he must feel in his own shrewdness and skill. On the contrary, the love which the Life according to Reason bears to itself, as a legitimate and well-ordered existence, manifests itself in its specific character, not as unexpected gratification, but in the dignified form of approval, esteem, and reverence.

In so far as we have attained the Life according to Reason, in the first way, namely, *in conception*, and as a picture of a Life removed from our own, in so far will this conception lovingly welcome and dwell upon itself in delighted complacency;—for, in that case, we shall at least have entered so far into the sphere of the Life of Reason, as to possess a worthy and adequate image of it. (We may add here, for the benefit of those who are acquainted with the scientific language of philosophy, that the feeling thus produced is an æsthetic pleasure, and indeed *the highest* æsthetic pleasure.)

This pleasure, however,—this approbation of something foreign to us,—something which we ourselves are not, inspires us with respect and reverence, combined, in the best of our race, with silent unsatisfied regards thrown back upon themselves, and a secret longing to assimilate their own life to the object of their love; out of which longing the higher Life gradually unfolds itself. In so far as, in the second way, the Life according to Reason actually becomes conscious of itself as a real and present existence, it flows forth in unspeakable enjoyment and satisfaction, before the thought of which the Egoist must retreat in envy, could he entertain the thought;—in this love to itself, it becomes pure Blessedness. For all feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction, as well as those of desire and insufficiency, are nothing else than the birth-pains of the higher Life struggling towards its perfect development. Is it developed?—then is it tho-

roughly satisfied with itself, and sufficient for itself, needing nothing more, but possessing the most perfect Freedom within itself, and in the consciousness of its own inherent power. Let us in the present lecture try the experiment of the first condition upon ourselves; in the next I shall attempt to present to you a feeble description of the second.

For our present purpose, I shall maintain the following proposition:—Everything great and good upon which our present existence rests, from which it has proceeded, and on the supposition of which alone our Age can order itself in the way it actually does, has an existence only because noble and powerful men have resigned all the enjoyments of life for the sake of Ideas; and we ourselves, and all that we are, are the result of the sacrifices of all previous generations, and particularly of their worthiest members. I have, however, no thought of making use of this remark to bribe you into toleration towards these our predecessors, by contemplation of the advantages which we have derived from their sacrifices; for in that case I should excite in you, and make use of for my present purpose, precisely that mode of thought which, had I the power, I would extirpate from the world; and then I might justly expect this answer,—'It is well for us that these fools have lived, who, in the sweat of their brow, gathered together the treasures we now enjoy; we shall, so far as in us lies, avoid similar folly:—let other generations look to their own prosperity when we shall be no more;'—and I should not be able to avoid commending this answer as, at least, consistent. It may be, that with regard to efforts for the sake of Humanity, which when they were conducted with propriety, have deserved no blame even in this respect, men have lifted up their voices and asked,—'Is it right that this generation should make such sacrifices for the future?' and thereupon looked around with triumph, as if they had uttered something very profound and secure from controversy. At present, however, I only wish to know this,—whether you do not feel constrained to

respect and admire in the highest degree such a course of thought and action, quite independently of any consideration of its prudence, upon which no judgment is now demanded.

Let us cast a glance on the world around us. You know that even now many tracts of the Earth's surface are still covered with putrid morasses and impenetrable forests, the cold and damp atmosphere of which gives birth to noxious insects, and breathes forth devastating epidemics; which are almost entirely the dwelling-place of the savage, and only afford to the few creatures in human form who are to be found in them, the means of dragging on a dull and joyless existence, without freedom, usefulness, or dignity. History informs us that the countries which we inhabit at the present day, formerly bore the same character to a large extent. *Now*, the morasses are dried up; the forests cleared out and changed into fruitful plains and vineyards, which purify the air and fill it with enlivening fragrance; the rivers are taught to keep their channels, and enduring bridges are laid across them; villages and towns have arisen, with lasting, convenient, and agreeable dwelling-places for men, and public buildings, which have already braved the storms of centuries, for the purposes of mental improvement and elevation. You know that, even at the present day, savage hoards roam over vast wildernesses, maintaining a miserable life upon impure and loathsome food, and yet, when they encounter each other, engaging in warfare for the sake of this scanty subsistence and of their wretched implements of acquisition and enjoyment,—extending the fury of their vengeance even to the destruction of their fellow-men. It is in the highest degree probable that we are all of us descendants of such races; that our forefathers, at least in some of their generations, have passed through this condition. *Now*, men are assembled from out the forests, and united together in masses. In the savage state each family had to provide for its manifold wants

immediately and without assistance from others, and had even to fabricate for itself the utensils for that purpose, with much loss of time and waste of energy:—*Now*, the human multitudes are divided into classes, each of which pursues its own profession, to the acquirement and exercise of which its life is devoted; providing in its own department for all other classes, and provided for by them with respect to all its other wants; and thus are the forces of Nature confronted by the greatest possible amount of the cultivated, ordered and combined powers of Reason. The laws and their administrators interpose an insuperable barrier to the fury of personal warfare and spoliation; quarrels are adjusted without bloodshed, and the lust of crime is scared, even in the dark recesses of thought, by severe punishments;—and thus is internal peace secured, and every one moves in safety within the limits which are prescribed to him. Large masses of men, frequently sprung from the most dissimilar origin, and united one scarce knows how, encounter similar masses in as wonderful combination, and neither being fully acquainted with the power of the other, reciprocal fear steps in between them, so that men are sometimes blessed even with external tranquillity; or when it does come to war, the superior power is often worn out and broken by the determined resistance of its opponent, and instead of the secretly desired extermination, peace is the result;—and thus has sprung up a kind of international law between independent countries, and from among opposing tribes a kind of republic of nations has arisen. You know how, even to the present time, the timid savage, unacquainted even with himself, finds a hindrance or a destroying foe in every power of Nature. To us, Science has laid open our own spiritual being, and thereby, in a great measure, subjected to our will the outward physical forces of the universe. Mechanics have multiplied, almost to infinity, the feeble powers of man, and continue to multiply them. Chemistry has introduced us into many chambers of the secret work-

shop of Nature, and enabled us to apply her wonders to our own uses, and to protect ourselves from the injuries they might otherwise inflict upon us. Astronomy has scaled the heavens for us, and measured their paths. You know, and the whole history of the Past as well as the description of the savage tribes which still exist upon the earth proves it to you, that all nations, the most cultivated not excepted, flying from the horrors of external Nature, and penetrating to the secret depths of their own heart, have first discovered there the most fearful of all horrors;—the Godhead as their enemy. By cringing humiliation and entreaty, by sacrifice of that which was dearest to them, by self-devoted martyrs, by human immolation, by the blood of an only-begotten Son, if need were, have they sought to bribe this Being so jealous of human happiness, and to reconcile him to their unexpected strokes of fortune, by humbly deprecating his resentment.

This is the Religion of the ancient world, and of the savage tribes which still exist, and I invite the student of History to point out any other. From us this phantom has disappeared long ago; and the redemption and satisfaction spoken of in a certain system is a public matter of fact, in which we may either believe or not,—and which is all the more a matter of fact the less we believe in it. Our Age, far from shunning the Godhead, has, by its representatives, constituted the Deity the minister of its pleasures. We, for our part, far from finding fault with them on account of this want of the fear of God, rather count it one of their advantages; and since they are incapable of the right enjoyment of the Godhead,—of loving it, and living in it, and thus attaining Blessedness,—we may be well pleased that, at least, they do not fear it. Let them, if they please, throw it off altogether, or so fashion it as may be most agreeable to them.

What I have declared in the first place, was *once* the form of Humanity, and in part is so still: what I have described in the second, is its *present* form, at least among ourselves.

How, by whom, and by what manner of impulses, has this new creation been accomplished?

Who then, in the first place, gave to the countries of Modern Europe their present habitable shape, and made them worthy to be the dwelling-place of cultivated men? History answers the question. It was pious and holy men, who, believing it to be God's Will that the timid fugitive of the woods should be elevated to civilized life, and thereby to the blessed knowledge of a Godhead full of love to man, left the abodes of civilization and all the physical and intellectual enjoyments to be found there,—left their families, friends and associates, and went forth into the desert wilderness, enduring the bitterest privations, encountering the severest labour, and, what is more, pursuing their end with unwearied patience, that they might win the confidence of untutored tribes, by whom they were persecuted and robbed;—frequently terminating an anxious and weary life by a martyr's death at the hands of those for whom, and for us their descendants, they died,—rejoicing in the hope that from their ashes a worthier generation should arise. These men, without doubt, gave up their personal life and its enjoyments for their Idea, and, in this Idea, for the Race. And should any one offer this objection:—'They indeed sacrificed the present life for the expectation of an infinitely higher, heavenly, and blessed life, which they hoped to deserve by these sacrifices and sufferings; but still it was only enjoyment for enjoyment, and indeed the lesser for the greater;'—then I would entreat such an objector earnestly to consider with me the following. How inadequately soever they might express themselves in words as to the Blessedness of another world, and with what sensuous pictures soever they might clothe their descriptions of this happiness, I ask only to know how they arrived at this firm Faith in another world, which they attested so nobly by their deeds; and what this Faith, as an act of the mind, really is. Does not the mind which faithfully accepts another world as certain,

in this very acceptance renounce the present?—and is not this Faith itself the sacrifice, once and for ever accomplished and perfected in the mind, and which only manifests itself outwardly when special circumstances call it forth? Let it be no wonder at all, but quite a conceivable thing, and only what thou thyself, who makest this objection, wert thou in the same position, wouldst do,—that they willingly sacrificed everything to their belief in an Eternal Life:—let this be so; then is it the wonder that they *did believe;* in which belief the Egoist, who is incapable of letting the Present escape, even for a moment, from his view, can never follow, nor even approach them.

Who has united rude races together, and reduced opposing tribes under the dominion of law, and to the habits of peaceful life? Who has maintained them in this condition, and protected existing states from dissolution through internal disorder, or destruction by outward power? Whatever name they may have borne, it was Heroes, who had left their Age far behind them, giants among surrounding men in material and spiritual power. They subdued to their Idea of what *ought to be,* races by whom they were on that account hated and feared; through nights of sleepless thought they pondered their anxious plans for their fellow-men; from battlefield to battlefield they rushed without weariness or rest, renouncing the enjoyments which lay within their grasp, making their life a spoil, often shedding their blood. And what sought they by these labours?—and how were they rewarded? It was an Idea, a mere Idea of a new condition of things to be brought about by them, to be realized for its own sake alone, and without reference to any ulterior purpose;—this it was which inspired them; and it was the unspeakable delight of this Idea which rewarded and indemnified them for all their labours and sacrifices;—it was this Idea which lay at the root of their inward life,—which cast the outward life into shade, and threw it aside as something undeserving of thought;—it was the power

of this Idea which made them giants in physical and mental energy, although by birth like their fellow-men; and their personal life was dedicated to this Idea, which first moulded that life into a worthy and accepted offering.

What impels the King, securely seated on a hereditary throne, with the fulness of the land spread out before him for his enjoyment,—what impels—(to combine my question with a well-known example so often misconstrued by a race of pigmy sentimentalists)—what impels the Macedonian hero to leave his hereditary kingdom already well secured on all sides and richly provided for by his father, and to seek foreign lands, to the conquest of which he forces his way by unceasing efforts? Will he thereby be happier or more contented?—What chains victory to his footsteps, and scatters before him in terror the countless hordes of his enemies?—Is this mere fortune? No!—it is an Idea which first gives the impulse, and which crowns the effort with success. Effeminate half-barbarians had looked down with scorn upon the most highly civilized people then living beneath the sun, on account of their smaller numbers, and had even dared to entertain the thought of their subjugation; they had actually subdued kindred tribes dwelling in Asia, and subjected the cultivated and the free to the laws and odious inflictions of rude and enslaved nations. This outrage must not be perpetrated with impunity: on the contrary, the civilized must rule, and the uncivilized must obey, if *Right* is to be the *Law* of the world. This Idea had already been long cherished in the nobler Grecian minds, until in Alexander it became a living flame which animated and consumed his personal life. Tell me not of the thousands who fell around his path; speak not of his own early ensuing death:—after the realization of his Idea, what was there greater for him to do than to die?

LECTURE IV.

THE LIFE ACCORDING TO REASON.

In our last lecture we set forth the principle directly opposed to that of the Third Age which we have undertaken to characterize,—the principle of the Life according to Reason;—this, namely,—that the personal life of man should be devoted to the Life of the Race, or, as we further defined this expression, to Ideas; and we found it desirable to prolong our consideration of this principle, as one of the more luminous points in our inquiry. I proposed, in the first place, to show you by your own nature, that you could not help approving, admiring, and respecting in the highest degree the sacrifice of the enjoyments of life for the realization of an Idea; that hence a principle upon which this judgment was founded must exist indestructibly within you; a principle namely to this effect,—that the personal life *ought to be* given up for the Idea; and that, strictly speaking, personal existence *is not,* since it should thus be sacrificed; while, on the contrary, the life in the Idea alone *is,* since it alone *ought to be* maintained. I explained this expected admiration on your part by this proposition: All life necessarily loves itself, and therefore the Life according to Reason must love itself, and, as the only true and real Life, must love itself with a love far exceeding all other love. Now the Life according to Reason may exist, and be known to man, in two different ways:—either in mere conception,

and as the picture of a condition foreign to his own;—or by himself *living* this life. In the first case it loves itself and delights in itself as seen in this conception, because this is at least the conception of the Life according to Reason, and is itself according to Reason; and then there arises the approval, admiration, and reverence of which we have spoken. In the second case, it rises to infinite enjoyment of its own being, which is Blessedness. The former condition,—that of approval,—I proposed to test by your own feelings in our last lecture; promising you for to-day a feeble description of the second.

And in the fulfilment of my first object, that I might not roam about at random, blindly groping among my materials, but arrange my thoughts around a common centre, I said—'Everything great and good on which our Age rests, and by the power of which it exists, has been brought about by the sacrifices which the Past has made for Ideas.' By calling to mind that the land had been redeemed from the state of wildness to that of cultivation, Mankind from the state of war to that of peace, from ignorance to knowledge, from blind terror before God to confidence in him,—I showed that the first of these changes, at least in the countries which we inhabit, had been effected by pious and holy men; and the last, everywhere and in all lands, by Heroes;—all of whom, the one class as well as the other, had sacrificed their life and its enjoyments for the sake of their Ideas. While I was proceeding to answer an objection which might be made with reference to this last point, my discourse was interrupted by the expiry of our usual time, and I now resume it at the same place.

It is Honour, some one may say, which inspires the Hero,—the burning image of his fame in after-times, which impels him onward through difficulty and danger, and which repays him for his life of sacrifice and self-denial in the coin on which he sets most value. I answer, even if this should be so, what then is this Honour? Whence has this thought

of the judgment which others may pass upon us, particularly of the judgment of future generations whose praise or blame shall echo over our graves unheard;—whence has it acquired this amazing power which enables it to suppress and extinguish the personal life of the Hero? Is it not obvious that in the depths of his mind there lies a principle which tells him that only on one condition can his life be of any value to him,—can be even endurable by him;—this, namely, that the voices of Mankind at large shall concur in ascribing a value to it? Is not this very thought the Idea of the Race, and of its judgment as a Race on the Individual, and the admission that the Race alone is entitled to pass the final judgment upon true merit? Is it not the supposition that this final judgment must be grounded on the inquiry whether the Individual has or has not devoted himself to the Race?—and is it not a silent, respectful acquiescence in this judgment proceeding on these premises?—in a word, is not this Idea precisely that in which we have placed the Life according to Reason? But let us more thoroughly investigate this matter.

The Hero acts:—undoubtedly then, I add, he acts in a certain way;—in order, it is said, thereby to acquire fame in the eyes of Present and Future Ages:—undoubtedly then, I add again, without having first interrogated the Present and Future Ages whether they would laud a life so employed;—without, I add yet again, having *had it in his power* to seek counsel of experience in any way upon this question; because his mode of action, so surely as it proceeds upon an Idea, is a new, hitherto unknown mode, upon which therefore no human judgment has ever yet been pronounced. But, it is said, he reckons so securely on fame being the result of this mode of action, that he is ready to peril his life on the accuracy of his calculations. How does he know, then, that he has not miscalculated? At the time when he goes forth into action, and has already once for all completed in his own mind the consecration of

his life, he and he only, and none other but himself, has examined and approved the mode of life which he has set before him;—how then does he know that Present and Future Ages will likewise approve it and cover it with immortal glory?—how does he come so boldly to ascribe to the whole Race his own standard of what is honourable and praiseworthy? Yet he does this, as is alleged; and this single remark of itself proves, that, in acting as he does, far from being moved thereto by the hope of future fame, he holds up to future Ages, in his own deeds springing forth in native purity from the primeval fountain of honour, the example of what they *must* approve and reverence, if their judgment is to have any weight with him;—despising and even utterly rejecting such judgment, if it be not in accordance with that which has already approved itself to him as worthy of eternal honour and respect. And thus it is not Ambition which is the parent of great deeds, but great deeds themselves give birth to faith in a world in which they must command respect. That form of Honour, indeed, which comes before us in every-day life, and of which we do not now speak, proceeds entirely from fear of disgrace; without having power to excite man to active duty, it only holds him back from that which would be notoriously despised, and disappears as soon as he can hope to gratify his propensities unobserved. Another Ambition, of which too we do not now speak, which first pores over ancient chronicles to discover what in them is commended, and then endeavours to imitate that, so as also to become an object of commendation; and which being incapable of creating the New, strives to reproduce in itself certain effete memorials of the Past, which once indeed may have possessed life and energy:—such an Ambition may sacrifice itself, but that to which it devotes itself is not an Idea but a Conceit;—and it misses its purpose; for what is once dead, never lives again,—and whatever may be its success in the senseless and purblind Present, the Future will assuredly despise the Imitator who mistakes himself for a Creator.

This remark upon Honour, which has been here adduced only in reference to Heroism, is also applicable to what is to follow, where in like manner superficiality is wont to speak of an Ambition, the nature and possibility of which it has not power to comprehend.

In our former lecture we said, that the timid savage, to whom every power of Nature was once an obstacle and a hindrance, is now through Science made acquainted with his own constitution, and has thus attained a mastery over the powers of the outward universe. Who are they who have discovered and extended the Sciences?—have they accomplished this without labour and sacrifice?—what has been their reward?

While the Age in which they lived spent its days in gay enjoyment, they sat lost in solitary thought, in order that they might discover a law or a relation which had called forth their admiration, and with respect to which they had absolutely no other desire than simply to discover it; sacrificing pleasure and fortune, neglecting their outward concerns, and lavishing their finest genius in these researches; laughed at by the multitude as fools and dreamers. *Now*, their discoveries have proved of manifold advantage to human life, as we have already called to mind. But have they themselves partaken of these fruits of their labours? have they foreseen, or even conjectured these results?—have they not rather, when their spiritual aspirations have been interrupted by such views of their occupation when entertained by others, uttered truly sublime lamentations over the desecration of the Holy to the profane uses of life, it being concealed from them that life itself must in like manner be thereby sanctified? Only when, through their labours, these discoveries had been made so comprehensible, and a knowledge of them been so widely diffused as to be carried out into practice by less inspired minds (whom we, standing upon an entirely different point of view, would by no means on that account despise, but of whom it should be distinctly

understood that they are not of so noble a nature as the first;)—only then have these discoveries been applied to the wants of life, and so become the means of arming the Human Race with superior power over the forces of Nature. If, thus, no vision, not even a presentiment of the usefulness of their discoveries, could indemnify them for their sacrifices, what was their reward?—and what, at the present day, is the reward of those, if at the present day there are such, who with the same devotion, the same sacrifices, and with the same disinterested zeal, amid the scorn and the mockery of the vulgar, raise their eyes towards the ever-flowing fountain of Truth? This it is:—they have entered into a new life-element of spiritual clearness and purity, whereby life in any other form becomes absolutely distasteful to them. A Higher World, which is first and most intimately made known to us by the light which is native within it, has arisen upon them; this light has filled their eyes with its beneficent and inspiring radiance, so that they can henceforth and forever direct their view to nothing else than that illumined height shining in deep surrounding darkness. This heavenly vision so rivets their gaze upon it, that their whole being is enchained, and every other sense is silently absorbed therein. They need no recompense; they have made an incalculable gain.

The dreadful phantom of a Deity hostile to Mankind has vanished, and the Human Race is now delivered from this horror, and enjoys tranquillity and freedom. Who has eradicated this error, so widely spread and deeply rooted among all nations?—has this been accomplished without sacrifice?—what has been the reward of such sacrifice?

It is the Christian Religion alone which has wrought this stupendous miracle, and it has accomplished this triumph by means of countless sacrifices on the part of those whose lives have been filled by its inspiration and devoted to its service. What they have endured;—what the Exalted Founder himself,—what his immediate followers,—what their successors through a long series of ages, until, even to

us as to a later birth, their word came;—what they all have accomplished and suffered among rude and superstitious nations, animated only by the gladdening and inspiring truth which had risen upon their souls, and become the ruling impulse of their lives,—I shall not here call to mind. This Age is not ignorant of these things; it brings them sufficiently into notice, in order that it may laugh at the fanaticism which is all it can discover in them. Only through Christianity, and through the vast miracle in which it had its origin, and by which it was ushered into the world, has this change been effected. It is easy to understand that after the Truth has once been proclaimed, and has even in consequence of its numerous adherents acquired an authority among men, we may by peaceful inquiry investigate its foundations, reconstruct it by the power of our own understanding, and so, in a certain sense, rediscover it: but whence the great Founder first obtained courage boldly to confront the phantom which had been consecrated by the universal agreement of all former Ages, and the very thought of which had paralyzed every exertion, and to discover that *it was not*, but that instead of it there was only Happiness and Love:—this was the miracle. So far as regards the representatives of this Age, it is very certain, if we may judge by other proofs of their acuteness and penetration, that it is not this acuteness, but only the unseen and unacknowledged influence exercised over them by this very tradition,—an influence which they deride wherever their dull eye can reach it,—to which they owe it that they do not, even to the present day, smite their faces before idols of wood, and pass their children through the fire to Moloch.

Whether you can forbear from passing a sentence of approval on the sacrifice of personal enjoyment for the sake of Ideas manifested in all these examples, is the question which I must now leave you to answer for yourselves, and also to draw from this phenomenon the inferences which, according to our former statement, necessarily follow from it.

This approval is, as we formerly explained, the immediate effect of the contemplation of the Life in Idea, merely *in conception*, and as a condition foreign to ourselves. We added that the existence of this Life, not in conception only, but *in living reality*, was the source of an infinite self-enjoyment, which is Blessedness; and we promised a description of this state, which may indeed prove but weak and inadequate, as every mere picture of a living reality must prove.

This is the place more definitely to explain the peculiar nature of the Idea as such;—an explanation for which we have endeavoured to prepare the way by our previous course of thought.

I say, then, that *the Idea is an independent, living, matter-inspiring Thought.*

First,—*an independent Thought:* Herein, indeed, consists the perverted way of thinking of the Third Age, and generally every perverted way of thinking,—that it ascribes independence, self-reliance, and self-subsistence to mere dead and torpid matter, and then superadds to that the quite superfluous quality of thought, one knows not why or how. No! Thought itself is alone truly independent and self-existent;—not indeed the thought which belongs to the single thinking Individual, which truly cannot be self-existent,—but the One Eternal Thought, in which all Individuals are but Thoughts. The innermost root of this world is not Death,—Death which, by gradual restriction and limitation of its power, may be refined and subtilized into Life;—but, on the contrary, Life is the root of the World, and what there *seems* to be Death is but a feebler form of Life. *A living Thought:* as is obvious at once, for Thought is by its very nature living, even as self-existence is by its very nature living; and thus Thought can only be conceived of as self-existent, and self-existence can only be ascribed to Thought inasmuch as both bear within them the Idea of Life. *A matter-inspiring Thought:*—and this

in a two-fold sense: All Material Life is the expression of the Idea;—for matter itself is but the reflection of a concealed Idea, from which it derives the motion and vitality it contains. But where the Idea breaks through this external covering, reveals itself openly and distinctly as Idea, and bursts forth into its own peculiar self-sustaining Life, then the lower grade of life where the Idea lies in concealment disappears in the higher, which now alone fills the Individual, and lives its own Life within him;—and then arises, in a word, that phenomenon which has shown itself in all our previous descriptions,—the phenomenon of the sacrifice of the personal, *i.e.* of the undeveloped ideal life, to the Life of the Idea distinctly revealed as such. Thus, I say, it is with Life:—not the flesh liveth but the spirit; and this fundamental truth, which the speculative philosopher can prove by the necessary laws of thought, has been verified and proved in his own person by every one in whom the Idea has assumed a determinate living form, although it may be that he himself has not been clearly conscious of it. To raise this direct proof from personal experience into the clearness of distinct consciousness, and so bring it home to every one, is the business of popular-philosophical teaching, and therefore mine.

We said that where the Idea manifests itself in its proper and independent Life, the lower form of life, namely the sensuous, entirely disappears in it, and is for ever superseded and extinguished. The love of this lower form of life for itself, and its interest in itself, is annihilated. But all our wants arise only from the existence of this interest, and all our griefs from wounding it. The Life in the Idea is forever secured against all violation in this respect, for it has withdrawn itself from the sphere in which alone such violation is possible. For this Life there is no self-denial and no sacrifice;—the self which has to be denied, and the desires which have to be sacrificed, are withdrawn from its sight, and its love for them has disappeared. This self-denial and

these sacrifices excite astonishment only in him for whom their objects still possess value, because he himself has not yet relinquished them;—when they are once relinquished they vanish into oblivion, and he finds that he has, in truth, lost nothing. The stern and authoritative Law of Duty, which presupposes vicious inclinations, and only exists that it may scare back the first movements of desire even in the dim obscurities of thought, is abolished in the Life in the Idea. '*Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.*' This higher Life once attained, that which at first was enforced upon man as the stern command of Duty becomes his spontaneous rule of conduct, the end for which alone he must live,—his sole joy, love, and blessedness. Thus, it is only ignorance which dreams that a profound philosophy would recal the gloomy morality of self-crucifixion and martyrdom. Oh no!—it invites man to cast from him that which can afford no enjoyment, in order that the source of infinite enjoyment may approach him, and fill his being with its presence.

The Idea is independent, self-sufficient, self-existent; it lives and has its being absolutely for its own sake alone; and scorns every outward and adventitious purpose which may be proposed for its existence. Hence it does not value and love its Life according to the foreign standard of any result, use, or advantage which may arise therefrom. As in the Life of the Race the Idea strives constantly towards absolute worth, not mere welfare,—worth in itself, not mere deserving;—so when it nourishes the individual life of man it is wholly satisfied with this worth, without demanding any ulterior results. The uncertainty of such results can thus never cloud its inward brightness, nor the actual want of them cause it grief; for it has never counted upon outward consequences, but on the contrary has resigned them along with every other desire of sense. How could sorrow, pain, or disturbance ever enter within the circle of a Life thus strictly comprehended within itself?

The Idea is sufficient in itself for the living, active Life

which eternally flows forth from it, without need of aught else, and without allowing aught else to exercise an influence within it. The consciousness of this ever-present independence; this self-sufficiency for infinite and unceasing activity; the purity of this sacred, self-fed flame, which with steady and unvarying power soars upwards through Eternity,—is the love of the Life of Reason for itself, its self-enjoyment, its Blessedness. No idle brooding over its own image, no contemplation of its own excellence;—for reflection is swallowed up in Life, and the unresting, ever-burning flame of actual Being, having annihilated the Past and sunk it into the depths of oblivion, leaves neither time nor opportunity again to recall it thence.

To those in whom the Idea has never attained to life in any form, such delineations of the Blessedness of the Life in Idea are wholly unintelligible; tones from another world; and—since they necessarily deny the existence of any world but their own,—dreams, folly, and fanaticism. But are we not entitled to calculate with some measure of certainty that in cultivated society every one has in some way or other come into contact with Ideas?

As the Idea is simple in its nature, so is the Blessedness of the Life in the Idea everywhere one and the same;—namely, the immediate consciousness of original spontaneous Energy. It is only in relation to the objects on which this Energy descends, and in which it reveals itself within our own sense and consciousness, that the one Idea assumes different forms;—which different forms are then themselves named Ideas. I say expressly,—*within our own sense and consciousness;* for only in consciousness do these manifestations of the Idea differ from each other: beyond that they are but one.

The first form assumed by this effluence of Original Energy,—that in which it has manifested itself in the earliest Ages, and in which it is most widely active at the present day, is its expression in outward matter by means

of our own physical power;—and in this expression of the Idea the *Fine Arts* consist. *Effluence of Original Energy*, I have said,—flowing forth from itself, and sufficient for itself, unsupported by experience or observation of the external world. This latter gives us only individual, and therefore ignoble and hateful, conceptions, which in having attained reality in one instance, have attained it once too often already;—the repetition and multiplication of which by Art would be but an evil service to humanity. *In outward matter*, I said,—irrespective of its peculiarities:—whether the physical expression of a Mankind lost in the Idea (for this alone is the true object of Art) stand fixed in marble, or glow upon the canvass; or the emotions of an inspired soul find an utterance in music, or the feelings and thoughts of such a mind speak themselves simply in words;—still it is the effluence of Original Energy in outward matter.

The true Artist, in the sense in which we have spoken of him, finds in the practice of his Art the highest enjoyment of the Blessedness we have described; for his whole being goes forth in free self-sufficient energy, and in the consciousness of this activity. And is there any one, then, to whom every way is shut up of participating in the enjoyment of such creations; and so, in a certain sense, and in a far inferior degree, becoming a joint-creator of them; and in this way at least perceiving that there is a delight which immeasurably transcends every enjoyment of sense?

Another and higher form of the Idea, which however manifests itself in fewer individuals, is the effluence of Original Energy in the *Social relations* of Mankind; the source of all great political Ideas; in life the parent of Heroism, and the author of all Law and Order among men. What power this Idea confers upon man, we have already seen; with what Blessedness it fills the soul devoted to its service, follows from what we have said; and whoever amongst you can think of the world and his country, and

devote his life to their service in forgetfulness of self, knows it from his own experience.

A third form of the Idea is the effluence of the Original Energy in the building up and reconstructing the Universe from itself, *i.e.* from Thought,—in other words *Science;* for whenever Science has shown itself among men, it has been essentially this which I have said, and so it must be forever. The high enjoyment which Science ensures to her votaries has been already described:—we have only to add that this pleasure is more spiritual, and hence higher and more exquisite, than any other ideal enjoyment, because here the Idea is not only present, but is felt and enjoyed *as Idea,*—as Thought itself rising into visibility from the depths of its own nature;—and this is without doubt the highest Blessedness to which mortal can attain here below. It is only in their outward influence that the Fine Arts have the advantage over Science, they being able at times to raise even the uninitiated to their own height by the magic of spiritual sympathy, and so give him a foretaste of perfect enjoyment; while the secrets of Knowledge are only attractive to those for whom they have ceased to be secrets.

Finally:—the most comprehensive, all-embracing and universally comprehensible form of the Idea;—the conscious dwelling of all activity and all life in the One, Ever-Present Source of Life, the Godhead;—or *Religion.* He in whom this consciousness arises with immediate and unalterable certitude, and becomes the soul of all his other knowledge, thoughts, and feelings,—he has entered into possession of a happiness which can never be disturbed. Whatever he encounters, is a form of that original source of Life which in all its forms is holy and good, and which he cannot but love in every shape it may assume; for it is, as he may express it in other words, the Will of God, with which his Will is always at one. Whatever he may be called upon to do, however difficult, mean, or ignoble it may seem, is the living form of that fountain of Life within him,

to be the expression of which constitutes his greatest happiness;—it is the Will of God with him; and to be the instrument of God is his supreme delight. He who ploughs his field in this Faith and Love is infinitely more blessed than he who, without them, removes mountains.

These are the materials for the picture of the One Life according to Reason, to the delineation of which we have devoted the last and the present lecture. Let us now gather together these materials into one conception.

We said that the different forms into which the conception of the One Eternal Original Energy separates itself in our consciousness, and of which we have now indicated the most remarkable, are nevertheless, beyond this consciousness of ours, only one and the same Energy. Wherever this Energy enters into life in any one of these forms, it nevertheless, in and by virtue of that form, embraces itself as a whole, loves itself as a whole, and developes itself as a whole, only without its own knowledge or consciousness; nowhere separated into parts, but always the One, undivided Energy, only repeated and reproduced in different shapes; everywhere the One Life, the fountain of whose Being is in itself Alone, ceaselessly producing itself anew in its own primitive unity, and in its movement rolling forth an endless stream of Time. This One Idea, in the form of the Fine Arts, impresses upon the life-elements which lie around us the outward image of a Humanity lost in the Idea,—to this end only, whether conscious of it or not, that thereby future generations, even on awakening to life, may be surrounded by representations of what is excellent and worthy, and thus receive a sympathetic education of the outward sense, whereby an efficient preparation is made for the cultivation of the inward life;—and so, in this particular form, the Idea struggles towards itself, and labours for itself, as a Whole. Or, the same One Idea, in the form of Religion,—of the soaring of all Earthly Life and activity towards the One, Eternal, Ever-pure, Ever-good, Ever-

blessed Source of Life,—what is it? What noble mind, thoroughly aware of the true character of the Earthly Life, and no longer attracted by it, could prevail upon itself to pursue this Life without reference to the One, Eternal, and Abiding Existence which Religion offers to its view? And thus it is again the One, Undivided Idea which in this form supports Religion itself and all its ultimate consequences, and finally resolves the almost indissoluble contradictions between the feelings which it inspires, and the burdens which it cannot help imposing. And so it is with every other form of the Idea which we have named, and with every other possible form;—the elucidation of which I must leave to your own reflection.

Thus, I said, does the One, Eternal, Self-comprehensive, Self-existent Idea roll forth in the undivided Stream of Time. And, I add, that in every individual moment of this Time-stream it comprehends and pervades itself, being throughout all Time, eternally present to itself. What takes place in it at any moment of time, *is* now, only because the Past *has been*, and because the Future Eternity *shall be*. Nothing in this system is lost. Worlds produce worlds, Ages produce new Ages, which stand in meditation over those which have gone before, and reveal the secret bond of connexion which unites causes and consequences within them. Then the Grave opens,—not that which men heap together in the earth, but the grave of impenetrable darkness wherewith the first life has surrounded us,—and from out it arises the mighty power of Ideas, which sees in a new light the End in the Beginning, the Perfect in the Partial; every wonderful work which springs from Faith in the Eternal appears, and the secret aspirations, which are here imprisoned and bound down to earth, soar upwards on unfettered pinions into a new and purer ether.

In one word: As when the breath of Spring enlivens the air, the strong and fixed ice, which but a few moments before imprisoned each atom within its own limits, and shut

up each neighbouring atom in similar isolation, now no longer holds Nature in its rigid bondage, but flows forth in one free, animated, and glowing flood; as the powers of Nature, which were before divided, and in their separation and antagonism produced only devastation and death, now rush together, embrace and interpenetrate each other, and in this free communion send forth a living balsam upon every sense; so does the Spirit-World not indeed *flow* together at the breath of Love, for in it there is no Winter, but there all *is* and *abides* in eternal communion with the mighty Whole. Nothing individual can live in itself or for itself, but all live in the Whole, and this Whole unceasingly dies for itself in unspeakable love, that it may rise again in new Life. This is the law of the spiritual world:—All that comes into being falls a sacrifice to an eternally increasing and ascending Life; and this law constantly rules over all, without waiting for the consent of any. Here alone lies the distinction;—whether man allow himself to be led, with the halter round his head, like a beast, to the slaughter; or freely and nobly bring his life a gift to the altar of the Eternal Life, in the full fore-enjoyment of the new Life which is to arise from his ashes.

So is it:—under this sacred Legislation, willing or unwilling, asked or unasked, we all stand;—and it is but a heavy fever-dream which weighs upon the brain of the Egoist when he thinks that he may live for himself alone, whereby he cannot change the nature of things, but only does himself a wrong. Might there some more gladdening dream from out the Infinite Silence at times refresh the slumberer in the cradle of Eternity!—might there, from time to time, prophetic whispers fall upon his ear, that there *is* a Light and a Day!

LECTURE V.

FARTHER DELINEATION OF THE THIRD AGE.

Returning from a digression, through which we promised ourselves additional light upon our way, we resume the straight path of our inquiry. Let us once more cast a glance over the purpose of this inquiry as a whole.

It is the end of the Earthly Life of the Human Race, to order all its relations with Freedom according to Reason. To do this with Feeedom, with a Freedom of which the Race shall be conscious, and which it shall recognise as its own, presupposes a condition in which this Freedom had not yet appeared;—not that the relations of the Race have at any time not been ordered according to Reason, for in that case there could have been no Race; but only that this ordering has not been accomplished *by Freedom*, but by Reason as a blind power; that is, by Reason *as Instinct.* Instinct is *blind;* its opposite, Freedom, must therefore be *seeing;*—that is, must be a Science of the laws of Reason according to which the Race is to order its relations by means of its own unconstrained Activity and Art. In order that the Race may be able to attain to Reason as Science, and from thence to Reason as Art, it must in the first place set itself free from the blind dominion of Reason as Instinct. But far from having even a wish to free itself from this constraint, Humanity cannot help loving it, since it rules, as an unconscious power, within Humanity itself. Hence this

constraint must, in the first place, assume the form of an External Authority, and impose itself on Humanity with outward compulsion and power, as the foreign Instinct of a few Individuals; against which External Authority, Humanity now rises in opposition, and sets itself free — primarily from this External Authority itself, but, at the same time, from Reason also, in the form of Instinct; and — since Reason has not yet appeared in any other form, — from Reason altogether.

From this principle we arrived at *five* great Epochs of the Earthly Life of the Human Race, which are the only possible Epochs thereof, and thoroughly exhaust the whole of this Life: — *First*, That in which human affairs are governed by Reason as Instinct without violence or constraint. *Second*, That in which this Instinct has become weaker, and now only manifests itself in a few chosen Individuals, and thereby becomes an External Ruling Authority in reference to all the rest. *Third*, That in which this Authority is thrown off; and, with it, Reason in every shape which it has yet assumed. *Fourth*, That in which Reason in the shape of Science appears among men. *Fifth*, That in which Art associates itself with this Science, in order to mould Human Life with a firmer and surer hand into harmony with Science, and in which the ordering of all the relations of Man according to Reason is, by means of this Art, *freely* accomplished, the object of the Earthly Life attained, and our Race enters upon the higher spheres of Eternity.

We chose for the principal subject-matter of these discourses, the characteristics of the *Third* of the Epochs above mentioned, in consequence of the opinion which we expressed that the Present Age stands in this Third Epoch: — of the correctness or incorrectness of which opinion, we left you entirely to judge for yourselves.

This Third Epoch, as the declared foe of all blind Instinct and of all Authority, takes this maxim as its motto:

—'Accept nothing, but what is understood,'—that is, understood immediately, and by means of the previously existing and hereditary Common Sense. Could we lay open the true nature of this Common Sense, which the Third Epoch assumes as the standard of all its thoughts and opinions, we should then have a clear analysis of its whole system of thought and opinion.

This also we have accomplished. Reason, in whatever shape it reveals itself, whether as Instinct or as Science, always proceeds upon the Life of the Race, *as a Race;* —Reason being thrown off and extinguished, nothing remains but the mere *individual, personal life.* Hence in the Third Age, which has set itself free from Reason, there is nothing remaining but this latter life; nothing, wherever the Age has thoroughly manifested itself and arrived at clearness and consistency, except pure, naked Egoism; and hence it naturally follows that the inborn and established Common Sense of the Third Age can be nothing else, and can contain nothing else, than the wisdom which provides for mere personal well-being.

The *means* of the support and well-being of the personal life, can only be discovered by Experience, since man has no direct guide thereto, either in an animal instinct, such as the beasts possess; or in Reason, which has for its object only the Life of the Race: and hence the assumption of Experience, as the only source of knowledge, is a characteristic trait of such an Age.

From this principle there arise further, those views of Science, of Art, of the Social Relations of Men, of Morality and of Religion, which we have in like manner adduced as prevailing characteristics of such an Age.

In one word: the permanent and fundamental peculiarity and characteristic of such an Age is this,—that every genuine product of it thinks and does all that he actually thinks and does, solely for himself and for his own peculiar advantage;—just as the opposite principle, that of a Life

according to Reason, consists herein,—that each Individual ought to devote his own personal life to the Life of the Race; or in other words,—as it afterwards appeared that the form in which this Life of the Race enters into consciousness and becomes an active power in the life of the Individual, is called Idea,—that each Individual ought to set his personal life, and power, and all enjoyment thereof, in Ideas. In order to make our farther characterization of the Third Age more clear, by contrasting it with the Life according to Reason, we have in our last two lectures entered upon a delineation of this Life, and with respect to that matter, I have now only to add the following remarks:—

In the first place: Herein,—namely, in the distinction which we have pointed out between a life devoted to mere personal well-being, and a life devoted to the Idea,—lies the difference between the Life opposed to Reason and the Life according to Reason; and it is of no importance here whether, in the latter case, the Idea reveal itself in the obscurity of mere Instinct, as in the First Epoch; or be imposed by External Authority, as in the Second; or stand bright and clear in the fulness of Science, as in the Fourth; or rule in the equally clear realization of Art, as in the Fifth; and in this respect the Third Age does not stand opposed to *any one* of the others in particular; but as being essentially and throughout contrary to Reason, it stands opposed to *all other* Time which is in accordance with Reason, and that truly in one uniform way, though from Age to Age under various forms.

In the particular manifestations of the Idea, and its mode of working, which we have adduced in our two last lectures, it appears only in the form of Instinct; for we have there described only the Time which *precedes* the Third Age, and which indeed first makes the existence of that Age possible,—and when Time in general has not yet advanced to the manifestation of the Idea in clear consciousness. Let this

distinction be henceforth kept in view, to prevent misunderstanding.

Now, should any one reject, and cast forth our delineation of a mode of thought in which everything is dedicated to Ideas, as well as this mode of thought itself; should fret over it, attempt to decry it, and represent it as unnatural, (always to himself of course) and as a foolish extravagance; —against such a repudiation we can do nothing, and would do nothing if we could. The more frequently, loudly, and openly this is done, the more thoroughly is there developed, and the more quickly will pass away a mode of thought through which humanity must necessarily pass; and, I may add, the more clearly does it appear that I have hit my mark. But I wish that this repudiation were honestly, openly, and unequivocally avowed; and in so far as it lies with me, I would remove every pretence behind which such a repudiation can take shelter, while something else seems to occupy its place. In this way I desire to do everything, and am conscious of having hitherto done everything in my power, to take away the pretext that these discourses have not been thoroughly understood; and that if they were, they would be at once assented to. These discourses still exist, precisely as they were delivered: the meaning of the language, the sequence of thought, the definition of each individual thought by other thoughts, —upon which the clearness of a discourse depends, —all these things have their well-defined rules; and it may still be determined, whether these rules have been followed; and I, for my own part, believe that I have said nothing but that precisely which I intended to say. A discourse, indeed, which undertakes really to say something, must be heard from beginning to end, and in all its parts. But when a man, let him hear as often as he will, at each new hearing still misconceives what is said; —in him there is no understanding at all, but only some empty husks of phraseology learned by rote, like chaff upon the granary floor. To make this clear by two examples selected at

random: Should some one, for instance, with his head full of the fatal, newly invented confusion of language, according to which every thought may, by mere arbitrary expression, be named Idea, and in which there is no objection to speaking of the *idea of* a chair or a bench;—should such an one wonder how so much importance is attached to the dedication of Life to Ideas, and how in this can be placed the characteristic distinction between two opposite classes of men, whereas everything which enters the mind of any human being is Idea; such an one has understood nothing at all of what we have hitherto said; but without any fault of ours. For we have not failed strictly to discriminate between *Conceptions* which, by means of Experience, find their way into the understanding of the mere sensuous man; and *Ideas* which kindle into independent life in those who are inspired by them, without the aid of Experience.

Or should some one be unable to get over a certain catch-word, brought into circulation with others of the same kind of which it would be quite as difficult to give any rational account, by some conceited *bel esprit*,—the word Individuality—fair, lovely Individuality!—with which he cannot reconcile our unconditional rejection of all Individuality, which after all may be difficult to do;—then such an one has not understood that by Individuality we only mean the personal, sensuous existence of the Individual, which is the true meaning of the word; and by no means deny, but rather expressly teach and inculcate, that the One Eternal Idea assumes a new and hitherto unknown form in each Individual in whom it comes to Life, and this by its own power and under its own legislation, and quite independently of physical nature:—consequently in no way determined thereto by sensuous Individuality, but on the contrary abolishing such Individuality altogether, and of itself alone moulding the Ideal Individuality, or, as it may be more properly called, Originality.

Finally, in this connexion let us add the following:—We by no means assume here the strict tone, and compulsive form of demonstration, but, in addressing open and unprejudiced minds, we have limited ourselves to the modest style of popular lectures, and to the moderate desire of interesting such minds in our communications. But should there be some one who loves to examine and judge upon more special grounds, and wishes to do so here; then let it not be withheld from him, that, notwithstanding our apparent superficiality, we have yet surrounded him with a chain of argument, which he may well consider, and bethink himself what link of it he shall first attempt to break. Should he say,—'All this devotion of Life to the realization of an Idea is a mere chimera to which we ourselves have given birth;'—then we have proved to him historically, that at all times there have been men who have led this Life in the Idea, and that all things great and good which now exist in the world, are the products of this Life. Or should he say,—'Even if this has been so, this way of Life is an old folly and superstition, and our present enlightened Age is far above it;'—then we have shown that since he himself cannot refrain from admiring and reverencing, even against his will, such a mode of Life, there must lie at the bottom of this admiration and reverence a principle to this effect,—that the personal life *ought to be* dedicated to the Idea; and thus, by his own confession, such a mode of Life is approved by the voice of Reason immediately audible within us, and therefore is no superstition. Both these positions being cut off, there would remain no other course for him, but to declare boldly that he has never discovered in himself any such specific feeling as that of admiration or reverence, and that it has never happened to him to reverence or respect anything;—and in this case he would have entirely got rid of our premises, and therefore of all their consequences; and we should then be perfectly satisfied with him.

In the detailed picture of the Third Age which it is now my duty to present to you, I ought, perhaps, in the opinion of most of those who consider the matter, to proceed in my description of the relation of the Present Age to the several forms of the One Idea; in the same order in which these forms themselves have been set forth; and which order I followed in the general characterization of the Age which is contained in the second lecture.

But I have already stated, and I now repeat, that the fundamental maxim of this Age is, to accept nothing but that which it can understand:—the point upon which it takes its stand is thus a conception. It has also been already shown, that it does not attain the Epochal character, and assume the rank of a separate Age, so long as it only *blindly* follows this maxim; but that it can then only be clearly apprehended when it recognises its own nature in this principle, thoroughly understands itself therein, and accepts it as the Highest. Hence the distinctive and peculiar characteristic of this Age is this notion of conception, and it bears the form of *Knowledge;*—only the *empty form*, indeed, since that from which alone Knowledge derives its value, the Idea, is wholly wanting here. Hence, in order to get at the root of this Age, we must first speak of its system of Knowledge. In the description of this system, the views which it contains of the fundamental forms of the Idea, being necessary parts of the system itself, must likewise be considered.

In order to give you, in this place, a still more comprehensive view of what you have now to expect, I add the following ground of distinction, to which I have not yet adverted. The maxim of the Age is, to accept nothing but that which it can understand,—understand, that is to say, through the mere empirical conceptions of Experience,—and, therefore, wherever the Age can establish itself in sufficient power and consistency, it sets up this maxim as its scientific principle, and by it estimates and judges every ac-

quisition of knowledge. But it cannot fail that others, less powerfully animated by the prevailing spirit, without having yet descried the morning-dawn of the new Age, must feel the infinite emptiness and platitude of such a maxim; and then imagining that to get at the True we have only to reverse the False, are disposed to place all wisdom in the Inconceivable and Unintelligible. But since these, too, with their whole mode of thinking, arise out of the Age, and are nothing but its reaction against itself; so, notwithstanding the antagonism of their principles, they as well as the others are products of the Age, and under other conditions would have been but the residue of a former Time; and he who would comprehend the Knowledge of the Age, must bring forward and investigate both principles:—as we shall do.

There is now only one general remark with which I must preface our delineation, namely, the following:—Whether that which we call the Third Age is precisely our own, and whether the phenomena which I shall derive by strict deduction from the principle of this Age, are those which now exist before our eyes;—on this point I have more than once said I leave you to form your own judgment. But in case any one should desire to pass such a judgment, it is necessary to guard him against such reasoning as the following:—'Well, suppose that it cannot be denied that this is the case at present, yet it is by no means a feature peculiar to our Age, but may always have been so.' With this view, when speaking of any phenomena of which this might by possibility be said, I shall call to your recollection Ages in which it was otherwise than it is now.

We commence the delineation of the scientific condition of the Third Age, by a description of its *form*,—that is, of the fixed and essential peculiarities which permeate its whole existence; and we approach these peculiarities in this way:—

When the Idea enters into life, it creates an inexhaustible power and energy, and only from the Idea can such energy arise: an Age without the Idea must therefore be a weak and powerless Age; and all it does, all wherein it shows any sign of life, is accomplished in a languid and sickly manner, and without any visible manifestation of energy. And, with respect to its objects,—since we are now in particular discoursing of Knowledge,—it is neither powerfully drawn towards any one subject, nor does it thoroughly penetrate any; but, attracted by a momentary caprice or other passion, one day to this and another day to that subject, it satisfies itself with glancing at some superficial Appearance, instead of penetrating to the inmost Truth. In its opinions on these subjects, it is dragged here and there by the blind influence of association, consistent in nothing but in this universal superficiality and fickleness; and in its first principle,—that in this levity true wisdom consists. Not so with him who is animated by the Idea in the form of Science. This Idea has arisen upon him in some one particular point in the world of Science, and to this one point it holds his whole life and all its powers enchained, until it becomes perfectly clear to him, and sheds forth a new light on the entire Universe of Thought. That such men have formerly existed, and that Science has not always been prosecuted in such a shallow and feeble manner as that in which the Third Age must necessarily pursue it, is proved at least by the discovery of Mathematics among the ancients. Finally, in its communication of thought, whether in speech or in writing, the same mediocrity and feebleness are apparent. These communications never show forth an organic whole, with all its parts proceeding from, and referred back to, one central point; but they rather resemble a cloud of sand in which each grain is a whole to itself, and which is only held together by the inconstant wind. It seems a master-stroke of invention in such an Age to hit upon the mode of communicating knowledge after the order of the letters of the alphabet. Hence its representations can never possess clear-

ness; the want of which is supplied by a tiresome perspicacity, amounting to nothing more than frequent repetition of the same thing. Wherever this Age attains to full power and energy, this mode of communication even comes to understand itself, and to represent itself as worthy of imitation; so that from thenceforward elegance is placed in neither giving the reader the trouble of thinking for himself, nor in any way calling forth his own independent activity; which indeed is considered as obtrusive;—and the classical writings of the Age are those which every one may read without preparation, and which he may peruse, and lay aside, and still remain exactly what he was before. Not so he who has Ideas to communicate, and who is moved by Ideas to such communication. Not he himself speaks, but the Idea speaks, or writes, in him with indwelling power;—and that only is a good discourse wherein the speaker does not so much declare the thought, as the thought declares itself by the organ of the speaker. That such discourses have been delivered, at least in former times, and that it has not always been the fashion to avoid arousing independent thought in the mind of the hearer or reader, is proved by the writings which are left to us of classical antiquity; the study of which, indeed, and of the languages in which they are written, will be discountenanced and discarded by the Third Age, wherever it acts consequentially,—in order that its own productions alone may be honoured and regarded.

The Idea, and the Idea only, fills, satisfies, and blesses the mind:—an Age without the Idea must therefore necessarily suffer from the consciousness of unsatisfied vacuity, which manifests itself in an infinite, unappeasable, constantly recurring weariness:—it must be wearied as well as wearisome. In this unpleasant state of feeling, it grasps eagerly at that which seems its only remedy,—namely, Wit; either for its own gratification, or, from time to time, to break the weariness which it is conscious of producing in others, and thus in the long deserts of its earnestness, to sow here and

there some grain of sport. This design must indeed of necessity fail, for he only is capable of Wit, who is susceptible of Ideas.

Wit is the communication of profound Truth, — that is, of Truth belonging to the region of Ideas, — in its most direct and intuitive aspect. *In its most direct and intuitive aspect*, I say; — and in this respect Wit is the opposite of the communication of the same Truth in a chain of consecutive reasoning. When, for example, the philosopher separates an Idea, step by step, into its individual component parts; interprets each of these separate parts, one after the other, by means of some other conception which limits and defines it, and pursues this course until he has exhausted the whole Idea; then he proceeds in the way of methodical communication, and proves circuitously the truth of his Idea. Should it happen, however, that he can at last encompass the whole Idea in its absolute unity with one single light-beam, which shall, as with a lightning flash, illumine and reveal it, and penetrate each intelligent hearer or reader, so that he must at once exclaim, 'Yes, truly, so is it; now I see it at one glance;' — then is this the representation of the Idea in question in its most direct and intuitive aspect, or its expression by Wit; and in such a case by direct or positive Wit. Again, Truth may also be proved indirectly, by showing the folly and error of its opposite; and when this is done, not by methodical and gradual exposition, but in immediate and intuitive clearness, then this is indirect, and, in relation to the Idea, negative Wit; exciting laughter in those to whom it is addressed: — it is Wit as the source of the Ridiculous; for Error in its direct and intuitive aspect is essentially ridiculous.

It is not Wit in the first signification, of which even theories are silent, but in the second, — namely, in the form of derision and as exciting laughter, — which this Age comprehends; laughter being a means pointed out by the instinct of Nature itself, for refreshing the mind exhausted

by long-continued weariness, and in some measure enlivening its stagnation by the stirring emotion which it communicates. But even in this shape Wit remains necessarily inaccessible to this Age, for in order freely to perceive and represent Error in direct and self-evident clearness, it is necessary to be oneself superior to Error. This Age has no Wit;—but rather it is often the object of Wit, and that most frequently when, in its own estimation, it is most witty;—*i.e.* it then manifests to the intelligent observer, in its own person, Folly and Error in their highest perfection; but without the slightest suspicion of doing so. He who, in order to paint the Age to the life, has put things into its mouth to which it often unexpectedly gives utterance with the greatest possible gravity,—he may securely call himself a Wit.

How then does the Third Age acquire the kind of scoffing irony which serves it in place of Wit, and its measure of the Ridiculous? Thus:—it sets it down as indisputable that *its* Truth is the right Truth; and whatever is contrary to that must be false. Should any one then take up the opposite position, he is of course in error,—which is absurd: and hereupon it shows, in striking examples, how entirely different the opposite view is from its own, and that in no single point can they coalesce; which indeed may be true. This once laughed at, it readily finds those who will join the laugh, if it only apply to the right quarter. Assuming a scientific form, according to established custom, this principle of the Age is soon understood and dogmatically announced; and it now appears as an axiom to this effect,—that '*Ridicule is the touchstone of truth*,' and consequently that anything may be at once recognised as false, without farther proof, if a jest can be raised at its expense,—in the manner indicated above.

You observe the immense advantages which an Age acquires through this, at first sight, insignificant discovery. In the first place, it is by this means established in secure

possession of its own wisdom; for the Age will always take care to found its test of the Ridiculous upon its own Knowledge, or to join in the laugh when others take this Knowledge for their guide. It is thus spared the trouble of disproving what is brought against it, and has no more to do than to show how far this is from agreement with its own views, and from having hit the mark of its opinion; thus making its opponents ridiculous, and, — should it bring ill-humour in its train, — suspected, and even hated. Finally, this laughter is in itself a pleasant and healthy recreation, by which the most oppressive ennui may frequently be dispelled.

No! — I speak to all here present without exception, in whom I believe that I speak not to members of the Third Age, with whom indeed I never wish to speak, nor to members of any other Age, — but of whom I suppose that they are with myself elevated above all Time, and are now looking down on this particular portion of it: — no, I say, Wit is a godlike spark, and never condescends to Folly. It dwells eternally with the Idea, and never quits its fellowship. In its first shape, it is the wonderful light-conductor in the Spiritual World, by which Wisdom spreads from the point on which she first alights, until she reach and embrace all other points. In its second shape, it is the avenging lightning of the Idea, which seeks out every folly, even in the midst of its disciples, and surely strikes it to the ground. Whether hurled by the hand of an individual with deliberate aim, or not so directed, it still, even in the latter case, reaches its object with the sure course of concealed and inevitable fate. Like the suitors of Penelope, who, when already beset with impending destruction, raved through the dim palace-halls of Ithaca, with frenzied laughter mocking their lugubrious aspects; so do these laugh with insensate mirth, for in their laughter the Eternal Wit of the World-Spirit laughs at them. We shall not grudge them this enjoyment, and we shall be careful not to take the bandage from their eyes.

LECTURE VI.

SCIENTIFIC CONDITION OF THE THIRD AGE.

The principle of the Third Age,—that Age which we have undertaken to describe,—is now sufficiently apparent:—this, namely,—*to accept nothing whatever but that which it understands.* The Conceivable is its highest Idea;—it is thus Scientific in its form; and any complete delineation of it must commence with a description of its Scientific position, because it here becomes most clear and intelligible to itself; and from this, its best defined point, all its other characteristics may most readily be deduced.

In our last lecture, we described this Scientific position, in the first place as regards its *form*,—that is, by means of certain general and fundamental peculiarities which are visible in all its phenomena, and which spring directly from its essential characteristic—its incapacity for the Idea. The Idea, we said, was the source of all power; this Age must therefore necessarily be feeble and powerless;—the Idea was the source of a perennial satisfaction; this Age must therefore be conscious of an emptiness which it endeavours to supply by means of Wit, although this is unattainable by it. To-day we desire to present you with a concise description of this Scientific position itself, as it actually exists.

In the first place, let me remark what I have already

mentioned, in passing, on another occasion, but here desire to inculcate, and for the first time to apply:—Every possible Age strives to encompass and pervade the whole Race; and only in so far as it succeeds in doing this, does it manifest the true character of an Age, since besides this Life of the Race there is nothing remaining but the phenomena of individual life.

So also the Third Age. It is in its nature Scientific: and it must therefore labour and strive to raise all Mankind to this Science. To this Age, Understanding, as the highest and decisive tribunal, possesses a value in itself, and indeed the highest value, determining all other value: and men are thus esteemed only in so far as they readily receive, or studiously acquire, the conceptions of the Understanding, and easily apply and clearly discriminate among them;—and all the efforts of the Age in the Culture of Mankind must be directed to this end. It matters not that individual voices may be heard from time to time exclaiming—'Act! act!—that is the business: what shall mere knowledge avail us?'—for either, by such action is only meant another form of learning; or else, those voices are but the reaction against itself of an Age dissatisfied with its own emptiness, of which we have already made mention in our last lecture: and by such a reaction this Age, in all its varied manifestations, must necessarily be accompanied. In judging of this point, the decisive test is the Education which an Age bestows on the children of all classes, but particularly on those of the people. Is it found that, among all classes, the object aimed at in such Education is that children should *know something;* and, in particular among the people, that they should at least be enabled to read with facility, and, so far as it may be attainable, to write also; and generally, that they should be possessed of the knowledge peculiar to the class on whom their Education devolves: as for example, where that Education is entrusted to the clerical body, that they should be well versed in a systematic and tabular code of dogmatics under

the name of a catechism ;—is this, I say, found to be so? then experience makes good that which we have said. Should other maxims of popular Education here and there make their appearance, and even be in part carried out, this is but the reaction: —the former is the rule, without which indeed no reaction could take place.

It is impossible that these influences, directed upon the Age on all sides and from every quarter, should entirely fail of their purpose. Every individual, even the most insignificant and least cultivated, will in some measure acquire an independent consciousness and knowledge of himself; that is, since the enlightenment of the Age is throughout negative, he will by means of reflection raise himself above something which has been taught him in his youth, and will no longer be restrained by many things which before restrained him. And thus does man recognise himself as Man, attain to independent thought, and the whole Age transforms itself into a fixed camp of Formal Knowledge, —in which, indeed, many and various degrees of rank are to be found, but where each brings his contribution to the common armoury.

I trust that no one here will so far misunderstand what I have said, as to suppose that I unconditionally condemn the characteristics of this Age, which we have now adduced, and thereby attach myself to a party which has already appeared in many shapes, and lately in that of Philosophy also, and which, in every shape it has assumed, has rightly borne the name of *Obscuranti*. Were the Knowledge of the Third Age, Knowledge of the right sort, —did it strive to reach all men of every class, —it should in that case deserve no blame. But those representatives of the Age, who desire to retain their wisdom to themselves, and will not allow it to be spread forth among the masses, only exhibit their inconsistency on a new side. The Age which succeeds the Third, —that of True Science, —will also strive to embrace all men, for if the Laws of Reason are to be made manifest

by Art throughout the whole Race, every individual of the Race must possess at least a certain amount of knowledge of these Laws, since each individual must uphold, by his own private and individual conduct, the outward and public dominion of Reason in the Race, which again reacts in aid of individual effort. All without exception must sooner or later attain to the Science of Reason; therefore all without exception must first be set free from the blind faith of Authority. To accomplish this is the object of the Third Age, and in this it does well.

Understanding, I said, for its own sake possesses a value to this Age,—and indeed the highest value, determining all other value; and upon it is made to depend the dignity and worth of all personality. It is therefore an honour in the estimation of this Age, simply to have thought for oneself, provided only that something new has been brought forward, even although this originality may be merely an obvious perversion of Truth. This Age will never pronounce a final judgment; and by this judgment arrive at ultimate Truth, where it might then remain steadfast and for ever:—it is too faint-hearted to do this;—it only desires a treasury of materials for opinion, among which it may have the power of choice, should it at any time desire to form a judgment;—and therefore every one is welcomed who can increase this store. Thus it happens that individuals, not only without shame, but even with a certain self-satisfaction, step forth and proclaim—'See, here is my opinion; this is the way in which I, for my part, conceive of this matter:—for the rest I willingly allow that others may think quite differently of it,'—and that these individuals even give themselves credit for an amiable modesty of spirit;—whereas, in the truly Scientific mode of thought, it is the greatest arrogance to suppose that our personal opinion is of any essential value, and that any one can be interested in knowing how we, important personages as we are, look upon the matter; and before the tribunal of this mode of thought no one has

a right to open his mouth before he is thoroughly satisfied that his speech shall be not of himself, but the utterance of the Pure Reason within him, and that therefore every one who comprehends him, and desires to maintain the rank of a reasonable being, will recognise his utterance as true and genuine.

Understanding, for its own sake, possesses the highest value for this Age:—this Understanding has therefore supreme Authority, and becomes the first and primitive Authority, limited by no other. Hence arises the idea of Intellectual Freedom, of freedom of Scientific judgment and of public opinion. Let it be made manifest to a true son of this Age that what he has produced is absurd, ridiculous, immoral, and corrupt:—'That is nothing,' he replies; 'I have thought it,—of my own self I have created it,—and thought of itself is always some merit, for it costs some labour; and man must be at liberty to think what he pleases:' —and, truly, to this one has nothing further to say. Let it be shown to another that he is ignorant of the very first principle of an Art or a Science, upon the results of which he has pronounced at great length, and that the whole domain to which it belongs is quite beyond his knowledge:— 'Am I thereby tacitly to understand,' he replies, 'that I ought not to have exercised my judgment under these circumstances? Surely those who say this have no conception of the Freedom of Judgment which belongs of right to men of learning. If a man were in every case to study and understand that upon which he pronounces a judgment, the unconditional Liberty of Thought would thereby be much limited and circumscribed; and there would be found exceedingly few who could venture to pronounce an opinion;— whereas the Freedom of Judgment consists in this,—that every man may judge of all things whether he understands them or not!' Has any one, in the circle of a few friends perhaps, allowed an assertion to escape him, which it may be supposed he would not willingly see published to the world?

In a week or two the printing press is at work to announce the remarkable fact to the world and to posterity. The journals take a part on one side and on the other, carefully investigating and inquiring whether the assertion was actually made or not, what were the exact words employed, and under what conditions the offender may be dismissed in the meantime with a partial punishment, or else be irretrievably condemned. He must stand the brunt; and it will be well for him if, at the end of a few years, he find his business forgotten in some new affair. Let no man smile at this; —for thereby he will only show that he has no sense of the high value of Public Opinion. But should any one who is summoned before the tribunal of this Public Opinion dare to despise its authority, then total perplexity takes possession of the minds of its representatives, and to the end of their lives they gaze in profound astonishment at the man who has had courage sufficient to scorn their jurisdiction. They have, of a truth, thought this which they say;—at least they have assumed the air of having thought it. How then can any reasonable man refuse to pay them that respectful submission which is their due?

The right to raise itself in thought to the conception of the Laws of Reason, free from all constraint of outward authority, is indeed the highest, inalienable right of Humanity:—it is the unchangeable vocation of the Earthly Life of the Race. But no man has a right to wander recklessly about in the empty domain of unsettled Opinion; for such a course is directly opposed to the peculiar and distinctive character of Humanity; *i. e.* to Reason. Neither would any Age have such a right, were not this uncertain hovering between authority and doubt a necessary step in the progress of our Race, whereby it may first be set free from blind constraint, and then be impelled towards Knowledge by the oppressive sense of its own emptiness. Let these men, then, with their pretensions about unlimited Freedom of Thought, and unrestrained Public Opinion,

make what demands they please; and let no man hinder them from degrading themselves as far, and making themselves as ridiculous, as they please;—this must be permitted them. And who should desire to hinder them? Not the State,—at least no State that understands its own interest. The State has charge of watching over the outward actions of its citizens, and ordering these actions by means of imperative laws, which, if they are rightly adapted to the nation, and imposed without distinction upon all, must, without danger of failure, secure and maintain the order which is contemplated. The opinions of the citizens are not actions;—let these opinions be even dangerous, still if crime is sure of its threatened punishment, it will be suppressed despite of opinion. The State may either attempt to change the opinions of its citizens for its own advantage;—and in this case, it partly undertakes a thing which it cannot accomplish, and partly shows that its laws are not adapted to the existing condition of the nation to which this system of opinion belongs; or, that the governing power is inadequate, and, being unable to trust to its own resources, needs the aid of a foreign power which can never be thoroughly incorporated with it. Or, the State may attempt,—perhaps with the purest intentions, and from the warmest zeal on the part of its administrators for promoting the dominion of Reason,—it may attempt to combat the prevailing opinions by means of external power;—and in this case it undertakes a thing in which it can never succeed, for all men feel that it then takes the form of injustice, and the persecuted opinion being thus to a certain extent established in its right, gains new friends by the injustice which it suffers, and by this conviction of the justice of its cause acquires a stronger power of opposition; and the matter ends by the State being obliged to yield, whereby it once more only shows its weakness. In like manner, neither will the few worshippers of True Knowledge hinder these advocates of unrestricted license. They have

no power to do so; and if they had, they would not desire to use it. Their weapons are no other than the Truths of Reason; their wishes for the world no other than that these Truths should make their way by means of free conviction. Whatever they may say, is to be comprehended as true, and as alone true: nothing that they say is to be learned by rote, and accepted in faith and trust; for then would humanity be only brought back again to bondage, and subjected to a new authority; and instead of the desired progress, there would be only a retreat in a new direction. Could these men comprehend it, they would no doubt acknowledge its truth;—for we do not charge them with the baseness which disavows its own conviction of better things. But, precisely because they do not comprehend it, they are what they are; and so must they remain, so long as they do not comprehend it:—since they are once for all what they are, it is impossible for them to become anything else;—and they must be endured, as integral parts of an unchangeable and necessary order of things.

This mode of thinking, I said before, will strive to spread itself universally; and in certain masses of the Human Race it will succeed in this, and with them the whole Age will become a camp of mere Formal Knowledge. Who rules in this camp, and leads on its armies?—'Clearly,' it will be answered, 'the Heroes of the Age; the champions in whom the Spirit of the Time has most gloriously revealed itself.' But who are these, and by what marks are they to be recognised? Perchance by the importance of the researches which they set on foot, or the truth which radiates from their doctrines, and enlightens all men? How were that possible, when the Age passes no judgment whatever upon the importance or truth of any thing, but only collects a store of opinions as materials for a future judgment? Thus he who only announces an opinion, and thereby brings his contribution to the great magazine of general speculation,

in this way qualifies himself to be a leader of the host. But, as we have already observed, there is no preëminence to be attained in this Age; for every one who breathes its atmosphere, has at one time or another swelled the general store of opinion by producing some conception of his own. Unfortunately, a disaster often befalls this fertile capacity of thought;—this, namely,—that the opinion which bears universal sway in the evening, is in the morning forgotten by all the world, even by its own prolific inventor;—and so this new contribution to the treasures of the Age vanishes into thin air. But should a method be discovered by which this fact of an opinion having been announced, as well as the opinion itself, in so far as this latter may be possible, should be firmly established, and protected against the next morning's breeze, so that all who are blessed with sound eyesight might be distinctly advertised that an opinion had been ushered into the world, and the opinion itself be provided with a fixed record of its import, and thus secured against oblivion;—if, for example, the arts of Writing and Printing were discovered, then should the Age be delivered from its perplexity. Then he whose opinions stood permanently recorded by means of ink and paper, should belong to the Heroes of the Age, the sublime phalanx of whom constitutes a community of votaries of Knowledge, or, as they better love to be called,—their whole being resting only on empiricism,—a Republic of Letters.

In this estimate the Age is by no means disturbed by the consideration that the admission into this glorious senate of humankind is usually effected through the nearest printer, whose knowledge of what he prints is even less than that of the writer as to what he writes, and whose only desire is to exchange his own printed paper for that of others.

In this way the Republic of Letters is brought together. By means of the printing press, it is separated from the masses who do not print anything, and whose position in the camp of Formal Knowledge is that of Readers only. Hence

arise new relations and connexions between these two principal sections of the camp of Formal Knowledge.

The first purpose of printing is obviously to announce publicly to all the world the independence of mind possessed by the Author;—from this arises, *in Science*, a catching at new or seemingly new opinions; and *in Literature*, a striving after new forms. He who has attained this end, gains the favour of his Reader, whether or not, in the one case, his *opinion* be true; or, in the other, his *form* be beautiful. But when the printing press has thoroughly come into play, even this novelty is laid aside, and mere printing, for its own sake alone, becomes a merit;—and then arises, *in Science*, the tribe of *compilers*, who give to the world what has been a hundred times before given to it, only with some slight transposition of its parts; and *in Literature*, the *fashionable author*, who continues to repeat a form which has been already approved in others or in himself, until at last no man can any longer discover the faintest significance in it.

This stream of Literature now flows forth, constantly renewing itself; every new tide displacing its forerunner; so that the purpose originally contemplated in printing is frustrated, and the hope of immortality by means of the press destroyed. It matters not to have brought forth one's opinion in open print, unless one also possess the art to continue so to do unceasingly:—for all that is Past is soon forgotten. Who is there that shall bear it in memory? Not the Author, as such: for since each strives after something new, no one listens to another, but each goes his own way, and promulgates his own conceptions. Not the Reader: for he, glad to be done with the old, flies to the newest comers, in choosing among whom he is for the most part guided by mere chance. In these circumstances no one who commits his lucubrations to the press, can be sure that any one, except himself and his printer, shall know anything of the matter. Hence it becomes indispensably necessary to set on foot and establish some public and general record or me-

morial of Literature. Such are the learned Journals and Magazines, which once more make known what it is which the Author has made known, and by means of which an Author is enabled to repeat, even after the lapse of half a year, what he has said already; and a similar opportunity is afforded to the reading public to learn what he has said, if they read the learned Journals. But it would not accord with the dignity of the authors of these publications, and would place them too far below other writers, if they only conveyed this intelligence of the thoughts of others; they must therefore, while reporting their information, also assert their own independence by discussing these thoughts and announcing their own opinion thereupon;—the leading maxims in this business being the following:—that the Reviewer shall always find something to censure; and that he knows everything better than the original Author.

With such writings as commonly appear, this is of little moment; for it is no great misfortune that something which is bad at first should be made worse by the new treatment of the Reviewer. Writings which really deserve to see the light, whether in the department of Science or that of Literature, are invariably the expression of a whole Life devoted to the Idea in some new and original form; and until such writings have seized upon the Age, and penetrated it, and fashioned it after their own thought, no judgment of them is possible: and therefore it is obvious that no thorough and comprehensive Review of such works can be produced in a half, or even in a whole year. It is of course understood that the ordinary critics do not make this distinction, but unhesitatingly seize upon all that comes under their notice without discrimination; and also that the same judgment is pronounced upon truly original works, as upon the most thoroughly worthless productions. But even this fault is no misfortune except to themselves; for nothing really good is lost in the stream of Time:—how long soever it may lie defamed, misunderstood, and disregarded, the day at length

arrives when it throws off its disguises and comes forth into light. But the individual who should feel aggrieved by such perverted views of his writings,—who should vex himself at such attacks, instead of compassionately laughing at them, would only show thereby that his opponent had a certain amount of truth on his side,—that his own individual personality had not yet wholly disappeared in the Idea, and in the Knowledge and Love of Truth;—that therefore this personal feeling may indeed have shown itself in his work, and that the more offensively, the purer the expression of the Idea with which it is associated:—and such an one receives thereby the most urgent and impressive summons to retire within his own soul, and to purify himself. 'Do they regard this matter falsely?'—thinks he who is pure within himself:—'it is to their prejudice, not mine; and that they do regard it falsely, is not the fault of an evil will, but of a weak vision;—they themselves would be glad indeed were it possible for them to come to the truth.'—Finally it is to be mentioned as an advantage arising from the creation of the critic species, that he who has no great pleasure in reading, or has not much time to devote to that purpose, no longer requires to read books; but by mere reference to the learned Journals finds the whole Literature of the Age brought within his grasp;—and in this way, indeed, it may be said that books are only printed in order that they may be reviewed; and there would no longer be any need for books, if Reviews could be fabricated without them.

Such is the portraiture of the active section of this camp of Formal Knowledge;—namely, the Authors. After their image, the passive or receptive section,—the body of Readers, fashions itself, that it may become their exact counterpart. As the former write on, without rest or intermission; so do the latter read on, without rest or intermission,—straining every nerve to keep their head above the flood of Literature, and, as they call it, to advance with the Age.

Glad to have been driven through the old by necessity, they eagerly grasp at the new, while the newest already makes its appearance; and not a single moment remains for them ever to revert to the old. They can by no means stop themselves in this restless career, in order to consider what they read;—for their business is pressing, and time is short:—and so it is left wholly to chance what and how much of their reading may stick to them in this rapid transit, how it may influence them, and what spiritual form it may assume.

This custom of reading for its own sake is specifically different from every other habit of mind; and having something about it in the highest degree agreeable, it soon becomes an indispensable want to those who once indulge in it. Like other narcotic remedies, it places those who use it in the pleasant condition betwixt sleeping and waking, and lulls them into sweet self-forgetfulness, without calling for the slightest exertion on their part. It has always appeared to me to have the greatest resemblance to tobacco-smoking, and to be best illustrated by that habit. He who has once tasted the delights of this condition, will desire continually to enjoy them, and will devote himself to nothing else: he now reads even without regard to the knowledge of Literature, or to advancing with his Age, but with this view only, that he may read, and reading live;—and so represents in his person the character of the pure *Reader*.

At this point Authorship and Readership both reach their end; they melt away and disappear, being destroyed by their own results. To the pure Reader, as we have described him, there is no longer any instruction in his reading, nor does he derive any clear conceptions therefrom; for any printed production forthwith lulls him into listless repose and placid forgetfulness. Besides, all other means of instruction are cut off from him. Hence verbal communication, by continuous discourse or scientific conversation, possesses infinite advantage over the mere dead letter. Writing was only

practised by the Ancients in order to convey such spoken instruction to those who had not access to the speaker; everything that was written had in the first place been verbally communicated, and was but a copy of the spoken discourse: only among the Moderns, and particularly since the invention of printing, has this method of intercourse claimed recognition for its own sake; whereby style, among other things, having lost the living corrective of speech, has fallen to ruin. But even for spoken communication, a Reader such as we have described is from the first wholly unfit.

How could such an one, accustomed to resign himself in absolute passivity, understand the bearings of a connected discourse, which demand an active effort of the mind to lay hold of and retain them? How could he, were the discourse broken up into periods, as every good discourse ought to be; —how could he combine the separate periods together, and review them as a whole? If he could have them put before his eyes in black and white,—then, he thinks, his difficulty should be removed. But he deceives himself. Even in that case, he would not mentally comprehend the unity of the discourse, but would only, through his eye, embrace the extent of it included within his range of vision, hold this fast upon the paper and by means of the paper;—and then imagine that he had comprehended it.

Arrived at this point, I said, the scientific effort of the Age has destroyed itself! and the Race stands in absolute impotence on the one side, and in absolute incapacity on the other, for farther cultivation:—the Age can no longer read, and therefore all writing is in vain. Thus it is high time to begin something new,—and, in my opinion, this something should be, on the one side, to return to the method of spoken discourse, and to cultivate proficiency in this Art;—and on the other, to acquire the requisite capacities for appreciating this form of communication.

If reading is still to be practised, it should at least be in another way than is customary now. In order that I may

follow up the repulsive description which I have had to bring before you to-day, with something more pleasing, allow me to state what mode of reading I hold to be the right one.

Everything that is to be read in print, is either a work of Science, or a production of refined Literature: whatever is neither of these, and is without relation to one or other of them, is much better unread, and might as well have remained unwritten.

In the first place, with respect to works of Science:— The first object in reading them is to understand them, and to apprehend historically the true meaning of the Author. To do this, we must not passively resign ourselves to our Author, and suffer him to mould us as chance or fortune may direct; or accept at once whatever dicta he may choose to propound, and so depart, and get these by rote. But as the Experimentalist subjects Nature to his interrogatories, and compels her not to speak at random but to reply to the questions which he puts to her; so is the Author to be subjected to a skilful and well considered experiment by the Reader. This experiment is made in the following way. After a cursory perusal of the whole book, with the view of obtaining beforehand a general conception of the Author's design, the Reader ought to turn to the first leading principle, period, or paragragh, as the case may be. This is necessarily, even with respect to the purpose of the Author, only to a certain extent defined; in other respects undefined;—were it already completely defined, then were the book at an end, and there were no need for the continuation, the only purpose of which is, that therein what still remains undefined, may gradually be brought to light. Only in so far as this principle is defined, is it intelligible; in so far as it is undefined, it as yet remains unintelligible. These separate portions, the Intelligible and the Unintelligible, the reader sets clearly before himself in the following way. 'The subject of which this Author treats is, in itself,

and independently of the Author, definable in this way, and this.' The more completely the various possible modes of defining the conception are understood beforehand, the better are we prepared. 'Of these different ways of defining his subject, the Author in his first principle touches only this, and this; and thus defines his subject only in such and such respects, as distinguished from the other modes of defining it which are also possible. So far only is he intelligible to me. But he leaves his principle undefined in this, and this, and this respect; how he may view it on these sides, I know not as yet. I stand fast in an intelligible position, surrounded by a distinctly recognised circle of what is as yet unintelligible. How the Author may think upon these points, provided he has not declared it at once, will be seen from the way in which he follows up the principles he has laid down; the use which he makes of his admitted propositions will reveal this. Let me read further until the Author more fully declare himself: by this new definition, a portion of the former indefiniteness certainly disappears; the clear point is extended, the sphere of the Unintelligible is narrowed. Let me make this new acquisition of the Intelligible thoroughly distinct to myself, and impress it on my mind, and read on until the Author declare himself anew;—and so on in the same way until the sphere of the Undefined and the Unintelligible has wholly disappeared in the general mass of light, and I can re-create for myself the whole system of the Author's thought in any order that may be desired, and from any selected point deduce all its other forms.' And in order that he may strictly watch over himself during this examination of his Author, and also in order that what has once become clear and distinct may not again be lost, it would even be advisable that he should undertake this whole operation pen in hand, although it should be necessary, as at first might well be the case, to devote twenty written sheets to a single printed one. Any lamentation

over the loss of paper were here out of place;—only let him take care that this paper do not hastily find its way to the press under the name of a Commentary! This Commentary, as proceeding from the amount of culture which he has brought to the study of his Author, is still merely a commentary for him: and every one who truly desires to understand the matter would require to practise the same operation upon his commentary. Let him rather, as is more becoming, leave others to perform the same operation for themselves upon the original Author which he himself has had to do.

It is obvious that in this way a writer may often be much better understood by another than by himself, particularly when the Reader sets out from a clearer conception than his Author. '*Here* he gets involved in his own reasoning,—*there* he makes a false conclusion,—*elsewhere* fitting utterance is denied him, and he writes down something wholly different from what he wishes to express;—what is that to me? I know *how* he ought to have proceeded, and *what* he would have said, for I have penetrated his whole thought. These are the failings of human weakness, which, when united with true merit in the subject itself, no honourable mind will reprove.'

It is also clear, that by this mode of reading it may soon be discovered when the Author is not master of the Science of which he aspires to write, and is ignorant of the extent to which it has already been cultivated; or when he is only a bewildered dreamer. In both cases his book may be quietly laid aside: it will not be necessary to read it again.

And in this way, the first object,—the understanding and historical recognition of the Author's meaning,—is attained. Whether this meaning be consistent with Truth,—to ascertain which is the second purpose of reading,—will be very easily determined after such a searching study as we have described; if, indeed, a judgment upon this latter point has not already been formed during the study itself.

In the second place, with respect to the reading of a Literary work:—The only purpose of such reading is, that the Reader may partake of the inspiration, elevation, and culture of mind which the work may be designed to communicate. For this purpose, mere passive self-abandonment is all that is requisite; for it is not the business of every man to penetrate to the source of æsthetic pleasure, or even to trace its operations in individual cases. Art summons all men to the enjoyment, but only a few to the use, or even to the knowledge, of her secrets. But in order that a work of Art may even come into contact with our minds, and we ourselves enter into communion with it, it must first of all be understood;—that is, we must thoroughly comprehend the purpose of the Artist, and what it is which he desires to communicate to us by his work, and be able to reproduce this purpose, as the pervading spirit of the whole work, out of all its parts, and again to deduce these from the purpose which created them. Still, this is not the work itself, but only the prosaic part of it;—that only which, in the contemplation of the work from this point of view, lays hold of and penetrates us with irresistible power, is the Truth of Art:—but still we must first possess this introductory knowledge, this comprehension of the work in its organic unity, before we are capable of its enjoyment. This organic unity indeed, like all works of Genius, still remains infinite and inexhaustible, but it is no mean pleasure to have approached it, although only at a distance. We may return to our common occupations, and forget this glorious revelation; but it will abide secretly in our souls, and gradually develope itself there unknown to us. After a time we will return to this work, and see it under another form; and thus it shall never become old to us, but with every new contemplation create a fresh life within us. We shall no longer desire something new, for we shall have discovered the means of transforming even the oldest into young and living originality.

What this organic unity of a work of Art, which is before

all things to be understood and comprehended, really is,—will be asked by no one to whom it is not already known, and whose own thoughts I have not either repeated, or at least given clearer utterance to, in what I have already said. With regard to the unity of a *Scientific* work, I could make myself quite clear to you, and I think that I have done so; not so with respect to the unity of a work of *Art*. At all events, the unity of which I speak is not that unity of its plot, and coherence of its parts, and its probability, and psychological value, and moral instructiveness, which are prated of in the common theories, and by the common critics of Art:—vain chatter of barbarians who willingly calumniate the feeling of Art, on behalf of other barbarians who suffer themselves to be deluded into an approval and sanction of such calumny!—the unity of which I speak is another than this,—and is best made known, to those who have not yet attained to it, by examples, and by actual analysis and comprehension of existing works of Art, in the spirit which we have described. Would that a man could be found who would work out this high advantage for humanity, and thereby rekindle in young minds the almost extinguished sense of Art!—such an one, however, must not himself be a young mind, but a thoroughly tried and mature man. Until this come to pass, others may quietly refrain from the reading and contemplation of those existing products of Art which by reason of their infinite depth are unintelligible to them, and the enjoyment of which, since enjoyment presupposes an understanding of them, is also shut up from their participation. They will find it better to their account, to content themselves with Artists of another class; who take the favourite tendencies, weaknesses and amusements of the Age under their protection; and so crowd into a few short moments that which all men desire to be through life; and actually are, although unfortunately not without frequent interruptions. And so it shall be in reality, henceforward as hitherto, whether we have accorded it our sanction or not.

LECTURE VII.

EARLIER CONDITIONS OF THE SCIENTIFIC OR LITERARY WORLD, AND ITS IDEAL CONDITION.

There are two objections which may be anticipated to such descriptions as have been presented to you in my last lecture, and which require consideration: — *First*, that everything we have adduced may indeed exist in Human Nature generally, but not in the constitution of any particular Age; and hence may chance to be found in all Times: *Second*, that the whole view is one-sided; — that we have only adduced whatever is defective in the Age, and set it in an unfavourable light, but have passed over in silence the good which is nevertheless to be found in it. The former objection may be best met by recalling to mind Ages in which it has been otherwise than we have described, and showing historically how, and by what causes, the present state of things has arisen. The latter objection cannot affect us, if we only keep in mind the nature and purpose of our present undertaking. We have asserted nothing whatever upon the ground of experience, but on the contrary have deduced the different elements of our description from principle alone. If our deduction has been correct and rigid, we have no occasion to inquire whether these things are so in present reality or not. Are they not so? — then we do not live in the *Third* Age. What we do maintain with regard to them, — that they constitute a real stage in the progress of Hu-

manity, which our Race must of necessity pass through;—this cannot be disproved by any such phenomenon. We must also keep in view the general remark made in an early portion of these lectures, that the elements of very different Ages may often be found coëxistent in the same period of chronological time, and may intermingle or cross each other; and in accordance with this remark, our case may be thus stated:—We have not taken up empirically the literary condition of *our own Time*, as such; but we have put together a philosophical picture of that of the *Third Age*:—it was this which we had to make out, and not its opposite; and it was of it alone that we undertook to speak. If in the same period of Time there are found other elements, then these are either the remnants of a Past, or the presages of a Future Age;—neither of which we are now called upon to notice.

Nevertheless, to guard ourselves in every possible way against misconception, and particularly against that most hateful of all misconceptions,—that we have denied everything good which exists in our Age;—and also in order to make a distinct and complete separation of whatever belongs to different Ages,—it will be proper to show in the latter respect, how the Scientific world *ought to be* constituted. Both of these questions,—the last which we have mentioned, as well as the first,—we shall consider in this day's discourse.

In the first place:—we have to show that the state of literature has not always been such as we have described in our last lecture; and to declare how it has now become so. Among the two classical nations of antiquity with which we are best acquainted, the Greeks and Romans, there was much less written and read than among ourselves; while, on the contrary, there was much more spoken, and vocal discourse was much more carefully cultivated. Almost all their writings were in the first place delivered in speech, and were thus only copies of spoken discourses for the use of those

who could not themselves be present at their delivery; and from this circumstance arises, amongst other advantages, the great superiority of the Ancients over the Moderns in respect of style, since, among the latter, written productions claim a peculiar value for themselves, and, for the most part, want the corrective of living speech. There existed no particular interest in spreading scientific culture among the people; but the culture in which they actually participated was chiefly accidental, and more a culture of Art than of Science.

Christianity appeared in the world, and there arose an entirely new interest in general cultivation, for the sake of Religion, to which all men were now called. There are in our opinion two very different forms of Christianity:—the one contained in the Gospel of John, and the other in the writings of the Apostle Paul; to which latter party, the other Evangelists, for the most part, and particularly Luke, belong. The Johannean Jesus knows no other God than the True God, in whom we all are, and live, and may be blessed, and out of whom there is only Death and Nothingness; and he appeals, and rightly appeals, in support of this Truth, not to reasoning, but to the inward practical sense of Truth in man,—not even knowing any other proof than this inward testimony. 'If any man will do the will of Him who sent me, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God:'—such is his teaching. As to its historical aspect, his doctrine is to him as old as the creation,—it is the first and primitive Religion;—Judaism, on the contrary, as a corruption of later times, he unconditionally and unsparingly rejects:—'Your father is Abraham; mine is God,'—says he to the Jews;—'Before Abraham was, I am;—Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad.' This latter assertion,—that Abraham saw Jesus' day,—refers without doubt to the occasion when Melchizedek, the Priest of The Most High God,—(which Most High God is expressly opposed, throughout the whole first chapter of the

first book of Moses, to the subordinate and creating God, Jehovah)—when, I say, this Priest of the Most High God blessed Abraham, the servant of Jehovah, and took tithes from him; from which latter circumstance the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews very fully and acutely proves the greater antiquity and superior rank of Christianity over Judaism, and expressly calls Jesus a Priest after the order of Melchizedek, and thus represents him as the restorer of the Religion of Melchizedek;—without doubt entirely in the sense of that peculiar revelation of Jesus which is given by John. In this Evangelist it remains wholly doubtful whether or not Jesus was of Jewish origin at all;—or if he were, what was his descent and parentage. Quite otherwise is it with Paul, by whom, even from the commencement of a Christian Church, John has been superseded. Paul, having become a Christian, would not therefore be in the wrong in having been once a Jew; both systems must therefore be united, and fitly accommodate themselves to each other. This is brought about in the following way, as indeed it could not easily have been effected in any other:—He sets out from the powerful, angry, and jealous God of Judaism, the same whom we have already depicted as the God of the whole Ancient World. With this God, according to Paul, the Jews had made a Covenant;—this was their advantage over the Heathen. During the existence of this Covenant they had but to keep the Law, and they were justified before God; that is, they had no farther evil to fear from him. By the murder of Jesus, however, they had broken this Covenant; and since that time it no longer availed them to keep the Law. On the contrary, since the death of Jesus, a New Covenant came into operation, to which both Jews and Heathen were invited. According to this New Covenant, both had only to acknowledge Jesus as the promised Messiah, and were thereby justified; as the Jews had been justified, before the death of Jesus, by the keeping of the Law. Christianity became a New Testament or Covenant,

existing now for the first time, and abolishing the Old Testament or Covenant. Now, indeed, it was necessary that Jesus should become a Jewish Messiah, and be made a son of David, that the prophecies might be fulfilled;—genealogies were discovered, and a history of his birth and of his childhood,—which, however, in both the shapes in which they appear in our canon, strikingly enough contradict each other. I do not say, that in Paul, generally, True Christianity is not to be found: when he is not directly engaged with the great problem of his life,—the intercalation of the two systems,—he speaks so justly and so excellently, and knows the True God of Jesus so truly, that we seem to listen to another man altogether. But wherever he treats of his favourite theme, it is as we have stated above.

The immediate consequence of this Paulinean system;—a system which undertook to remove the objections raised by the disputatious reasonings of the Jews;—the first principle of which reasonings, *i. e.* that Judaism was once the True Religion,—which is wholly denied by the Johannean Jesus,—is here not only not denied, but fully asserted:—I say, that the immediate and necessary consequence of such a system was, that it should itself become addicted to disputatious reasoning, and constitute itself a judge of such reasoning;—and indeed, since Christianity is addressed to all men,—a judge of the reasoning of all men. And so did Paul in reality;—he reasoned and disputed like a master, and gloried in having taking captive—*i. e.* convinced—all minds. Thus the Understanding was already to him the highest Authority, and it necessarily assumed this position in a system of Christianity of which Paul was the Author. But by this means the way was already prepared for the ruin of Christianity. 'You have summoned me to reason;—I, with your good leave, will reason for myself. You have indeed tacitly taken it for granted that my reasoning cannot issue in any result different from your own; but should it fall out otherwise, and I should arrive at some wholly

opposite conclusion,—as will unquestionably happen, should I proceed upon some other prevalent philosophy,—then must I prefer my own conclusions to yours, and that too with your own approval, if you are consistent to your own teaching.' Such liberty was very assiduously cultivated in the first centuries of the Christian Church, and arguments without end were carried on respecting dogmas which owed their origin wholly to the Paulinean scheme of Mediation; and there arose in the One Church the greatest possible variety of opinions and disputes;—all proceeding upon the maxim that the Understanding is the Supreme Authority:—and this scheme of Christianity, I may once for all term Gnosticism. In this way it was impossible to preserve the unity of the Church; and since all parties were equally far from discovering the true source of the evil, in the original departure from the simplicity of Christianity for the purpose of gaining the good graces of Judaism, there was nothing left but a very heroic expedient; this, namely, to forbid all farther thought, and to maintain that, by a special providence of God, the Truth was deposited in the Written Word and the existing Oral Traditions, and must be believed whether it was understood or not;—and as any farther interpretation of those infallible sources of Truth which might be necessary, rested with the Church at large, or with a majority of the voices of the Church, it followed that the statutes in which this interpretation was contained demanded a faith as unconditional as the original media themselves. Henceforward all invitations on the part of Christianity to individual thought and conviction were at an end: on the contrary, such thought became a forbidden enterprise visited with all the punishments of the Church; so that he who could not abandon it, pursued it at his own peril.

In this condition the matter remained for a long period, until the Reformation broke forth;—the Art of Printing, the most important instrument of this Reformation, having been previously discovered. This Reformation was as far

removed as the original self-constituted Church from perceiving the true ground of the degeneration of Christianity; it remained at one with the Church in its rejection of Gnosticism, and in its demand for unconditional Faith even without Understanding;—only it directed this Faith towards another object; rejecting the Infallibility of Oral Tradition, and of the Decrees of Councils, and taking its stand upon the Written Word. The inconsistency of this position,—the Authenticity of this Written Word itself resting upon Oral Tradition, and upon the Infallibility of the Councils who collected and fixed our Canon,—was overlooked. And thus, for the first time in the world, a *Written Book* was formally installed as the highest Standard of Truth, and the only Teacher of the way of Salvation.

Out of this Book, thus elevated to be the sole criterion of Truth, the Reformers combated whatever flowed from the other two sources of belief; thus obviously reasoning in a circle, and ascribing to their opponents a principle which they disowned; these asserting that without Oral Tradition and the Decrees of the Church it is impossible to understand the Scriptures, of which they contain the only authentic interpretation. In this position of their cause, and its absolute untenableness for an *educated* public who were acquainted with the points at issue, they had no course remaining open to them except an appeal to the *people*. For them, therefore, the Bible had to be translated into the vulgar tongues, and thus placed in their own hands; and they had to be called upon to read and to judge for themselves, whether that which the Reformers found in the Scriptures is not clearly contained therein. These means could not but succeed. The people were flattered by the privilege conferred upon them, and eagerly availed themselves of it on every opportunity; and by means of this principle, indeed, the Reformation would certainly have spread over the whole of Christian Europe, had not the authorities set themselves against it, and hit upon the only certain antidote to its

progress; *i.e.* to prevent the Protestant translations of the Bible, and their other writings, from falling into the hands of the people.

It was only through this zeal for Christianity, as represented by the Bible, which Protestantism called forth, that the printed *letter* acquired the high and universal value which it has possessed since the Reformation: it became the almost indispensable means of salvation; and without being able to read, a man could no longer, properly speaking, be a Christian, or be tolerated in any Christian and Protestant State. Hence the prevailing notions on the subject of popular education; hence the universality of reading and writing. We need not be surprised that the primary object,—Christianity, —was afterwards forgotten, and that what was at first only the means, became in itself the end: this is the common fate of all human arrangements, after they have endured for any length of time.

This abandonment of the end for the means was particularly promoted by a circumstance which, for other reasons, we cannot leave untouched. The Old Church, wherever she was enabled to maintain herself against the first assaults of the Reformation, soon discovered new means of opposition, whereby she was relieved from all dread of the new power; and this the more easily that Protestantism itself placed these means in her hands. There soon arose, namely, in the bosom of the latter, a new Gnostiscism; bearing indeed the form of Protestantism, and taking its stand on the Bible, but, like the old Gnostiscism, maintaining the principle that the Bible must be interpreted by Reason; that is, by such Reason as these Gnostics themselves possessed;—and they were just so far reasonable as the worst of all philosophical systems, that of Locke, enabled them to be. They did no other service than the combating some of the Paulinean notions;—that of vicarious satisfaction, saving faith in this satisfaction, &c.;—leaving untouched the great leading error of an arbitrary God, now making Covenants, and now

abolishing them, according to time and circumstances. By this means Protestantism lost almost every feature of Positive Religion, and the followers of the old faith were enabled, aptly enough, to represent it as absolute Infidelity. Thus securely protected against its assailants, the Church had nothing more to fear from Authorship and its attendant tribe of Readers; and these could now propagate their opinions out of Protestant into Catholic States under the name of Independent Philosophy.

Thus much it was necessary for me to say in order to resolve the question with which we set out, as to the origin of the high value which is now set upon the *printed letter*. In this inquiry, I have had to touch upon matters which possess great value for many, who associate them with what alone is possessed of absolute value — with Religion. I have spoken of Catholicism and Protestantism, so that it may be seen that I hold them both to be in error in the most important matter at issue; and I would not willingly leave this matter without, at least, declaring my own view of it.

In my opinion, both parties stand on one common ground, which is wholly untenable,—the Paulinean theory;—which, in order to give validity to Judaism, even for a limited time, had necessarily to proceed upon the conception of an arbitrary God; and both parties being completely at one as to the truth of this theory, and not harbouring the slightest doubt regarding it, dispute only concerning the grounds upon which the Paulinean scheme is to be maintained. Thus peace and unity are no more to be thought of; nay, it were far from desirable that a peace should be concluded in favour of either side. Peace, however, would forthwith be the result, were mankind to throw aside this theory altogether, and return to Christianity in its original form, as it exists in the Gospel of John. There, no proof is recognised but the Inward Testimony, — the appeal to man's own sense of Truth, and to his spiritual Nature. Who Jesus himself, in his mere personality, was or was not, is of importance only to the follower of

Paul, who would make him the abrogator of an Old Covenant with God, and the mediator of a New one in the same name, for which business it was of essential importance that he should possess a significant descent. The true Christian knows no Covenant or Mediation with God, but only the Old, Eternal, and Unchangeable Relation, that in Him we live, and move, and have our being; and he asks not *who* has said this, but only *what* has been said;—even the book wherein this may be written is nothing to him as a proof, but only as a means of culture; he bears the proof in his own breast. This is my view of the matter, which does not seem to contain anything very dangerous, and does not overstep the limits of the freedom of philosophical inquiry into religious topics recognised among Protestants; and I have communicated it to you in order that you may test it by your own knowledge of Religion and its history, and may try whether by means of it, light, order, and connexion are introduced into the whole;—but I have no wish to invite the *Theologian* to a discussion of it. Educated myself in the schools of the Theologians, I am well acquainted with their weapons, and I know that upon their own ground they are invincible; but I also know my own theory, which I have now communicated to you, too well not to perceive that it altogether supersedes the whole present Theology, with all its pretensions; and that whatever is valuable in the inquiries of these men, has reference only to the departments of historical and philological learning, without possessing any influence upon Religion or Happiness;—and thus I can hold no communion with the Theologian, who desires to remain a Theologian rather than a Teacher of the People.

So much for our first business,—to exhibit historically the way in which that state of Literature and Science, already described as characteristic of the Third Age, has actually arisen. Now to our second task,—to show how this Literary and Scientific world *ought to be* cultivated.

In the first place:—All the existing relations of actual

life, which can only be superseded in and by the Age of the perfect Art of Reason, demand that only a few shall devote their lives to Science, and by far the majority to other pursuits;—that thus the distinction between the Scholar, or, let us rather say, between the Learned, and the Unlearned, must still subsist for a long period. Both have yet to raise themselves to the real substance of knowledge, to the true creative Reason; and the formalism of mere conception must be wholly got rid of. The people, in particular, must be raised to Pure Christianity, such as we have described it above, as the only medium through which, at first, Ideas can be communicated to them. In this respect both parties, Learned as well as Unlearned, are in the same position. They are separated in the following way:—the Learned possess Reason itself, and all its modifications, in a system of connected and consecutive Thought; to them, the Universe of Reason, as we have elsewhere expressed it, reveals itself in pure Thought as such. This knowledge they communicate to the Unlearned, unaccompanied, however, by the strict proof of which it is susceptible in the system of pure Thought,—to adduce which would render the communication itself Learned and Scholastic;—which knowledge is then authenticated immediately by the Unlearned themselves, through their own natural sense of Truth; just as we have proceeded in these lectures, which we have announced as popular discourses. I myself have discovered what has been here taught, in a consecutive system of Thought, but I have not communicated it to you in this shape. In one of our first lectures I requested you to inquire whether you could withhold your approval from such a way of thinking as I there described, and if you should find it impossible to do so, I asked you whether, within your own selves, Reason does not in this way declare in favour of such a mode of Thought:—in the two last lectures I have presented the opposite view to you in such a light that its falsehood and perversion must have been immediately evident; and if I made myself intelligible to you, it must have

excited, at least, inward amusement. Other proofs I have not here adduced. I teach the same things in my scientific philosophical lectures; but there I accompany my teachings with proofs of another description. Further,—these lectures have been addressed,—as popular-philosophical discourses,—to a cultivated audience, and therefore I have clothed them in refined language, and in that garb of metaphor which belongs to it. I might have taught the same things to the people, from the pulpit, in the character of a preacher, and then it would have been necessary to make use of Bible language:—for example, what I have here termed the Life in the Idea, should in that case have been named Resignation to the Will of God; or Devotion to the Will of God, &c. This popular communication of knowledge by the Learned to the Unlearned, can only be effected in discourses,—or by means of the press, if those to whom it is addressed possess the art of reading.

Secondly:—In the cultivation of the whole domain of Science, and therefore in the constitution of the Literary Republic, plan, order, and system are requisite. From the pure Science of Reason, or the Absolute Philosophy, the whole domain of Science may be completely surveyed, and the office of each individual strictly defined. Every one who lays claim to the name of a Scholar must necessarily be in possession of this pure Science of Reason; otherwise, however well informed he may think himself in some particular department,—if he be ignorant of the ultimate ground of all Science, upon which his own Science depends, then of a surety he cannot understand even his own Science in its ultimate foundations, and indeed has not yet thoroughly penetrated into its significance. Every one can in this way distinctly see when there is something yet awanting in the circle of Science, and what it is which is awanting; and can thus select some particular department as the field of his own exertion. He will not think of completing anew what has been already completed.

All Science which is strictly *a priori*, may be completed, and the inquiry closed; and it will be brought to this conclusion so soon as the Literary Republic shall carry on its labours systematically. Empiricism only is infinite; as well in its fixed department, *i. e.* Nature, in Physics,—as in its changing department, *i. e.* the varying phenomena of the Human Race, in History. The first, Physics, after having had all its *a priori* elements separated from it by the Science of Reason, and these completed and perfected in their several forms, will be limited to experiment; and receive from the higher Reason the Art of rightly comprehending the significance of experiment, and the knowledge how Nature is to be again interrogated. The second, History, will by the same Reason be relieved of the Myths respecting the origin of the Human Race, which properly belong to Metaphysics; and will receive instead, a distinct conception of the true objects of historical inquiry, and what belongs to them; with a Logic of historical Truth:—and thus, even in this inexhaustible province, we shall have a sure progress according to rule, instead of an uncertain groping in the dark.

As the substance of all Knowledge has its fixed law, so both its scientific and popular expression have their settled rules. Have these been transgressed?—then the error may perhaps be discovered by some one else, and corrected in a new work:—have they not been transgressed, or am I unable to make any improvement on that which already exists?—why should I change it for the mere sake of change? In every Science let the *best* scientific and the *best* popular works remain the only ones, until something really better appear to take their place;—then let the former be altogether laid aside, and the latter alone remain. True, the unlearned public is a progressive body; for its members are presumed to advance in the ranks of culture by means of the fit teaching of the Learned, and what they already know, they do not need to be taught again. It is thus quite conceivable,

that a popular work, which is well suited to the period of its appearance, may afterwards, when the Time has changed, become no longer adequate to its purpose, and must be replaced by another; but this progress will certainly not be so rapid that the people shall need to be supplied with something new every half-year.

From the pure Science of Reason, I have said above, the whole domain of Knowledge may be surveyed. Every Scholar must be in possession of this Science, were it only that he might thereby be able at all times to understand the actual state of the Scientific world, and thus to know at what point his labour may be most advantageously applied. There is no reason why this actual condition of the Scientific world should not be chronicled in a continuous work, devoted to that purpose, and a survey of it recorded there, partly for the use of cotemporaries, and partly for the future history of Literature. Something similar to this was mentioned in our description of the Third Age, as the function of the Literary Journals and Magazines. Thus if we describe how such a Review must of necessity be executed in the Age of Reason as Science, we shall at the same time declare how a Literary Journal *ought to be* conducted, if such Journals must exist; and from the contrast, it may also become obvious why such Journals, in their common form, are good for nothing, and can be good for nothing. To complete the antithesis between our last lecture and our present one, we must now proceed to this description.

The scientific position of every point of Time must manifest itself according to the Idea which we have already announced; and the supposition is, that it will so manifest itself in the works of the Time. These lie open to every eye; and all who are interested in the questions which we have proposed can answer them, without our aid, by reference to the same source from which we, without their help, have answered them. We see not to what end our assistance is needful here. If we would make our aid

necessary, we must do something which others either cannot do at all, or cannot do without some specific labour of which we can relieve them. We cannot again inform the Reader of what the Author himself has said; for the Author has already said this for himself, and the Reader may satisfactorily learn it from him. What we must declare for him, is precisely that which the Author has not said, but from which he has drawn everything which he has said; we must lay bare what the Author himself really *is*, and how all which he has said has become to him such as it is;—we must extract the spirit from his letter. If this spirit in the individual be also the spirit of the Time, and if we have made it manifest in one instance belonging to the Time, and perhaps in that instance in which it is most clearly visible, then I do not see why we should repeat the same thing with reference to others, in whom there may indeed be some accidental and outward difference, but internally an exact similitude;—and thus become mere copyists of ourselves. The question is not concerning the position of Sempronius, or Caius, or Titus, but concerning the position of the Age;—if we have already made this manifest by the example of Sempronius, then we have, at most, to add the remark that Caius and Titus are examples of the same kind; so that no one may expect that they should be separately considered. Should these possess, in addition to the essential and prevailing spirit of the Age, such and such subsidiary and characteristic tendencies, then we must thoroughly investigate these tendencies, and exhibit each of them clearly by means of its most remarkable example:—as for the other instances belonging to the same class, we may, at most, apply to them the remark already suggested.

It is not otherwise with the estimate of the Age in reference to Art; in which department we here confine ourselves to Literature. The measure of excellence is the elevated purity, the ethereal clearness, the serene calmness, untrou-

bled by individual imperfection or any relation which does not belong to the domain of pure Art, which the work displays. Have we set these forth as they exist in the masterworks of the Age;—why need we concern ourselves with the efforts of mere aspirants? or even with the *studies* of the master? The latter we employ, in order thereby the better to penetrate and understand the individuality of the Artist,—which, as such, is never a sensuous, but always an ideal individuality,—and by means of this knowledge of his individuality to attain a more thorough comprehension of his work. In short, such a Review must be nothing else, and desire to be nothing else, than a record of the essential spirit of Science and of Art;—whatever cannot be regarded as an extension and farther improvement of this spirit, should have no place in it, and should not enter within the circle of its observation. It matters not that each day in the calendar may not send forth its printed sheet of such a Review; nor every month, nor even perhaps every half-year, its volume;—in that case, paper has been saved, and the Reader has been spared much useless labour. Does no continuation appear?—it is a sign that nothing new has occurred in the Spiritual World, but that everything moves in its old round:—has something new occurred?—the record will not be wanting to announce it.

With regard to Art alone, an exception to the strictness of this rule may be permitted. Humanity is as yet much further removed from the perfection of Art than of Science, and there will be needed a much longer course of preparation before it can arrive at the former, than may be required in its progress towards the latter. In this respect, even feeble efforts employed upon imperfect works, with the view of developing these works, and so restoring them to unity, may be welcomed at first,—not indeed as portions of our record of the Spiritual World, which can only describe the real, living movement of Humanity; but only as popular aids, that thereby the general public may become more con-

versant with the art of understanding a work;—and if the common Journals of Criticism only sometimes made such attempts, they might be entitled to our thanks. But with reference to Science, no such exception to the strictness of the rule can be admitted:—for beginners in this department, there are Schools and Universities in existence.

LECTURE VIII.

MYSTICISM AS A PHENOMENON OF THE THIRD AGE.

The Third Age has now been described in its fundamental character,—*as an Age which accepts nothing but what it understands;*—and its leading conception in this process of understanding has been sufficiently set forth as that of *mere sensuous Experience.* From this fundamental principle of the Age we have deduced the distinction between a Learned and an Unlearned Class, and the constitution of these two classes, both in themselves, and in their relation to each other. In addition to this we have shown historically in our last lecture, that this relation has not always existed as at present; how and in what way it has arisen, and become as it now is;—and also how this relation must exist in the following Age,—that of Reason as Science.

Now we have formerly remarked, in our general survey of this subject, that such an Age of mere naked Experience and of empty Formal Knowledge, does by its very nature stir up opposition, and bears within its own breast the germs of a reaction against itself. Let us take up this remark in the lecture of to-day, and pursue it somewhat further. It cannot be but that single individuals,—either because they actually feel the dreary barrenness and emptiness of the results of such a principle,—or else moved by the mere desire of bringing forward something wholly new, which desire itself we have already discovered among the charac-

teristics of this Epoch,—should precisely invert the principle of the Age, and represent its pretension to understand all things, as its bane and the source of all its error; and on the contrary should set up the Unintelligible, *as such*, and on account of its unintelligibility, as their own principle,—as all of which man stands in need, the true source of all healing and sanctification. Even this phenomenon, as I said before, although apparently quite opposed to the Third Age, does nevertheless belong to the necessary phenomena of this Age, and is not to be overlooked in a complete description of it.

In the first place, the fact that the supporters of the maxim,—*that we must be able to understand everything which we ought to admit as true*,—do nevertheless constantly accept many things which neither they nor their opponents understand, is a manifest contradiction of the maxim itself; which contradiction obviously cannot take place, or be theoretically propounded until the maxim itself be announced, and indeed only arises in the polemical discussion of the maxim;—a contradiction, however, which must necessarily make its appearance so soon as this maxim has been prevalent for any length of time, has received mature consideration, and has been brought out in clear and unequivocal distinctness. Thus the announcement of this principle of the Unintelligible is neither the beginning, nor yet any essential element, of the new Age which is to arise out of the Third, namely, the Age of Reason as Science; for this latter Age finds no fault with the maxim of absolute Intelligibility, but rather recognises it as its own; finding fault only with the mischievous and worthless notion which is now made the standard of this Intelligibility, and the measure of all authentic Truth; while as to Intelligibility itself, the Age of Reason as Science lays it down as a fundamental principle, that everything, even the Unknown itself, as the limit of the Known, and as the only possible pledge that the domain of the Known is ex-

hausted, must be comprehended; and that in all Times, and as the only sufficient substratum of the Time, there must be a *then* Unknown,—known only as the Unknown, but at no Time an absolute Unintelligible. This principle of absolute Unintelligibility is thus much more directly opposed to Science, than even the principle of the Intelligibility of all things through the conceptions of mere sensuous Experience. Finally, this principle of Unintelligibility, as such, is not a remnant of any former Age, as is obvious from what we have already said on this point. The absolute Unintelligible of Heathen and Jewish antiquity,—the arbitrary God, never to be understood but always to be feared, with whom man could only by good fortune come to terms,—far from having been sought out by these Ages, was imposed upon them by necessity, and in opposition to their own will, and they would gladly have been delivered from this conception, had that been possible. The Unintelligible of the Christian Church, again, was held to be Truth,—not on account of its being Unintelligible, but because it existed in the Written Word, and the Traditions and Doctrines of the Church, although it had accidentally turned out unintelligible. The maxim of which we now speak, on the contrary, sets up the Unintelligible as the Highest, *in its own character of Unintelligibility*, and even on account of its Unintelligibility; and it is thus a wholly new and unprecedented phenomenon peculiar to the Third Age.

When the matter does not end in this mere acceptance of the Unintelligible generally,—so that it might be left to each man to determine for himself what is unintelligible to him; but when besides this, as might be expected from the dogmatic Spirit of the Age, a specific and defined formula of the Unintelligible is set forth and proposed for our acceptance; the question presents itself,—How does this phenomenon arise? Not from the superstition of Past Ages,—for this is now exhausted, so far as the cultivated

classes are concerned, and what remains of it is only to be found in Theology;—nor from Theology,—for this is, as we have already seen, something altogether different. This new system has arisen through insight into the emptiness of the previous system, and thus by means of reasoning;—it must therefore establish its Unintelligible by reasoning, and free thought, which here, however, assumes the form of Invention and Imagination;—and thus the founders and representatives of this system will bear the name of Philosophers.

The production of an Unknown and Unintelligible, by means of unrestrained Imagination, has always been named Mysticism; we shall therefore comprehend this new system in its essential nature, if we set forth distinctly what Mysticism is, and wherein it consists.

Mysticism has this in common with the True Science of Reason;—it does not recognise the conceptions of mere sensuous Experience as the Highest, but strives to raise itself above all Experience;—and since there is nothing beyond the domain of Experience but the world of Pure Thought, it builds up a Universe for itself from Pure Thought alone,—as we have already said of Reason as Science. The defenders of Experience as the only source of Truth thus hit the mark as closely as they possibly can, and more closely perhaps than they themselves are aware of, when they denominate him a Mystic, who, on whatever ground, denies the exclusive validity which they claim for Experience;—for this Mysticism, which they can only apprehend by an effort of fancy, and from which they have so carefully guarded themselves beforehand by strict adherence to Experience,—this Mysticism, I say, does indeed raise itself above Experience;—whilst the other way of rising above Experience,—namely, Science,—has never presented itself to them in its true character, and on this side they have had, as yet, no temptations to overcome.

In this firm reliance on the world of Thought, as the Highest and most excellent, the Science of Reason and Mysticism are completely at one.

The distinction between them depends solely upon the nature of the Thought from which they respectively proceed. The fundamental Thought of Science—which because it is a fundamental Thought, is absolutely one and complete in itself—is, in the view of Science, thoroughly clear and distinct; and from it Science perceives, in the same unchangeable clearness, the immediate procession of all the multiplicity of particular thoughts; and, since *things* can only exist in thought, of the multiplicity of all particular things,—making them, in this procession, the subject of immediate apprehension;—this even to the limits of all clearness; and as these limits must likewise be conceived of as necessary limits, even to the boundaries of the Unknown. Further, this Thought does not spontaneously present itself to Science, but must be pursued with labour, assiduity, and care; and Science must never rest satisfied with anything which is, as yet, imperfectly understood, but must continually ascend to a higher principle of interpretation, and again to a higher, until at last there shall be but one pure mass of Light. So it is with the Thought of Science. But the *thoughts* from which Mysticism may arise,—for these are very different in the different individuals who entertain them, and are even very variable in one and the same individual,—these *thoughts* can never be clearly referred to any fundamental principle. On this account they are only to a certain extent clear even in themselves; and, so far as regards their connexion with each other, they are absolutely unintelligible. On this account, too, these thoughts can never be proved, nor attain any greater degree of clearness than that which they already possess; but they will be postulated,—or, should the language of True Science be already current, the reader or hearer will be directed to the 'Intellectual Intuition'; which latter, however, has a totally different meaning in Science

from that which it bears in Mysticism. For the same reason, no account can be given of the method in which these thoughts have been discovered, because, in reality, they have not been discovered by means of a systematic ascent to a higher principle, like the primitive thoughts of Science,—but are, in truth, the mere conceits of Chance.

And this Chance,—what is it at bottom? Although those who are in its service can never explain it, yet cannot we explain it? It is a blind thinking-power, which, like all other blind powers, is, in the last analysis, but a force of Nature, from the control of which *free* thought sets us at liberty; depending, like all other natural conditions, upon the state of health, the temperament, the mode of life, the studies, &c. of the individual;—so that these Mystics, with their fascinating philosophy, notwithstanding their boast of having raised themselves above Nature, and their profound contempt for all Empiricism, are themselves but a somewhat unusual empirical phenomenon, without having the least suspicion of the real state of the case.

The remark that the principles of Mysticism are mere accidental conceits, imposes upon me the duty of distinguishing it from another, and, in some respects, similar process of thought;—and I embrace this opportunity of more strictly defining it. In the domain of Physics, namely, not only the most important experiments, but even the most searching and comprehensive theories, are often the results of chance, or it may be said, of mere fancy; and so must it be, until the Science of Reason be sufficiently extended and spread abroad, and have fulfilled the duty which it owes to Physics, as strictly defined in our last lecture. But the true Physical Inquirer always proceeds beyond the Phenomena, seeking only the Law in the Unity of which the Phenomena may be comprehended; and as soon as he has reached the primitive Thought, returns thence again to the Phenomena in order to test the Thought by its application to them;—undoubtedly with the firm conviction

that the validity of the Thought can only be established by its sufficiency for the explanation of the Phenomena, and with the determination to throw it aside should it not be verified in this way. It is verified; and he is thereby satisfied that his conception has been no arbitrary conceit, but a true Thought revealed by Nature herself;—and thus his inspiration is not Mysticism, but is to be named Genius. Quite otherwise is it with the Mystic:—he neither proceeds outwards from Empiricism, nor yet does he recognise Empiricism as the judge of his fancies,—but he demands that Nature should regulate herself by his thoughts;—in which he should be perfectly justified, had he only got hold of the *right* Thoughts, and if he knew how far this *a priori* knowledge of Nature can go, at what point it comes to an end, and where Experiment alone can decide.

These fancies of the Mystic, I have said, are neither clear in themselves, nor are they proved, or even capable of theoretical proof, which is renounced in the avowal of Unintelligibility; but yet they are true, and are therefore to be confirmed by our natural sense of Truth, provided they fall within its sphere. How is it possible, then, that they are only believed by their original authors themselves? I am bound to solve this question before we proceed further.

These fancies are, at bottom, as we have shown above, the products of a blind natural thinking-power; which power must necessarily manifest itself in these particular circumstances and in these particular individuals exactly as it does manifest itself;—*must*, I say, unless the individual were to elevate himself above the mere natural thinking-power, to free and clear Thought; and so foreclose this necessity. If this do not happen, then the necessary consequence is as follows:—every blind power of Nature is constantly active, although invisibly and unconsciously to man; it is therefore to be expected that this thinking-power, as the essential nature of this individual, should have already manifested itself in many shapes within him, and thus

from time to time have passed through his mind without its principle being discovered, or any distinct resolution being taken as to its adoption. Thus he goes on passively; listening attentively to the voice of Nature thinking within him; till at last the true Centre-Thought of the whole reveals itself; and he is not a little astonished to find unity, light, connexion, and confirmation spread over all his previous fancies; never imagining for a moment that these earlier fancies were but shapes or branches of that ever-active thought which has now come forth into light, with which they must, therefore, unquestionably harmonize. He satisfies himself of the truth of the whole by its sufficiency to afford an explanation of all the parts; for he does not know that they are only *parts of* this whole, and have only an existence *by means of* the whole. He accepts Fiction as Truth because it coincides with so many earlier Fictions, which, without any suspicion on his part, have come to him from the same source.

Since this imagination of the Mystic is but a thinking-power of Nature, it returns upon Nature, attaches itself to her soil, and attempts to exercise an activity there; in one word, Mysticism is, and always must be, a Philosophy of Nature (Natur-Philoſophie.) It is necessary that we should carefully consider these latter remarks, in order strictly to distinguish between Mysticism, and something else which is often inconsiderately mistaken for it. Either the mere sensuous instinct, the desire of personal preservation and of physical well-being, is the only impulse to the thoughts as well as to the actions of men,—and then Thought is only the servant of Desire, and only exists for the purpose of observing and choosing the means of its satisfaction; *or*, Thought is living and active in itself and by its own proper power. Upon the first supposition is founded the whole wisdom of the Third Age, which we have already sufficiently described, and need not further refer to at present. On the second supposition, there are, on the other hand, two, or it

may be, three cases. Namely, this self-existent and active Thought is either the mere Sensuous Individuality of Man clothing itself in the form of Thought, and is thus still a mere sensuous desire, only disguised, and therefore not recognised as such,—and then it is Mysticism:—or, it is Pure Thought flowing forth from itself without any dependence on Sense; not recognising individual persons, but always comprehending the Race, as we have already sufficiently described it in our second, third, and fourth lectures;—*i.e.* the Idea. Is it the Idea which is present?—then again, as we have already said, it may manifest itself in two different ways:—either, in one of its primitive forms which we previously indicated; and in this case, it struggles irresistibly onward to direct outward activity, streams forth in the personal life of the man, extinguishing all his sensuous impulses and desires; and then he is an Artist, Hero, Man of Science, or Religious Man;—or the same Pure Thought may manifest itself in its absolute unity; and then it is easily recognisable as the one, perfectly clear, and undisturbed Thought of Reason as Science, which in itself impels to no activity in the World of Sense, but only to free activity in the World of Pure Thought; or, in other words, is true and genuine Speculation. Mysticism is not *directly* opposed to the Life in the Idea; but that it may be carried out into action, it requires a specific determination of the will, which is moved thereto by desire. Thus Mysticism is still Speculation; it does not, however, comprehend the Race as such, but only Individuality, because it only proceeds from the Individual, and only refers to that whereon the life of the Individual depends, namely, to Physical Nature,—and it is thus necessarily Speculation applied to Nature (Natur-Spekulation.) The Life in the Idea, therefore, which the uneducated man calls Mysticism, is in reality very widely and distinctly separated from Mysticism. We have already sufficiently distinguished the Science of Reason, as true and genuine Speculation, from Mysticism, in an early part of this lecture.

But in order that we may be able to distinguish this true and genuine Speculation from its opposite,—that of the Mystic, with reference to the Philosophy of Nature (Natur-Philosophie),—we ought to be already in possession of the former, or of Reason as Science, and this is not the business of the unlearned public. Upon this matter,—and therefore upon the ultimate principles of Nature,—no true son of Science will think of communicating with the general public; the Speculative theory of Nature presupposes scientific culture, and can only be comprehended by the scientific intellect; and the general and unlearned public never stands in need of it. But with respect to that whereon the disciple of Science can and ought to communicate with the general public,—with respect to Ideas,—there is an infallible test whereby this public may determine for itself whether any doctrine which is presented to it is, or is not, mere Mysticism. Let it be asked,—'Has this doctrine a direct and immediate bearing on action, or does it only treat of a fixed and immovable constitution of things?' Thus, for example, the question which I put to you at the beginning of these lectures, and upon the assumed answer to which, the whole of my subsequent discourses have proceeded, as their true principle:—this question, whether you could refrain from approving, respecting, and admiring a Life wholly devoted to the Idea?—this question refers exclusively to an action, and to your judgment upon that action; and therefore, while we were elevated above the world of mere sensuous Experience, it is evident that there was nevertheless nothing of Mysticism in our inquiries. To adduce a still more marked example:—The Doctrine of a Perfect God; in whose nature nothing arbitrary or changeable can have a place; in whose Highest Being we all live, and in this Life may, and ought at all times to be, blessed;—this Doctrine, which ignorant men think they have sufficiently demolished when they have proclaimed it to be Mysticism, is by no means Mysticism, for it has an immediate reference to human action, and in-

deed to the inmost spirit which ought to inspire and guide all our actions. It can only become Mysticism when it is associated with the pretext that the insight into this truth proceeds from a certain inward and mysterious light, which is not accessible to all men, but is only bestowed upon a few favourites chosen from among the rest:—in which pretext the Mysticism consists, for it betrays a presumptuous contemplation of personal merit, and a pride in mere sensuous Individuality. Thus Mysticism, besides the essential and inward criterion which can only be thoroughly discovered by true Speculation, has also an outward mark by which it may be recognised;—this, namely, that it is never a Moral or Religious Philosophy, to both of which it is, in its true character, wholly antagonistic; (what it calls Religion is only a deification of Nature)—but it is always a mere Philosophy of Nature;—that is, it strives to discover, or believes that it has discovered, certain mysterious and hitherto inconceivable properties in the principles of Nature, by the employment of which it endeavours to produce effects surpassing the ordinary course of things. Such, I say, is Mysticism,—necessarily such by reason of its vital principle;—and such it has always been in reality. Let us not be deceived by the frequent promises it has held forth of introducing us to the secrets of the Spiritual World, and revealing to us the charm whereby we may spell-bind and enthral Angel and Archangel, or even God himself;—the purpose of all this has been only to employ such knowledge for the production of results in the world of sense; and these spiritual existences have therefore never been regarded as such, but only as powers of Nature. The end has always been to discover some charm, some magical spell. If we consider the matter strictly, as I do here, and do it advisedly, in order by this example, at least, to make myself perfectly clear and intelligible;—if, I say, we consider the matter strictly, the system of Religion which was described in our last lecture, which proceeds upon the conception of an Arbitrary God,

and admits an interposition between Him and man, and believes that,—through the efficacy of a ratified Covenant, either by observation of certain arbitrary, and, so far as their purpose is concerned, unintelligible laws, or by an historical belief equally unintelligible as regards its end,—it can redeem itself from any farther inflictions on the part of God; this Religion itself, I say, is such a system of mystical enchantment, in which God is contemplated, not as the Holy, to be separated from whom is, in itself, and without farther consequence, the greatest of all evils; but only as a dreadful power of Nature, threatening man with its devastating visitations, whose agencies, however, he has now discovered the means of rendering harmless, or even of diverting to his own purposes.

This which we have now described, and, I think, sufficiently defined and distinguished from all other things wherewith it may be associated, is Mysticism in general: and wherever it manifests itself, it must do so with those characteristics which we have now set forth; and it establishes itself in the way which we have now described, wherever it is mere nature. In the case in which we have here to speak of it, —as the reaction of the Third Age against itself,—it is not mere nature, but chiefly Art. It proceeds from deliberate opposition to the principle of the Third Age; from dissatisfaction with the recognised emptiness and impotence of that Age; from the opinion that man can only save himself from this emptiness and impotence by means of the principle directly opposed to the commonly received notion of the Conceivableness of all things,—*i. e.* by the Inconceivable; and from the determination which arises therefrom, to establish such an Inconceivable. Further, there is in the Third Age, and in all natures which proceed from it, but little energy to be applied to this Mysticism. How then do its adherents establish this Inconceivable, and summon up the amount of Mysticism which they actually exhibit? They proceed in this way:—They set to work to invent some imaginary

theory as to the hidden principles of Nature,—for it is the unalterable habit of the Mystic always to place Nature before him as his object; he admits whatever fancies may occur to his mind, and entertains those among them which are most agreeable to him; stimulating himself, should such fancies not flow so readily as he desires, by means of physical appliances,—the recognised and established support of all Artists in Mysticism, in ancient and modern times, amongst rude and civilized people;—a means through which the clearness, discretion, and freedom which belong to genuine Speculation, and which demand the highest degree of temperance, are infallibly lost, and from the use of which, for the sake of production, we may at once and with certainty conclude that what is produced is not true Speculation, but mere Mysticism. If by means of these accessories, the veins of fancy still do not flow with sufficient fulness, they then have recourse to the writings of former Mystics. The more singular and the more despised these writings are, the better; for, according to their principles, everything is good in proportion as it departs from the prevailing spirit of the Age;—and with these extraneous fancies they now decorate their own imperfect conceits, if indeed they do not take credit for them as their own. I may remark in passing, what cannot be denied, that among these fancies of the old and now decried Mystics, there are many admirable and genial hints; and we have even no wish to deny that among the more modern of them also, there may be found many excellent thoughts; but these gleams of genius are always surrounded by errors, and are never clear in themselves; and in order to discover the beauties contained in these writings, the reader must bring similar excellencies with him to their study, and no one will learn from them who was not already wiser than they when he sat down to their perusal.

All Mysticism goes forth in a kind of enchantment; this is its invariable characteristic. What form of this art-

magic, then, does that kind of Mysticism of which we now speak, produce? Only its Scientific form;—at least we now speak only of the Scientific Mysticism of the Age; although there is doubtless another Mysticism of Art, as well as one of Life, which we may perhaps characterise at another time. This Scientific Mysticism must therefore endeavour to produce some extraordinary and magical effect in Science —something wholly impossible in the ordinary course of Nature. What then?—Science is either *a priori*, or *empirical*. To comprehend *a priori* Science, partly as creating the world of Ideas and partly as determining the world of Nature, so far as it does determine it;—there is needed calm dispassionate thought, ceaselessly examining, correcting and explaining itself;—and it requires time and labour, and half a life of devoted endeavour, to produce anything remarkable after all. This is too well known for any one to dream of the influences of enchantment here;—hence the Mystics look upon themselves as excluded from this province, and whatever they may require from it for the frame-work of their own productions, they can borrow from others, and elaborate after their own fashion, so that no one may be able to recognise it;—and they may the more securely reckon upon concealment, if they abuse the plundered party while they are plundering him. *Empiricism* still remains. In so far as this is purely empirical, by separation from all that is *a priori* in Nature, it is the common opinion, which may indeed be the right one, that this province can only be investigated by way of experiment, and that every inquirer must in the first place acquire an historical acquaintance with what is already known, and carefully test it again for himself, and can only hope to arrive at any new result by means of new experiments based upon an intelligent survey of the whole existing stores of Experience. This however is too tedious, and demands time and persevering exertion; and there are too many skilful fellow-labourers who might anticipate our discoveries; so

that we might labour on to the end of our lives without getting credit for originality. Here some charm might be applied; and it is necessary to have one. Here therefore they attempt to penetrate, by a direct incursion of fancy, to the secret principles of Nature, and thus to supersede the course of laborious study, and the troublesome method of experiment, which peradventure might overturn all their previously formed systems.

On account of the universal prospensity of human nature for the Wonderful, this scheme cannot fail to attract general attention, and to call forth ardent enthusiasm. Although old men who have already travelled this path of laborious study, and perhaps have themselves produced fortunate and fruitful experiments, may see with some jealousy their former labours proved to be fruitless and inglorious, the results brought to light by their experiments demonstrated *a priori* in a few sentences, and proved to have been attainable in other ways; this phase of the Wonderful not having yet appeared when they were young;—the more welcome to those who have not yet entered upon this path of study, and now stand at the point whence, according to former usage, they must enter upon it, will be the promise of being safely lifted over it in the course of a few paragraphs. Should there, after all, no miracle ensue, as is the common fate of such magic arts; should no new empirical knowledge arise, and the Faithful remain exactly as wise or as ignorant as they were before;—it is yet obvious, or at least may be obvious to every one who is not blind, that whatever is essential in the empirical knowledge which has actually been brought forward, has not been deduced *a priori*, nor even attained by any course of reasoning, but has been presupposed, as already known, by means of previous experiment, and only compressed into an allegorical form, in which compression the pretended deduction consists;—should even the wonder-worker neither satisfy the demand which must necessarily be made upon him to

authenticate his higher mission by at least one fulfilled prophecy, nor even produce, as he ought, a single experiment never before made either by himself or others, in some region unattainable by means of inference from previous experiment, the results of which, distinctly announced by himself beforehand, shall be found coincident with its actual fulfilment, but should proceed, like all false prophets, to prophesy the result *a priori* after its accomplishment has taken place;—should all this unquestionably have occurred, yet will the Faith of the Adept not waver;—to-day indeed, the process has not succeeded, but on the seventh, or on the ninth day, it will infallibly succeed.

To this incentive of applause, there is added another very powerful one. The human mind, left to itself without discipline or education, would neither be idle nor industrious;—were a middle state between these two discovered, that were the proper thing for it. To remain idle altogether, and do nothing, is too tiresome;—and if one has unfortunately made study his business, it is to be feared that in such a case he might learn nothing, which again is unpleasant, especially on account of its consequences. Real Thought and Speculation are troublesome and unproductive;—to learn anything here likewise demands an effort of attention and memory. Imagination steps in. Let a successful master once bring this power into play,—and how can he fail to do so, if he be a Mystic, since Mysticism is always sure to lay hold of the unguarded and inexperienced?—then Imagination pursues its way without farther trouble to its possessor, quickens into life, assumes new and varied forms, and thus creates the appearance of a vigorous activity, without exacting the smallest trouble on our part;—bold and adventurous thoughts make their appearance in our minds, without we ourselves being compelled to think at all; and study is changed into the most pleasant business in the world. And then, above all, the glorious results!—when scarcely released from school, or even while

still there, to confront the most approved men in the empire with ideas, which they indeed, too well acquainted with the nature of their science, have never dreamed of!—and to be able to shrug our shoulders at their momentary embarrassment on account of our absolute ignorance, as at a confession of their own weakness, and so pass on pluming ourselves on our fancied superiority!

During the course of this description we have not been ignorant, nor have we overlooked the fact, that absolutely unscientific men may probably pass the same judgment on the labours of genuine Speculation and its friends. We grant that, since they must hold all Speculation to be Mysticism,—there being absolutely nothing in existence for them but Experience,—they are perfectly right in doing so according to their own view; and, on the other hand, since we maintain the existence of a world lying beyond all Experience, and at the same time, and precisely on account of this *a priori* world, and as a consequence of it, contend also for the existence of an Experience which must always remain Experience, so we for our part cannot fitly express in any other way the censure which is called forth by the opposite error,—that of introducing a *pretended* Speculation into the legitimate domain of Experience. Generally speaking, however, the mere expression is of little moment; but it is of moment whether one understand the subject under discussion, and can venture to give a reason to him who does understand it; and to this extent, we believe that we have vindicated our pretensions, were it only by what we have said to-day. It is allowable publicly to remain silent upon such obvious folly as does not force its way into our more immediate presence; and we should not, even in this narrow circle, have wasted upon such a subject the few words which we have spoken to-day, had not the completeness of our undertaking required us to do so.

In fine, this seems to be the spirit of the particular period of our Age in which we live:—the system of mere naked

Experience as the only legitimate source of Truth may be supposed to be on the decline, and on the contrary, the system of Mysticism which seeks to dislodge Experience even from its own legitimate domain, by means of a pretended Speculation, with all its revolutionary consequences, now begins to bear sway, in order to inflict a fearful retribution on the Race which gave itself up to the former delusion. It is in vain to seek a remedy against this movement, for it is now a necessary tendency of the Age, and is besides equipt with all that is most attractive to the Age. Happy the wise man who can rise superior to his Age and to all Time! who knows that Time is nothing in itself, and that there is a Higher Guidance, securely leading our Race, amid all its apparent wanderings, to the true end of its existence!

LECTURE IX.

THE ORIGIN AND LIMITS OF HISTORY.

The *Scientific* constitution of the Third Age has been sufficiently described in our former lectures, partly in itself, and partly by means of antecedent and succeeding conditions. The remaining characteristics and peculiarities of any Age depend upon the nature of its *Social* condition, and especially upon the State, and are to be defined thereby. Therefore we cannot proceed with our delineation of the Third Age, until we have seen to what stage of its development the State has attained in this Age,—of course in the countries of the highest Culture,—to what extent the Absolute Idea of the State is therein expressed and realized, and how far it is not.

In none of the relations of Humanity does our Race possess less real liberty, and in none is it more hindered and obstructed, than in the constitution of the State, which being chiefly determined by the common condition of mankind, checks the activity of men of the highest wisdom, and sets limits to the realization of their plans. The Social constitution of an Age is therefore the result of its earlier fortunes, whereby its present condition has been determined, which in turn determines its constitution;—hence this constitution cannot be understood, in the way in which we shall endeavour here to understand that of our own Age, except through the *History* of the Age. But here we meet

with a new difficulty;—this, namely:—our Age is far from being at one with itself in its view of History, and still further from agreement with that view which we, who are guided by Reason as Science, take of History, which view it cannot even understand. It is therefore unavoidably necessary that we should, in the first place, set forth our own view in a general way, and justify it, before making those applications of it which are afterwards to occupy our attention;—and to this purpose we shall devote our present lecture.

It is so much the more incumbent upon us to enter upon this exposition, inasmuch as History is itself a part of Knowledge, and ranks with Physics as the second department of Empiricism; and we have already expressed ourselves distinctly on the nature of all the other Sciences, while we have only given a passing glance to History. In this respect our present lecture still belongs to that part of our undertaking which comprises a picture of Scientific existence in general;—it closes that division of our plan, and opens up a passage to a new portion of it.

Not by any means with the view of leading your judgment captive beforehand, but, on the contrary, that I may incite you to its more vigorous exercise, I have to intimate, that I shall here give utterance to nothing but what, in my opinion, must become evident to you at once by its own immediate clearness;—of which there may be ignorance, but with respect to which, when once announced, there can be no dispute.

I begin my definition of the nature of History with a metaphysical principle, the strict proof of which I am prevented from adducing solely by the popular nature of our present discourses, but which recommends itself directly to the natural sense of Truth in man, and without the adoption of which we could arrive at no firm foundation in the whole field of Knowledge;—with this principle, namely:—*Whatever actually exists, exists of absolute necessity; and necessarily*

exists in the precise form in which it does exist; it is impossible that it should not exist, or exist otherwise than as it does. Hence, to whatever possesses real existence we cannot attribute any beginning, any mutability, or any arbitrary cause. The One, True, and Absolutely Self-Existent Being, is that which all voices call by the name,—God. The Existence of God is not the mere foundation, cause, or anything else of Knowledge, so that the two could be separated from each other; but it is absolutely Knowledge itself: His Existence and Knowledge are absolutely one and the same thing; He exists in Knowledge, precisely as He exists in His own Being, as absolute self-sufficient Power; and thus when we say—'His Existence is absolute,' and—'Knowledge has absolute Existence,'—the meaning is exactly the same. This principle, which is here announced merely in the form of a result, may be made thoroughly clear in the higher walks of Speculation. But further:—a World has no Existence but in Knowledge, and Knowledge itself is the World; and thus the World, by means of Knowledge, is the Divine Existence in its mediate or indirect manifestation; while Knowledge itself is the same Divine Existence in its direct or immediate manifestation. If therefore any one should say that the World might also not exist; that at one time it actually did not exist; that at another time it arose out of nothing; that it came into existence by an arbitrary act of God, which act He might have left undone had He so pleased;—it is just the same as if he should say, that God might also not exist; that at one time He actually did not exist; that at another time He came into existence out of non-existence, and determined Himself to be, by an arbitrary act of will, which He might have left undone had He so pleased. This Being, then, of whom we now speak, is the Absolute Being, existing above all Time; and whatever is comprehended in this Idea is only to be perceived *a priori* in the world of Pure Thought, and is invariable and unchangeable throughout all Ages.

Knowledge is, as we have said, the manifestation, utterance, and perfect representative of Divine Power. It exists therefore for itself; *i. e.* Knowledge becomes Self-Consciousness;—and in this Self-Consciousness it is its own peculiar, self-sustaining power, freedom, and activity, because it is a manifestation of Divine Power;—and it is all this as Knowledge constantly developing itself throughout Eternity to higher inward purity, by means of its action upon a certain *Object of Knowledge,* from which this progress takes its beginning. This Object manifests itself as *a definite something,* which might have been different from what it is; for this reason,—that it exists, and is yet not understood in its primitive origin; but Knowledge has throughout Eternity to unfold its own inward power in the comprehension of this Object;—and in this progressive development we have the origin of Time.

This Object of Knowledge only comes into view in consequence of the previous existence of Knowledge, and thus lies within the limits of that existence as already set forth; it is therefore an Object of mere perception, and can only be understood empirically. It is the one, persistent, and unchanging Object, towards the comprehension of which Knowledge must strive throughout Eternity: in this abiding and objective unity it is called Nature; and the Empiricism which is systematically directed upon it is called Physics. On this Object, Knowledge unfolds itself in a continuous succession of Eras; and the Empiricism which is systematically directed upon the fulfilment of this succession of Eras is called History. Its object is the development of Knowledge on the Unknown;—a development which at all times remains unexhausted.

Thus the Being and Existence which lies *beyond all Time* is in no way contingent; and no theory of its origin can be given either by the Philosopher or by the Historian:—the Actual Existence *in Time,* on the contrary, appears as if it might have been otherwise, and therefore as contingent;

but this appearance of contingency arises only from our ignorance; and the Philosopher may say, generally, that the One Unknown Existence, as well as the infinite steps towards its comprehension, exists as it does exist, only that it may be conceived of to Infinity; but he cannot, by means of these conceptions, at all *define* the Unknown, or deduce it from its primitive elements, as in that case he must have comprehended Infinity itself, which is absolutely impossible. Here therefore is his limit; and should he wish to acquire knowledge in this department, he is thus plainly directed to Empircism for it. Just as little can the Historian set forth this Unknown, in his genesis, as the origin of Time. His business is to point out the successive modifications of actual Empirical Existence. He must therefore assume beforehand this Empirical Existence itself, and all its possible conditions. What these conditions of Empirical Existence are, and thus, what is presupposed in the mere possibility of History, and *must be* first of all, before History can even find a beginning;—this is the business of the Philosopher, who has, in the first place, to secure a firm foundation and starting point for the Historian. To speak quite popularly on this point;—Has man been created?—then he could not have been present, at least with consciousness, at that event, or have been able to observe how he passed over from non-existence into existence; nor can he relate it as a fact to posterity. But, it is said, the Creator has revealed it to him. I answer:—In that case the Creator would have abolished the Unknown whereon the existence of man himself depends; He would thus have destroyed man again immediately after his creation; and, as the existence of the world and of man is inseparable from the Divine Existence itself, He would at the same time have destroyed Himself;—which is entirely opposed to Reason.

As to the *origin* of the world and of the Human Race, then, neither the Philosopher nor the Historian has anything to say; for there is absolutely no such origin: there is only

the One Necessary Being, raised above all Time. As to the *necessary conditions* of Actual Existence which lie beyond all Actual Existence itself, and therefore beyond Empiricism;—of them the Philosopher has to give an account; and should the Historian in his early researches touch upon such themes, he must distinctly understand that they belong not to the province of History, but to that of Philosophy,—it may be in the old simple form of narrative, in which form it is called *Myth;* and he must here acknowledge the jurisdiction of Reason, which in matters of Philosophy is the only judge, and not endeavour to sway us by the imposing word *Fact.* The fact,—often most fruitful and instructive,—is here simply that such a Myth has been.

Having thus fixed the boundaries which separate Philosophy and History, I shall now proceed, in the next place, to define generally the conditions of Empirical Existence which are presupposed in the possibility of History.

Knowledge necessarily divides itself in consciousness, into a consciousness of many individuals and persons:—a division which is strictly deduced from its first principle in the Higher Philosophy. As surely as Knowledge exists,—and this is as sure as that God exists, for it is His Existence itself,—so surely does Humanity also exist, and that in the form of a Human Race consisting of many individual members; and since the condition of the social life of men is intercourse by means of speech, this Human Race is also provided with the implement of Language. No History, therefore, should undertake to explain the origin of the Human Race in general, nor of its social life, nor of its language. Further, it is a part of the essential vocation of Humanity, that in this, its first life on Earth, it should train itself up with freedom to become an outward manifestation of Reason. But out of nothing, nothing can arise; and thus Irrationality can never become Reason. Hence, in one point of its existence, at least, the Human Race must have been purely Reasonable in its primitive form, without either

effort or freedom. In one point of its existence, at least, I say; for the true purpose of its existence does not consist in *being* Reasonable, but in *becoming* Reasonable by its own freedom; and the former is only the means and the indispensable condition of the latter: we are therefore entitled to no more extensive conclusion than that the condition of Absolute Reasonableness must have been *somewhere* extant. From this conclusion we are forced to admit the existence of a Normal People, who by the mere fact of their existence, without Science or Art, found themselves in a state of perfectly developed Reason. But there is nothing to hinder us from also admitting that there lived, at the same time, dispersed over the whole earth, timid and rude Earth-born Savages, without any Culture but what was necessary for the preservation of their mere sensuous existence;—for the purpose of the life of the Human Race is only to cultivate itself according to Reason, and it would be quite practicable to carry out this process among the Earth-born Savages by means of the Normal People.

As an immediate consequence of this position, no History should attempt to explain the origin of Culture in general, nor the population of the different regions of the Earth. The laboured hypotheses, especially on the last point, which are accumulated in books of travels, are, in our opinion, trouble and labour lost. But there is nothing from which History, as well as a certain half-philosophy, should more carefully guard itself, than the altogether unreasonable and fruitless attempt to raise Irrationality to Reason by a gradual lessening of its degree; and, given only a sufficient range of centuries, to produce at last a Leibnitz or a Kant as the descendant of an Ourang-Outang.

History takes cognisance only of the New,—the Wonderful;—that which may be contrasted with what has gone before, and what shall follow it. On this account there was no History among the Normal People, and there is no History of them. Under the guidance of their Instinct, one day

passed away like another; and one individual life like all the rest. Everything shaped itself spontaneously according to order and morality. There could even be no Science or Art; Religion alone adorned their Existence, and gave the uniform mind a relation to the Eternal. As little could there be a History among the Earth-born Savages; for with them, likewise, one day passed away like another,—with this only difference, that on one day they found food in abundance, while on another they could obtain nothing; prostrated the one day from indulgence, and on the next from enervation;—to awaken again, in either case, to the same unchanging round which led to no result.

Had things remained in this state; had the absolute Culture,—which however did not look upon itself as Culture, but only as Nature,—remained separate from the surrounding Barbarism, then no History could have arisen; and, what is still more important, the end of the existence of the Human Race could not have been attained. The Normal People must therefore, by some occurrence or other, have been driven away from their habitations, all access to which was thenceforth cut off; and must have been dispersed over the seats of Barbarism. Now for the first time could the process of the free development of the Human Race begin; and with it, History,—the record of the Unexpected and the New,—which always accompanies such a process. Now, for the first time, the dispersed descendants of the Normal People perceived with astonishment that all things were not, of necessity, such as they were with them, but might be otherwise, having indeed discovered them to be otherwise in reality; and the Earth-born, after they had attained consciousness and memory, had a great deal even more wonderful to record. In this conflict of Culture with Barbarism, the germs of all Ideas and all Science,—except Religion, which is as old as the world itself, and is inseparable from the existence of the world,—unfolded themselves, as the power and means of leading Barbarism to Culture.

Far from History being able to raise her voice on the subject of her own birth, all that has now been set forth is presupposed in the mere existence of History. Inferences from a state of things amid which it has had its beginning, as to what has preceded that state; especially inferences from the Myths which are already in actual existence, and in so far have themselves become facts,—particularly when such inferences are in accordance with Logic,—should be thankfully accepted. But let us bear in mind that they are inferences and not History;—and should we desire to examine more closely the form of the inference, let us not be scared back by the bugbear—Fact. Let this be our first preliminary observation; and let the second be as follows:—Every one who is capable of a survey of History as a whole,—which however is always rarer than a knowledge of its individual curiosities; and who in particular is able to comprehend what is universal, eternal, and unchanging in it, might here obtain a clear view of some of the most important problems of History;—for example, how the existence of races of men, differing so much from each other in colour and physical structure, is possible;—why it is that at all times, down even to the present day, civilization is spread only by means of foreign discoverers, who always encounter aboriginal inhabitants in a state of greater or lesser Barbarism;—whence arises the inequality among men discoverable wherever History has a beginning; &c. &c.

All that we have now set forth are necessary conditions of the existence of a Human Race;—the latter, however, must absolutely be, and hence the former must have been;—so far Philosophy informs us. Now all this is not merely a general supposition, but these things must further have had a definite existence;—for example, with regard to what we have said above,—the existence of the Normal People is not a mere general supposition, but they must have existed in one particular region of the earth and in no other; although, so far as appears to us, they might have existed

elsewhere; they had a language, which of course was constituted according to the fundamental laws of all language, but which possessed besides an element which appears to us as if it might have been otherwise; and therefore as an arbitrary element. Here Philosophy is at an end, because the Conceivable is at an end; and what is Inconceivable in the present life begins. Here accordingly Empiricism enters the field, which in this connexion is named History;—and the subordinate phenomena, which only in their general nature can be deduced from *a priori* principles, would now present themselves in their special and particular character *as facts*, without any Scientific explanation of their genesis, if they were not necessarily concealed from the view of History by other causes.

This much, however, follows from what has now been said:—History is mere Empiricism; it has only facts to communicate, and all its proofs are founded upon facts alone. To attempt to rise to Primeval History on this foundation of fact, or to argue by this means how such or such a thing might have been, and then to take for granted that it has been so in reality,—is to stray beyond the limits of History, and produce an *a priori* History; just as the Philosophy of Nature, referred to in our preceding lecture, endeavoured to find an *a priori* Science of Physics.

The evidence of facts proceeds in the following manner: First of all, there is a fact which has come down to our own time,—which may be seen with our eyes, heard with our ears, and felt with our hands. This can only be understood on the supposition of an earlier fact, no longer perceptible to us. Hence such an earlier fact is admitted as having been once perceptible. This rule, that we can only accept as proved so much of the earlier fact as is absolutely necessary for the comprehension of the now-existing fact, is to be taken strictly; for it is only to the Understanding, and by no means to the Imagination, that we can concede any value in historical evidence. Why then should we attempt

to educe and define the earlier fact further than is absolutely requisite for the explanation of the present? In all Sciences, and particularly in History, it is of greater importance to understand distinctly how much we do not know, than to fill up the void with fiction and conjecture. For example, I read a work which is said to be Cicero's, and till now has been universally acknowledged to be his:—this is the fact of the Present. The earlier fact to be detected herein is this: —Whether the Cicero, who is known to us by means of other history as this particular Cicero, did actually write this work. I go through the whole series of evidence lying in the interval of time between me and Cicero; but I know that herein error and illusion are possible, and this external proof of authenticity is not in itself decisive. I turn therefore to the internal characteristics: Is it the style, the mode of thinking of a man who lived at that time, who filled such a station in society, and was surrounded by such circumstances? Suppose I find these things so, then the evidence is complete:—it is not possible to conceive that this book, as it now exists, could have existed if Cicero had not written it: he was the only man who could write it thus; therefore he has written it.

Another instance:—I read the first chapters of the so-called first book of Moses, and, as must be presupposed, I understand them. Whether it was Moses who composed them; or,—since this, from internal evidence, may be obviously impossible,—whether it was he who collected them from mere verbal tradition and placed them on record; or whether it was Ezra, or some still later writer; is of no importance to me here:—it is even of no importance to me in this case whether any such person as Moses or Ezra ever lived; nor do I care to know how this composition has been preserved;—fortunately it has been preserved, and this is the main point. I perceive by its contents that it is a Myth concerning the Normal People in opposition to another merely Earth-born People; and concerning the religion of

the Normal People, and their dispersion; and of the origin of the Jehovah-Worship, among the followers of which the primitive religion of the Normal People was once more to re-appear, and through them to be spread over the whole world. I conclude from the contents of this Myth that it must be older than all History, since from the commencement of the historic period down to the time of Jesus there was none able even to understand, much less to invent it; and also because I find the same Myth everywhere repeated, as the mythical beginning of the History of all nations;—although in a more fabulous and sensuous form. The existence of this Myth, before all other History, is the first fact of History, and its true beginning; and therefore it cannot be explained by means of any previous fact:—the contents of this Myth are thus not History but Philosophy, and a belief in it is no further obligatory on any one than as it is confirmed by his own meditations.

We have said before, that if the true end of the Existence of the Human Race was to be attained, it was necessary that the Normal People should be dispersed over the seats of Barbarism: and now, for the first time, was there something new and remarkable, which aroused the memory of Man for its preservation;—now, for the first time, could History, properly so called, have a beginning; for it can do no more than collect in the shape of facts, and by means of mere Empiricism, that gradual civilization of the Actual Human Race of History, which is produced by the admixture of the original Culture with the original Barbarism. In this province, for the first time, the historical Art, the fundamental principle of which we have stated above, comes into play for the discovery and collection of mere facts; and to enable us to comprehend clearly and completely the actual condition of the Present Time, particularly in so far as it may lead us to the discovery of previous facts, and to perceive distinctly under the condition of what earlier facts alone the present can be understood. It is here particularly necessary to dis-

miss altogether the delusive notion of *probability*, which, taking its rise in a feeble Philosophy, has thence spread over every other science, and especially has found a secure refuge in History. The Probable, because it is only *probable*, is for that very reason not *True;*—and why should we concede any place whatever in Science to the *Untrue?* Strictly speaking, the Probable is what *would be* true *if* such and such principles, evidences, and facts *which are awanting*, could be produced. If we are of opinion that these absent proofs may be recovered, perhaps by the discovery of lost documents, or the digging up of hidden volumes; we may then properly enough note down these probabilities, so that their substance may not be lost, distinguishing them by this mark, —*mere probabilities;* accompanied with a notice of what is requisite to establish their truth; but we must by no means fill up the gap between them and Truth by our own too easy belief, and by the desire to prove an hypothesis which we, as Historians, choose to uphold *a priori*.

The History of this gradual Culture of the Human Race, as History properly so called, is again made up of two intimately connected elements; one *a priori*, and the other *a posteriori*. The *a priori* is the World-Plan, the general features of which we have set forth in our first lecture, conducting Humanity through the Five Epochs already enumerated. Without historical information at all, the Thinker may know that these Epochs, as we have described them, must succeed each other, and may also be able, in the same way, to characterize generally such of them as have not yet taken their place in History as facts. Now this development of the Human Race does not take place at once, as the Philosopher pictures it to himself in thought, but, being disturbed by foreign powers, it takes place gradually, at different times, in different places, and under particular circumstances. These conditions do not by any means arise from the Idea of the World-Plan, but are unknown to it; and since there is no other Idea of a World-Plan, they are

an Absolute Unknown to Philosophy: and here begins the pure Empiricism of History; its *a posteriori* element; History in its own proper form.

The Philosopher who, in his capacity of Philosopher, meddles with History, follows the *a priori* course of the World-Plan, which is clear to him without the aid of History at all; and the use which he makes of History is not to prove anything by it, for his principles are already proved independently of History; but only to illustrate and make good in the actual world of History, that which is already understood without its aid. Throughout the whole course of things, therefore, he selects only the instances in which Humanity really advances towards the true end of its being, and appeals only to these instances,—laying aside and rejecting everything else; and as he does not intend to prove historically that Humanity has to pursue this course, having already proved it philosophically, he only points out, for the purposes of illustration, the occasions on which this has been visible in History. The mere Collector of Facts indeed proceeds, and ought to proceed, quite differently. But his business is not to be despised on account of this opposition to Philosophy;—it is, on the contrary, highly honourable if properly pursued. He has absolutely no support, no guide, no fixed point, except the mere outward succession of years and centuries, wholly irrespective of their significance; and it is his business to declare all that can be discovered historically in any of these Epochs of Time. He is an Annalist. Does anything of this kind escape him?—then he has transgressed the rules of his art, and must endure the reproach of ignorance or carelessness. Now in each of these Epochs,—which he distinguishes only by their succession in Time, but not by means of their essential nature,—there lies, as only the Philosopher can tell him, or the Annalist himself if he be a Philosopher may know, the most diverse elements in immediate contact and intermixture;—the remnants of original Barbarism, or of an original Culture which has passed

away without communication; remnants or else foreshadowings of all the other four Epochs of Culture;—and finally the actually present and progressive Culture itself. The merely empirical Historian has to collect faithfully all these elements just as he finds them, and to place them in order beside each other: the Philosopher who uses History for the purpose which we have here in view, attaches himself only to the latter element,—the actually living and progressive movement of Civilization,—laying aside all the rest; and thus the empirical Historian, who should judge him according to the rules of his own art, and conclude that he was ignorant of that which he had no occasion to produce, would be at fault, for it is specially to be expected of the Philosopher that he should not bring forward on every occasion all that he knows, but only so much as bears upon the purpose in view. To make the distinction clear at once:—the Philosopher employs History only so far as it serves his purpose, laying aside everything of which he can make no use; and I announce freely, that in the following inquiry I shall employ it in this way. Such a proceeding, which would be highly culpable in the mere empirical study of History, and would indeed subvert the very nature of this science, is quite justifiable in the Philosopher; for he has already, independently of all History, proved the principles for the illustration of which he makes use of History. He should indeed deserve blame did he assert as fact that which had never taken place; but he relies upon the results of historical inquiry, of which results he employs only the most general; and it would be a great misfortune to historical inquiry itself, if so much as this were not clearly established;—but he deserves no blame if he is only silent with respect to some things which may nevertheless have taken place. He endeavours to understand the true significance and meaning of such historical events as are of universal importance; and with regard to them he only calls to mind the *fact* of their occurrence;—the *manner* in

which they took place, which doubtless implies many other facts, he leaves to the empirical Historian. Should he find that, with his limited knowledge of historical details, he may yet be able to understand and explain a fact in its connexion with the whole World-Plan, much better than he who possesses a more extensive acquaintance with such details, he need not be surprised at this, for only on this account is he a Philosopher. In short, it is Necessity which guides our Race,—not by any means a mere blind Necessity, but a living, conscious, and intelligent Necessity of the Divine Being; and only after we have come under this gentle guidance can we be truly free, and interpenetrated with Life; for beyond this there is nothing but Illusion and Unreality. Nothing is, as it is, because God wills it so arbitrarily, but because He cannot manifest Himself otherwise than as he does. To acknowledge this guidance, humbly to acquiesce therein, and in the consciousness of this identity with the Divine Power to attain true Blessedness, is the business of all men; to comprehend in clear intelligence whatever is Universal, Absolute, and Eternal in this progress of the Human Race, is the business of the Philosopher; to set forth the Actual Phenomena of the inconstant and ever-changing spheres over which this progress holds its way with stedfast course, is the business of the Historian;—whose discoveries are only incidentally employed by the former.

It may be understood that the use which we have partly made of History already, and partly still intend to make of it, can be no other than this its philosophical use, and cannot be viewed otherwise than as we have described it to-day,—I trust clearly and distinctly. Our next task shall be to show how the Idea of the State according to Reason gradually became realized among men, and at what point of this development of the Absolute State our own Age stands. In order to confine ourselves very carefully within the boundaries of our own Science, and not to give any

cause on our part for reviving the old dispute between Philosophy and History, we shall not even give out that which we have to state on this subject as ascertained historical data, but only as hypotheses and distinct questions for History, leaving it to the Historian to bring them to the test of facts, and to inquire how far they are confirmed thereby. Should our views prove merely new and interesting, they may still give rise to inquiries from which something also new and interesting may come forth, if not exactly that which was expected;—and so our trouble shall not be wholly lost. Restricting ourselves to this modest desire, we hope that we shall not lose the countenance even of the Historian.

LECTURE X.

THE ABSOLUTE FORM OF THE STATE.

To show at what point of its development the State has arrived in our own Age, is our next business as announced in the last lecture. The intelligibility of the demonstration which we have to make must evidently depend upon our starting from a strictly defined conception of the Absolute State.

There is nothing, especially in the Epoch in which we live, about which more has been written, read, and spoken, than about the State: therefore in all cultivated, although not exactly scientific society, we can reckon, almost with certainty, upon a greater amount of existing knowledge concerning the State, than concerning any other subject. We must first of all declare, especially with regard to what we intend to say here upon this question, that we partly coincide with certain well-known authors, but upon other and profounder principles than theirs; while we differ from them again in many important matters: and that the view of the State most prevalent among German Philosophers, is not unknown to us, according to which the State ought to be almost nothing more than a juridical institution;—a view which we oppose with deliberate and well-considered determination. It is to be remembered, then, that we are compelled to begin with some apparently uninteresting principles, concerning which, all I can ask of you at first is only

to keep them in mind:—but I trust that before the end of this lecture, these principles shall have become quite clear, by means of farther definitions and applications.

The Absolute State is in its form, according to our opinion, an artistic institution, intended to direct all individual powers towards the Life of the Race, and to transfuse them therein; and thus to realize and manifest in individual life the general form of the Idea, which has been sufficiently described above. Since we cannot here calculate upon the inward life, and the original activity of the Idea in the minds of men,—all life in Idea being of this latter kind, as we have seen in our former lectures,—and since the State rather operates outwardly upon individuals who feel no desire, but on the contrary a reluctance, to offer up their individual life for the Race, it follows that this institution must be one of constraint. For those individuals in whom the Idea has assumed a real inward life, and whose wish and desire is nothing else than to offer up their lives for the Race, no constraint is necessary, and for them it disappears; and the State remains, with respect to them, only that comprehensive Unity, which continually watches over the Whole, and points out and explains at all times the first and nearest purpose of the Race, and arranges the willing powers of man in their appropriate sphere of action. It is an *artistic* institution, we have said: but it is so, in the strict sense of this word, as an institution of free and self-intelligent Art, only after it has scientifically penetrated to its complete and perfect purpose, and the means for the attainment thereof, in the Age of Reason as Science, and when the Fifth Age of Reason as Art has begun. But there is also a higher order in Nature, that is, in the destiny of the Human Race, through which it is led towards its true end, without its own knowledge or will; which order might be called the Art of Nature: and in this sense alone I call the State, in the first Ages of the Human Race, an *artistic* institution. What we have already set forth as the dedication of all individual powers

to the purpose of the Race, is the Absolute State according to its *form;* that is, merely that individual powers shall be dedicated to a purpose of the Race;—but what that particular purpose of the Race may be, depends on whether there is an actual State in existence or not. It remains quite undecided however by this determination of the State, how many purposes of the Race, to the attainment of which the individual power is to be dedicated, can be prosecuted in particular States;—and it remains just as undecided by the same determination, what is the absolute purpose of the Race, by the discovery of which the *material* of the State, and the true meaning and purpose of it, might be described.

And now, after these preliminary definitions, to examine more closely the Idea which we have announced:—In the first place, the State which has to direct a necessarily finite sum of individual powers towards the common purpose, must regard itself as a completed whole, and, as its common purpose is identical with that of the Human Race, it must regard the aggregate of its citizens as the Human Race itself. It is not irreconcilable with this view, that it may also entertain purposes connected with others who are not numbered among its Citizens: for these purposes will still be its own, undertaken merely on its own account,—those, namely, to the attainment of which it directs the individual powers of its own Citizens;—and in every case, therefore, it devotes these powers to itself, considered as the Highest, as the Race. It is therefore the same thing whether we say, as above, that the State directs all individual powers *towards the life of the Race;* or, as here, that it directs them *towards its own life as the State:* only that this latter expression first acquires its true meaning through the former, as we shall soon see.

Once more:—the nature of the Absolute State consists herein,—that all individual powers be directed towards the Life of the Race,—in place of which Race, the State puts the aggregate of its own Citizens. It therefore becomes neces-

sary, *first*, that *all Individuals*, without exception, should be taken into equal consideration by the State; and *second*, that every Individual, with *all his individual powers*, without exception or reserve, should be taken into equal consideration. In a State so constituted, where all, as Individuals, are dedicated to the Race, it follows at the same time, that all without exception, with all the Rights which belong to them as component parts of the Race, are dedicated to all the other individual members of the State. For, to what are the powers of all directed?—to the Race. But what does the State hold as the representative of the Race?—all its Citizens, without a single exception. Were there some Individuals either not taken into account at all in the common purpose, or not taken into account with all their powers, while the rest were included,—then the former would enjoy all the *advantages* of the union without bearing all the attendant *burdens*, and there would thus be inequality. Only where all without exception are taken into account, is equality the result. Consequently, in this constitution, the Individuality of each absolutely disappears in the community of All; and each one receives back his contribution to the common power, strengthened by the united powers of all the rest. The purpose of the isolated Individual is his own enjoyment; and he uses his power as the means of its attainment; —the purpose of the Race is Culture, and the honourable subsistence which is the condition of Culture: in the State, each Individual employs his powers, not for his own immediate enjoyment, but for the purpose of the Race, and he receives in return the whole united Culture of the Race, and therewith his own honourable subsistence. We must guard ourselves, however, against regarding the State as if it were dependent on this or that Individual, or on Individuals in general, and were composed of them:—almost the only way in which ordinary philosophers are able to conceive of a Whole. The State is an essentially unseen Idea; just as the Race has been described in our former lectures: it is—not single

Individuals, but their continuous relation to each other, the living and ever-changing production of which is the work of Individuals, as they exist in space. To make my idea clear by an example:—The Rulers are by no means the State, but merely Citizens, like all the rest; and there is absolutely no *individual character* in the State but that of Citizen. The Rulers, as well as all other Individuals with all their individual powers, are taken into account in order to direct the powers of the governed,—who no more than they constitute the State,—towards the common purpose, so far as they understand it, and to enforce this purpose on all who are opposed to it. Only that result which arises from their guidance and the directed power of the governed, taken together, do we call the State, in the strictest sense of the word.

Only one objection is here to be anticipated; which I meet directly. It may be said: Why then are all the powers of Individuals to be taken into account in the purpose of the State? If this purpose might be attained at less cost, would it not, in that case, be sufficient to secure the desired equality, that the *necessary* expenditure of power should be equally divided among All; and the free use of the *superfluous* power be left to the free will of each Individual? To which we reply:—First of all, the supposed case, that the united power of all Individuals might not be necessary for the purpose of the State, can never occur, and is impossible. Such powers of the Individual as are unknown to himself, and also such as are unknown or are unavailable to the State, are indeed not to be taken into account in the purpose of the State; but all individual power which is known and accessible to the State, is necessary to it for the furtherance of its purpose: its purpose is Culture; and in order to maintain the position to which a State has already attained, and to advance still further, it requires at all times the exertion of every available power;—for only through the united power of All, has it attained this position. Should it not take the Whole into account, it must recede instead of advancing,

and lose its position in the ranks of Culture: and what would further arise out of this, we shall see at another time. Secondly, I ask,—What would the Citizens do with the remaining power which should in that case be left for their free use?—Shall they remain idle, and leave this power unemployed? This is contrary to every form of Culture, and is in itself Barbarism; the cultivated man cannot be inactive or unemployed beyond the necessary period of rest required by his sensuous nature, which period of rest the State in any case would have left to him. Or shall they apply this power for the advancement of their individual purposes? In a Perfect State no just individual purpose can exist, which is not included in the purposes of the Community, and for the attainment of which the Community does not provide. Should it finally be said,—This power may be applied by the Individual for the purpose of his own silent and undisturbed Culture;—then my answer would be,—There is no kind of Culture which does not proceed from society, that is, from the State, in the strictest sense of the word, and none upon which it is not incumbent to strive to return to the State again: this Culture is therefore a purpose of the State itself, and its advancement in each Individual according to his degree must have already been taken into account in the Perfect State. We shall afterwards take care that this shall not be misunderstood in its application to the Actual State: here we only speak of the Perfect State, and to it the principle which we have laid down is applicable without any limitation.

To raise themselves with freedom to this Absolute State, as one of the conditions imposed by Reason on the Human Race, is the vocation of Mankind. This gradual elevation could neither take place in the state of innocence, among the Normal People; nor in the state of original Barbarism among the Savages.

Not among the former:—there men found themselves in the most perfect social relations, without need of any re-

straint or superintendence: every one acted justly, and for the advantage of the Whole, by his own free choice; without reflection on his own part, or on the part of any one else for him; and without this condition being first brought about either by his own skill or by any process of nature:—we have here no trace of a new development. Neither could this occur among the latter:—there each individual cared only for himself; and indeed only for his lower, merely animal wants, and no one rose to the conception of any higher enjoyment. Consequently it was only in the commingling of the two original tribes of our Race, as the Actual Human Race of History, that the development of the State could begin and be carried out.

The first condition of a State, and the first essential characteristic of our idea of it, as stated above, is this: *That Freemen must at first become subject to the will and superintendence of other Freemen.* Freemen, I say, in opposition to Slaves: and by Freemen I mean those to whose own skill and judgment it is left to provide the means of subsistence for themselves and their families; who are accordingly sovereign heads of families, and even continue to be so, after their submission to a foreign will, which has other purposes in view. A Slave, on the contrary, is he to whom there is not left even the care for his own subsistence, but who is maintained by another, and in return becomes subject with his whole powers to the arbitrary will of his master; who therefore cannot be the head of a family, but is a member of a foreign family, and a bondsman for life; his master having no other reason for maintaining him, but that his maintenance is more profitable to him than his destruction. *Freemen*, I said, as such, and on the supposition that they still remain free, must subject themselves to a foreign will;—and I said so for this reason:—It belongs to the Idea of a State, that the subjected may at least *become* a purpose to themselves; and this can only occur, when in their subjection they remain free to a certain extent, and the sphere of their

liberty afterwards comes within the purpose of the State, whenever the State advances to higher Culture;—but the Slave as such, and in the case of his never attaining freedom, cannot become a purpose to himself; he is at best, like every other animal, a mere instrument of his master's purpose; but by no means a purpose to himself. In this subjection of Freemen to the oversight and rule of other Freemen, there are then two, or, if we reckon otherwise, three cases possible: and,—as this subjection is the origin of the State,—there are just as many possible fundamental forms of the State, through which it must pass towards its accomplishment; and I entreat you to observe well, and even to commit to memory, these fundamental forms, as the foundation upon which we intend to rest all our subsequent disquisitions upon this subject.

Namely,—after this subjection has been accomplished, the general mass of individuals, who have thereby come into combination, considered as a completed Whole, are either *All without exception subjected to the Whole,* that is, to the common purpose of All,—as it should be in the Perfect State; or *they are not All subjected to the Whole.* The latter case, where All are not subjected to the Whole, can only be supposed possible in this way,—that as the *subjected* at least are All subjected to the Whole, the *subjectors* have not, on the other hand, subjected themselves in return to the necessary purposes which are common to the others and to themselves. The subjectors have consequently subjected the others to their *own* particular purpose; which,—as it cannot be, at least cannot be wholly, one of sensuous enjoyment; for in that case they would at once have reduced the subjected to slavery, and destroyed their freedom altogether,—must necessarily be the purpose of ruling for the sake of ruling. This would be our first case, as it is the first form which the State assumes in time;—namely, *the absolute inequality of the members of the State,* who are divided into the classes of Rulers and Ruled, which can never ex-

change their relative positions so long as this arrangement endures. It is evident here, in passing, that such a State cannot subdue its vassals *with all their powers* to its purpose, as the State can certainly do when it has a better purpose in view:—for, in so doing, it would make them perfect Slaves, and would thereby cease to deserve the name even of a nascent State. Our other case was this:—That all the individual members of the State, without exception, are subjected to the purpose of the Whole. This, again, is possible in two ways:—First, all the individual members may be only *negatively* subjected to the Whole; that is, a purpose may be secured to every one without exception, in the prosecution of which no one else dares to hinder him. Such a purpose, secured by the constitution against interference on the part of any one else, is called a *Right:* in such a constitution, therefore, every one has a Right, to which all other men without exception are subjected. Equal Rights for all men *as Rights*; but by no means equal Privileges;—for the purposes secured to different individuals may be very different in extent, and the existing state of Privileges was generally taken for the Standard of Right when the dominion of Laws began. It is evident that the State which occupies this position, since it confers Privileges upon some of its Citizens, which exceed the Privileges of others who are nevertheless able to keep their ground, is far from subjecting all the powers even of these favourites to its purpose: nay,—since by these Privileges of its favourites it hinders the others in the free use of their powers,—that it even wastes these powers for the purposes of Individuals; and therefore, with all its Equal Rights, is far removed from the Absolute form of the State. The case we have now described would be the second fundamental form of the State, and the second stage upon which our Race would find itself in its progress towards the perfect form of the State. Lastly,—that all the individual members of the State are subjected to the purpose of the Whole, may also mean, that they are not

merely subjected negatively thereto, but *also positively;* so that absolutely no Individual can propose any purpose to himself, and devote himself to its furtherance, which is his own merely, and not at the same time the purpose of the whole Community. It is obvious that in such a constitution all the powers of all men are taken into account for the common purpose,—this common purpose being no other than the purpose of all men without exception, considered as a Race; and that therefore this constitution manifests the Absolute form of the State, and a true equality of Privileges and Powers begins. This equality does not by any means exclude the distinction of Classes in society; that is, the different modes in which human power may be applied, which are left to the exclusive cultivation of Individuals, who again leave the remaining modes of this application of power to the exclusive cultivation of other men. But no Class, and no exclusive application of power, must be permitted, which is not dedicated to the purpose of the Whole, and which is not absolutely necessary for the Whole;—the produce of which is not actually partaken of by all other classes, and by all the Individuals who compose these classes, according to their ability to enjoy it. This would be the third stage of the development of the State;—in which it would be perfected, at least according to its Form.

It will be found, and perhaps it may be understood at once by the more attentive and prepared auditor, that by means of this perfection of its *Form,* the State for the first time obtains possession of its true *Material,*—that is, the genuine purpose of the Human Race which has associated itself within it; and that it has still to go through many stages of its progress before its end shall be attained. We speak here in the meantime only of the *Form* of the State. I have undertaken these preliminary inquiries, in order that we may be enabled to show what point of its development the State has attained in our own Age,—in those countries, of course, where it is furthest advanced. In the

meantime I may declare, that in my opinion the State is still occupied with the completion of its Form, that it has now firmly established itself on what we have described as the second stage, and endeavours to attain the third;—which latter it has even attained in part, and in part has not yet attained. Hence, that in our own Age, more than at any previous time, every Citizen, with all his powers, is subjected to the purpose of the State, is thoroughly penetrated by it, and so has become its instrument; and that the State endeavours to make this subjection universal and complete:—this constitutes, in our opinion, the fundamental character of the Age, in its Civil Relations. What we precisely mean by this assertion, and that it is actually the case, will be most easily shown by depicting Times when it was not so; and by proving historically, how and by what course it has gradually become as it now is. We reserve this inquiry, as well as some other investigations, which must precede it, for the following lectures.

Let us, however, discuss one not unimportant point of this nature, to-day:—that of Political Freedom. Even in the first form of the State, the Subject remained personally free: he did not become a Slave. Had all been made Slaves, then the nature of the whole institution would have been lost. In this condition, however, not even the personal freedom of the Subject was guaranteed: he might be reduced to slavery by one of the Rulers; he had therefore no Civil Freedom,—that is, as we have explained it above, *he had no Right secured to him by the constitution:* he was in fact not a Citizen, but only a Subject; a Subject, however, only to a certain extent,—not being a Slave; and beyond the limits of his subjection he was free,—not through Law, but through Nature, and Accident. In the second form of the State, each Individual, without exception, received back through the constitution a portion of freedom,—not exactly of arbitrary power, but of independence,—by which he compelled all other men to respect a certain purpose or

Right, which belonged peculiarly to him;—and every one had thus his own degree, not of mere personal liberty, but of more secure, and therefore of *Civil* Freedom; while beyond this he was a Subject; and if the Privileges of others, by which he was restrained, were more extensive than his own, —he was more a Subject than a Citizen. In the Absolute form of the State, where all the powers of all men are called into activity, for the necessary purpose of the whole community, each Individual binds all others just in so far as he is bound by them: all have equal Civil Privileges or Civil Freedom; and each Individual is thus at once a complete Citizen and a complete Subject;—and, for the same reason, all are Citizens and Subjects in like manner. If we call him the Sovereign who in reality gives its purpose to the State, then in this last-mentioned form of the State, every Citizen will be a part of the Sovereign power, in the same manner and in the same degree;—and if in this respect we bestow the title *Sovereign* upon Individuals, then the principle just laid down may also be expressed thus:— Each Individual is entirely a *Sovereign* in respect of his necessary purpose as a member of the Race, and entirely a *Subject* in respect of the application of his individual powers:—and all are therefore both Sovereign and Subject in the same manner.

Such is the case, in reference to the State, when taken in its strictest sense, as we have described it above,—*i. e.* as an Idea. It is a wholly different question, possessing nothing in common with the former one,—Who then shall understand and measure this purpose of the State, given to it in reality, although not openly, by the Community as a whole, and, by means of this estimate, guide the power of the Citizens, and compel such as may oppose themselves thereto?—in one word, Who shall govern? Since it is impossible that any higher estimate of the purpose which has been given to the State by the Community as a whole can find a place in the State itself,—all other powers and capa-

cities in the State being subjected to this supreme estimate, and guided thereby;—it follows that this estimate is associated with external independence and freedom; and indeed with *Political* Freedom, if the Greek word from which this expression is derived may be applied to the active and efficient administration of a State. The former question would regard *the Constitution of the State,* which is and ought to be absolutely determined by Reason alone: the question now raised is directed to the *Form of Government.*

It is evident, that with respect to the latter, only two cases are possible: either all individuals without exception take part *by right,* and in a perfectly equal degree, in this estimate, and, by means of it, in the direction of all the powers of the State; and then All are partakers of Political Freedom, and are so in an equal degree:—or this estimate, and the direction consequent upon it, is given over exclusively to a certain number of individuals:—which latter case, according to our previous investigations, amounts to nothing more than this,—that a particular Class in society is established by Art, or is met with in Nature and History, to which is committed, as its exclusive branch of the general application of power, the estimate of the purpose of the State, and the task of governing according to this estimate; while the other Classes direct their powers to something else; and all of them, in their common character, as the governed, stand in opposition to the Rulers. Here Political Freedom is possessed only by the Rulers; the governed are altogether without it, and, in reference to the Government, they are merely Subjects.

In the first place, the Constitution of the State, as it should be acccording to Reason, is not necessarily altered or abridged in any respect by such a form of Government as we have now described. The governing Class remains subject to the common purpose of the State, which is determined by the general wants of the Community; and it must apply all its powers, without exception or reserve, *directly* to the attain-

ment of this purpose; just as the other Classes have to dedicate their labour *indirectly* to the attainment of the same purpose: hence, in regard to this purpose, it is as much subjected as the others. This Class itself, as a constituent element of the Race, is a part of the purpose of the State; and the attainment of its wants, as an element of the Race, but not as a governing Class, must likewise be secured; and the Ruler is therefore a Citizen, just as much as all the others, but in no higher degree.

It is thus only the form of the *State* which is determined by Reason, and its realization absolutely required, but by no means the form of *Government*. If the purpose of the State be understood, as clearly as is possible at the time, and all existing power be directed towards the realization of this highest conception, then is the Government right and good, whether it be in the hands of All, or in the hands of a few Individuals, or finally in those of a single Individual: —it being understood, in this last case, that this single Individual chooses his assistants according to his own judgment, who remain subject and responsible to him. Civil Freedom, and that to an equal degree, is absolutely required for all men; but Political Freedom is, at most, only necessary for one. All the inquiries which have ever been set on foot concerning the best Government, particularly in later times, have had finally in view to find a means of restraining the all-compelling power of Government: —first of all, in order that, as an absolutely correct insight cannot be obtained by force, there may at least be the best possible insight actually applied to the Government; and, in that case, that this best possible insight shall be actually realized with all power. How useful soever this inquiry may be in itself, and however possible the theoretical solution of the problem, which indeed may actually have been solved somewhere; yet thousands of years may pass over our Race before this solution can belong to a philosophical characterization of any Present Age. It is a fortunate and satisfac-

tory thing for us, that in the actual position of all cultivated States, and in all existing Classes of civilized men, there are numerous urgent and constraining reasons for every Government striving to attain the clearest possible insight into the true purpose of the State, and acting at all times with all its powers according to the best insight which it possesses.

In the pursuance of our inquiries, we shall have opportunities to refer to these reasons. Could such indications on our part, and the whole range of inquiries which we have begun to-day, contribute in particular anything towards making the Constitution under which we live more intelligible, and thereby dearer and more valuable, to us, then would one end be attained which belongs to the purpose of these lectures.

LECTURE XI.

FARTHER DEFINITION OF THE IDEA OF THE STATE.

To determine at what stage of its development the State has arrived in the Present Age, is the problem with which we are now occupied, and to solve which we have undertaken the immediately preceding inquiries and investigations. We had first of all to declare the mere *Form* of the State; that is, what is implied in the mere general assertion of the existence of the State;—and this we have done in our last lecture. Should this investigation have appeared to some to be too speculative,—so that, on this account, it has either never been entirely clear to them, or is not now any longer wholly present to their memory,—this can only arise, in my opinion, from the proper comprehension of the form of the State requiring the attention to be distributed over the numerous Individuals, wholly different in respect of their outward qualities, who compose the State; while at the same time it is requisite that this multitude of Individuals should be regarded as an indivisible organic Whole. For the Understanding, this business of comprehension is not rendered more difficult by the multitude and variety of these elements; but the imagination, and still more the common power of observation which attaches itself only to the peculiarities of Individuals and of Classes, is easily tired, unless it has had a certain amount of practice beforehand. Thus, in order to make our ideas perfectly clear to

those who perchance have not altogether understood our former lecture; and to bring the whole once more at one view before those to whom it may no longer be thoroughly present in memory; let us to-day illustrate our views by the example of a smaller Community, to which, although not itself a State, we may give the *form* of the State,—that being all with which we are concerned at present.

Let us suppose a union, perhaps by mutual agreement, of several natural families into one, which would thenceforward be an artificial family. The purpose of such a union could be nothing more than to acquire and preserve, as far as possible, by their common labour, the means of physical existence; and hence this union would not constitute a State, —the State not being an economical society, and having a purpose very different from the mere physical maintenance of individual life. But let us give to this family-union the general form of the State. This is only possible in the three following ways:—Either all the members of the Society are bound to apply their whole time and ability to labour for the whole number of families composing it, so that they cannot occupy themselves with aught else; while, on the other hand, all without exception have an equal interest in the property and enjoyments of the whole;—there being nothing whatever belonging to the household which is not the property of all, and which would not, were the occasion to arise, actually be expended for any one. That each should apply his whole ability for all the families, I said;—meaning thereby, in so far as he possesses such ability. It is not allowable that any one should say,—'I am stronger than all the others; I do more for the common good, and therefore I must have something more than others in the division of enjoyments;'—for the union and combination of all into one Society is altogether *unconditional;*—that this one is the strongest, is quite *accidental;* were he the weakest, he would not be less cared for on that account; and were he accidentally to become weak or sick, so that he could no

longer do anything for the common good, he would still be cared for in the same way. Were our supposed family-union organized in this way, it would then bear the Absolute form of the State, *as it ought to be* according to Reason,—consisting in Equal Rights and Equal Privileges for All.

Or:—the constitution of our supposed Society might be thus arranged:—that perhaps,—for we may leave this point undetermined,—that perhaps all, without exception, are bound to apply all their powers for the purposes of the Community; and also that there is no one to whom the participation in some portion of what has been acquired by the common labour is not secured; but that, nevertheless, only a few are admitted to partake of whatever is most precious and valuable in the produce of the common power, while the others are excluded from this enjoyment. In this case it would follow, that those who are thus excluded have laboured only *in part* for the whole Community, and in part not for the whole (to which nevertheless they themselves belong), but only for the few privileged Individuals; and hence that they have been, not indeed wholly, but yet in this latter respect, only means for the attainment of the purpose of these others. This arrangement would represent the second possible form of the State: Equal Rights for all, but not Equal Privileges. Finally, we may conceive of this union of families in the following way:—that the greater number of its members labour with all their powers to acquire a permanent and fixed estate, while some neither put their own hand to the work, nor direct the labour of others, nor trouble themselves in any way whatever about the matter; but only come from time to time, and snatch from the property accumulated by the labour of the others, whatever is most accessible and pleasing to themselves; at most taking care that the working part of the Community be not wholly ruined;—but even this only by their own arbitrary choice, since no one can bind them to this foresight. This condition of the Society would bear the first form of the State:—the

absolute subjugation of the Many to the selfish purposes of the Few, and absolute extinction of Rights among all.—This would be a picture of the three possible fundamental forms of the State which we have already enumerated.

From this constitution of the *State*, and the *Personal* and *Civil* Freedom which are its necessary elements, we carefully distinguished the form of *Government* and the *Political* Freedom which belongs to it. That which we have adduced on this latter subject, may likewise be illustrated by our imaginary Society. In the supposed family-union, all the powers therein united ought to be directed to the attainment of the common purpose. This can only be secured by one single Will assuming the guidance of the whole application of power,—determining at all times what ought to be done immediately for the purpose of the Society, and what may be deferred; what must be infallibly accomplished, and what may be relinquished should sufficient time and ability be wanting for its attainment;—a Will which appoints each one his place, so that his exertions may not interrupt, but assist and coöperate with, the labours of others;—a Will, in fine, to which each individual unconditionally submits his own will, in respect to the employment of his powers for the purposes of the Community. Whence shall proceed this one Will, which is to guide all other wills?—Either all the members of the Society who have attained mature age, assemble together so often as a new resolution is needed upon the interests of the Society; all, without exception, express their opinion on the question proposed, so far as they understand it; and after a sufficient general deliberation, the majority of voices decides the point,—to which decision all must thenceforward be subject in their outward actions, whatever they may think in their own minds of its justice. If the Society be constituted in this way, then each has *by Right* an equal share in the direction of the common purpose,—which direction in the State is called Government: and this freedom, which, with reference to the State, we

call *Political Freedom*, is thus *by Right* equally divided among all. *By Right*, I have said, both in the former lecture with reference to the State, and in this with reference to the supposed family-union; for should there be any one who is never possessed of thoughts upon the good of the Community, which are nevertheless quite evident to the others, or who, if he do possess such thoughts, yet cannot express them; then he would *actually* possess little or no influence in the ultimate determination of the Community; but he would not be excluded from this influence by defect of Right, but only by his own incapacity.

Or, in the second case,—the Society may have made over to a committee composed of a few Individuals, or even to one Individual, the superintendence and direction of the whole;—and in this case they resign their own right of direction and judgment in the administration of Government,—but only so far as outward action is concerned, for in thought and speech they are still at liberty to do what they will,—and unconditionally subject their own practically active will to the will of their authorised committee, or individual manager. In this method of prosecuting the common purpose of the Society, there is no place for what the State calls Political Freedom, but only the condition of subjection. Nevertheless, if all without exception have an equal share in all the advantages of the Society, and if all the individual powers are directed by the best possible insight towards the common advantage, but by no means towards any private advantage, then the management of the Society is perfectly legitimate; and this Society has lost nothing by making over the direction to a few or even to one; but, on the contrary, has gained thereby, since many Individuals who would have contributed nothing available for the common good in the assembly, are no longer compelled to sacrifice their time in attending there, but may instead continue peaceably to practise that which they understand.

All that has been now illustrated by means of our sup-

posed Society, we had already adduced in our former lecture upon the form of the State, or upon the question,—What is implied in the mere existence of a State? But we added at that time, that the position of a particular State, or of the State at a particular Epoch of Time, is also to be determined by this inquiry,—whether, and in how far, the true purpose of all States,—or whether, and in how far, the *Material* of the State as distinguished from its *Form*,—has been attained therein? We must further discuss this Material of the State before we can begin the historical inquiry,—how the State has gradually attained that point of its development upon which, in our opinion, it now stands.

The purpose of the State is, as we have already shown in our last lecture, no other than that of the Human Race itself:—to order all its relations according to the Laws of Reason. It is only after the Age of Reason as Science shall have been traversed, and we shall have arrived at the Age of Reason as Art, that the State can reflect upon this purpose with clear consciousness. Till then it constantly promotes this purpose, but without its own knowledge, or free premeditated design; prompted thereto by the natural law of the development of our Race, even while it has a totally different purpose in view;—with which purpose of its own, Nature has indissolubly bound up the purpose of the whole Race. This special and natural purpose of the State in the earlier Epochs which precede the Epoch of Reason as Science, is like that of individual men,—mere self-preservation; and as the State only exists in the Race, the mere preservation of the Race; and, as the Race developes itself progressively, its preservation in each particular stage of that development;—in both the two last-mentioned cases, without the State entertaining any clear conception of its purpose. In one word, the purpose of the State, *i. e.* to maintain itself,—and the purpose of Nature, *i. e.* to place the Human Race under such external conditions as may enable it to form itself, by its own free activity, into an express image of

Reason,—wholly coincide; and while the attainment of the former is pursued, the latter is at the same time accomplished.

Let us consider this matter in detail:—

In the intermixture of original Culture and original Barbarism,—from which intermixture alone a Human Race capable of development could arise,—the first and immediate purpose is the cultivation of the savage tribes. Again, when we arrive at the first traces of a State, and Freemen are permanently subjected to other Freemen according to a definite rule, there Culture already exists;—artificial Culture namely, produced by civilization, not the original Culture of the Normal People, of which we do not here speak;—and we may therefore regard the State, particularly in the most perfect form which it has assumed in any given Age, as at the same time the seat of the highest Culture of that Age. Barbarism stands directly opposed to the purposes of this Culture wherever it comes in contact with them, and constantly threatens the existence of the State; which thus finds itself, even by the necessity of its own preservation, placed in natural war with the surrounding Barbarism, and is compelled to use every effort for its overthrow,—which latter, indeed, can only be thoroughly accomplished by bringing the Barbarians themselves under the dominion of law and order; and, in so far, cultivating them. Thus, while thinking only of itself, the State promotes indirectly the great purpose of the Human Race. This natural war of all States against the surrounding Barbarism is of great significance for History: it is this, almost exclusively, which introduces a living and progressive principle into History. We shall revert to this principle at another time, and therefore I entreat you to note this. Even after the general dominion of Culture has become so powerful that it has nothing more to fear from outward Barbarism,—after it is perhaps divided from this Barbarism by broad oceans,—it will nevertheless, impelled by

an inward necessity, seek out those Barbarians who can no longer approach it, in order to appropriate to itself those products of their lands which they themselves do not employ; or those lands themselves; or it may be, to subdue to itself the powers of those Barbarians;—in part directly, by means of slavery,—and in part indirectly, by means of unfair and overreaching commerce. However unjust these purposes may appear in themselves, yet, by means of them, the first characteristic of the World-Plan, *i. e.* the general diffusion of Culture, is gradually promoted;—and thus will it continually proceed, until the whole Race which inhabits our globe shall, according to the same plan, be amalgamated into one national republic of Culture.

A second necessary purpose of the Human Race is, that surrounding Nature, which exercises an influence upon its existence as well as upon its actions, shall be wholly and completely subdued to the jurisdiction of the Understanding. No power of Nature shall prejudice or disturb the purposes of Culture, nor be able to destroy the results of such purposes; every manifestation of such power shall be ascertainable beforehand, and there shall be known and accessible means of preventing any consequent danger. It shall be possible to compel every useful power of Nature to shape itself to the uses and purposes of men. The powers of Man, again, shall be multiplied by a legitimate distribution of the necessary branches of labour among many members, each of whom shall acquire only one branch, but acquire that one well;—these powers shall be armed with the knowledge of Nature and of Art, and with convenient implements and machinery, and thus be raised superior to every power of Nature; so that all the mere earthly purposes of man may be attained without much expenditure of time or labour, and sufficient opportunity be left remaining for him to turn his attention upon inward and celestial things. This is the purpose of the Human Race, as such.

In the State, the greater the proportion of the time and

power of its Citizens which it requires, and must lay claim to, for the purpose of its own support, and the more thoroughly it seeks to interpenetrate all its members, and make them the instruments of this purpose,—the more must it endeavour to multiply and extend the means of physical life, by promoting that dominion of Man over Nature which we have already described, in order that it may thereby secure the existence of its Citizens;—it must therefore accept all the before-mentioned purposes of the Race, and assume them as its own, for the sake of its own purpose. It will consequently,—to adopt the common enumeration of these purposes,—strive to quicken Industry; to improve Agriculture; to carry to their highest perfection Manufactures, Commerce, and Machinery; and to encourage discoveries in the Mechanical Arts and in Natural Science. Let it be believed that it does all this only with the view of adding to its revenue, so that it may be enabled to maintain a larger army;—let even the Rulers themselves, at least for the most part, be unconscious of any higher design;—it nevertheless promotes, though without its own knowledge, the purpose which we have indicated as that of the Human Race, as such.

The outward purpose of this dominion of the Race over Nature is, as we have said in one of our first lectures, a double purpose:—Either that Nature may be subjected merely to the purpose of rendering our sensuous existence more easy and agreeable,—whence arise the Mechanical Arts; or that it may be subjected to the higher spiritual wants of man, and have stamped upon it the majestic image of the Idea,—whence arises Fine Art. A State which has yet much to fear for its existence, and requires to make great efforts in order to place even that in safety, will indeed, so soon as it attains the very first glimpse of its true interest, study to promote in every possible way the Mechanical Arts, in the extended sense which we have given to them above; but should it do this merely with

the view of having at command a larger surplus of the national power which it may then employ for the maintenance of its own security, then it will apply this surplus of power only to that purpose, and will have very little remaining for the systematic and general promotion of Fine Art, *i.e.* of the higher purposes of Humanity. It is only after the State, even for the sake of its own self-preservation, has subjected Nature to the mechanical uses of its Citizens, and made these Citizens themselves, and all of them equally, its instruments in the highest possible degree;—after the whole empire of Culture has entered into such relations with that of Barbarism, and the particular States into which the former may be divided have entered into such relations with each other, that no one need any longer be anxious about his external security;—it is only after this has taken place, that the question arises,—To what should the surplus of national power, rendered superfluous by the mechanical elaboration of Nature, which surplus of power has hitherto been devoted to the security of the State, and stands entirely under the authority of the State, as all the Citizens do;—to what shall this surplus of power be applied?—and there can be no other answer given to this question than that it should be devoted to Fine Art. During War, Art can scarcely exist, far less advance with sure step and according to a settled plan;—the time of War however is not limited to the period when War is actually carried on, but the general insecurity of all men with respect to each other, and the constant state of preparation for War resulting from this, is itself War; and has almost the same consequences for the Human Race as active War. Only real, that is, permanent Peace, can be the parent of Art, as we understand that word.

I said, that only after the State has attained to perfect external security, the question arises, to what the surplus of national power, now no longer necessary for the purposes to which it was previously directed, should be applied. This

question is also one which is obviously forced upon the State by the purposes of self-preservation; since, from such a considerable mass of power, undivided and uncomputed, and which nevertheless cannot by possibility remain wholly quiescent, nothing is to be expected but disturbances and hindrances to the State in the prosecution of its prescribed plans, and therefore the breaking up of its internal peace; and thus it is obvious that, in all those respects to which we have adverted, the State stands under a higher guidance, concealed it may be from itself; and that while, in its own belief, it is merely pursuing its special purpose of self-preservation, it is nevertheless, at the same time, promoting the higher purpose of the development of the Human Race.

For the rest:—It is only for the sake of completeness that we have introduced this latter point;—namely, how and under what external conditions the State is compelled, even in providing for its own preservation, to adopt the general, and universally accessible form of Fine Art, as its own purpose: not by any means as indicating that this consideration belongs to the characteristics of the Present, or of any preceding Age. Should this latter assertion surprise any one who thinks of the loud talk about Art, and the promotion of Art, current in the present day, even among our great men, we would entreat such an one to consider that this talk cannot have escaped us; that as little can it have escaped us, in the second place, that by a peculiar concourse of circumstances, among which one at least can never reappear, there has once more burst forth from the Christian Church a morning-dawn of Art, the beams of which continue to illumine our present day, though with a reflected splendour; but that nevertheless the expression Fine Art, and particularly a Fine Art pervading the whole nation and every branch of its activity, has with us a signification quite different from the common one; of which meaning we have here neither time nor opportunity to give such a full account as is requisite for its proper comprehension.

Thus far and no farther extends the legitimate promotion of the purposes of Reason by means of the State, while the latter seems to be occupied solely with the pursuit of its own purpose. The higher branches of the Culture of Reason,—Religion, Science, Virtue,—can never become purposes of the State. Not Religion:—We do not here speak of the superstitious fear of God, as a Being hostile to man, which ancient nations conjured up from their own thoughts, in order that they might propitiate this dreadful Being in name of the nation, and so establish National Religions:—with this we have nothing to do at present. The True Religion is as old as creation, and therefore older than any State. It was one of the arrangements of that Providence which watches over the development of our Race, that this True Religion should, at the proper time, reappear from out the obscurity in which it had previously lain concealed, and spread itself over the empire of Culture; asserting even beforehand the claim that the State should have no power over it; and exacting from the Rulers, as the condition of their reception into the bosom of this Religion, the acknowledgment of their submission to God, and the equality of all men in his sight; and devolving its preservation and extension upon a society, in so far wholly independent of the State,—*i.e.* the Church. Here it must necessarily remain,—for the Rulers can never shut themselves up from the need of Religion; and here will it remain to the end of Time. As little can Science ever become a purpose of the State. From this remark there is to be excluded whatever Individuals, Rulers, or partakers in the Government, may do on account of their own familiarity with Science or Art, or their interest therein, as an exception to the general rule. But with respect to the regular and ordinary course of things, the more the State approaches the perfection of its Form, and makes its Citizens entirely the instruments of its purpose, the more must it be estranged from Science, strictly so called,—which is elevated far above common life, and has no direct

influence thereon,—and must even regard it as a useless expenditure of time and power, which might be more profitably devoted to its own immediate service; and the phrase 'mere Speculation' will become more and more a sure term of reprobation. It might indeed easily be proved that no one can be a thoroughly useful servant of the State, capable at all times of passing from established Custom to new Truth; who has not first been trained in the school of severe Science. But the insight into this Truth presupposes either the possession of Science itself; or, should this be awanting, a self-denial which cannot reasonably be exacted. In this position of matters, Science may consider itself fortunate enough if it be tolerated by the State; either through inconsequence; or from the hope that the barren Speculation may, at one time or other, lead to some useful discovery; or from receiving the protection of the Church, or even that of Medicine, since every man would willingly live as long and enjoy as good health as possible.

Finally, Virtue can be no object of the State. Virtue is the constant and all-directing Good-will, which strives to promote with every power, the purposes of the Human Race; and in the State particularly to promote these purposes in the way prescribed by it;—the desire and love to do this, and an unconquerable aversion to any other course of action. But the State, in its essential character of a compulsive power, calculates upon the *absence* of Good-will, and therefore upon the absence of Virtue, and upon the *presence* of Evil-will;—it supplies the want of the former, and represses the out-break of the latter, by Fear of Punishment. Strictly confining itself to this sphere, it has no need to calculate upon Virtue, nor to take it into account for the accomplishment of its purposes. Were all its members virtuous, it would lose its character of a compulsive power altogether, and become the mere Leader, Guide, and true Counsellor of the willing.

Nevertheless the State, by its mere existence, conduces to the possibility of a general development of Virtue throughout the Human Race, — although, strictly considered, it does not expressly make this its purpose, except as concealed under another form, — by the production of external good manners and morality, which indeed are yet far off from Virtue. Under a Legislation which should strictly and systematically embrace every possible crime against the outward Rights of the Citizens, and under an Administration from which actual crime could seldom or never conceal itself, or escape the punishment threatened by the Law, every thought of crime, as something wholly vain, and leading to nothing but certain punishment, would at once be stifled in its birth. When the Nation had lived in peace and quietness for a series of Ages under this constitution, and new generations had been born and had grown to manhood beneath its sway, and from them again younger races had arisen; then the habit even of inward temptation to injustice would gradually disappear altogether; and men would live with each other peacefully and justly, without the outward appearance of the least Evil-will, exactly as if all were virtuous of heart; — while it might still perhaps be only Law which restrained them, although now with a silent and gentle authority; and in moments when its dominion should be cast off, we might witness very different scenes.

Let us not be afraid, with certain reasoners, — who also assume the name of Philosophers, and who recognise in Virtue nothing but a mere negation, and can only conceive of it as the opposite of crime, — let us not be afraid that in such a state of society, Virtue should be no longer possible. If these reasoners speak of outward actions in society which shall even surpass the Law of the State, and which may perhaps spring from inward Virtue, perhaps from other motives; — then are they quite right; for, in the Perfect State, the virtuous man finds everything relating to so-

ciety, which he himself loves and desires to do, already outwardly commanded; and everything which he detests and would never consent to do, already outwardly forbidden: in this State it is impossible to go beyond what is commanded, and thus it can never be determined from the outward action itself, whether a man has done right from Love of Goodness or from Fear of Punishment,—with his own free consent, or against his will. But Virtue does not need this outward recognition; it rests in its own Love of Goodness, without reference to what is commanded, and in its own aversion to Evil, without reference to what is forbidden; it is sufficient for itself, and is supremely blessed in its own consciousness of rectitude.

And so it must be at once admitted, that, through the perfection of all the relations of the Human Race, and in particular through the perfection of that relation which includes within itself all the others, *i.e.* the State,—all voluntary Sacrifice, all Heroism, all Self-denial, in short, all that we are wont to admire in man, must cease, and only the Love of Goodness, as the one imperishable Virtue, remain. To this Love, man can only raise himself with Freedom; or rather its flame will kindle spontaneously in every soul which has first eradicated from itself the Desire of Evil. The State can, at furthest, facilitate the development of this Love, inasmuch as it scares back the incipient desire of Evil into the secret depths of the breast, accords it no advantage, but counts it as a mere idle detriment. He in whose soul this flame of Heavenly Love is kindled, however hindered and bound down he may seem to mere outward appearance, yet in inward Freedom and independence rises even superior to the State;—the State does not give a Law to his will, but its Law accidentally accords with his will, because it is a perfect Law. This Love, as it is the only imperishable Virtue, and the only Blessedness, so is it also the only True Freedom; and only through it can Man rise

superior to the bondage of the State, as well as to all other bondage which oppresses and confines him here below. Happy is it for Mankind, that they have not to wait for the slowly advancing perfection of the State, in order to attain this Love; but that in all Ages, and under all circumstances, every Individual of our Race may freely raise himself to its possession!

LECTURE XII.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE.

As a preparative to the solution of the problem with which we are more immediately occupied,—What point of its development has the State attained in our own Age?—we have shown, in our two last lectures, though only in the abstract, and by means of Philosophy, what the State, both in its Form and its Material, really is; and through what stages and elements of progress it gradually advances towards its perfection. This delineation, which must have been somewhat tedious in itself, acquired an interest from the purpose we had in view;—this, namely, to render what is to follow thoroughly intelligible to you. We have now to give life to this general picture, by summoning to your recollection the actual events of History;—with the view of enabling you to discover for yourselves what is new, original, and peculiar in the constitution and government of existing States; and thus, wherein the political character of our Age, as distinguished from all other Ages, consists. We have already sufficiently explained the nature of our use and treatment of History in a special lecture; out of which lecture we find it necessary here to remind you only of one thing,—namely, that our remarks upon History do not lay claim to the character of historical principles themselves, but are merely designed to open up questions and problems for proper historical investigation. And we add, as a new and farther

limitation, that we shall confine ourselves to the simple and obvious traces of civilization which have come down to us; employing only our own History,—that of civilized Europe, as the existing domain of Culture; passing by other adjoining civilizations, which may indeed have had a common origin with our own, but which cannot now be referred back to such an origin, and have no direct influence upon ourselves;—for example, the civilizations of China and of India.

We have already set forth as the beginning of all social combination, the occurrence of this fact;—namely, *that Freemen became subject, to a certain extent and in a certain respect, to the will of other Freemen.* How and in what way has this subjugation been brought about?—this is the first question which here forces itself upon our notice. This question is intimately connected with that respecting the origin of inequality among men, which has become so famous in our own day, and which we shall by no means solve in the way in which it has been solved by a writer who has gained great celebrity, particularly on this account.*

According to our system,—which we have already set forth, and which may be fully proved in the strict domain of Philosophy,—we find an original inequality among men, and indeed the greatest possible inequality; namely, between the Normal People existing as a pure manifestation of Reason, on the one hand;—and the wild and savage Races of Barbarism, on the other. In what way these primitive ingredients of our Human Race were first mingled together, no History can inform us; for the very existence of a History presupposes such an intermixture as already accomplished. In this condition of intermixture, even the descendant of the Normal People,—the partaker of their primitive Culture,—first became aware of the demand upon him for an entirely new *Cultivation*, not necessarily included in that

* Rousseau.

primitive *Culture;* — namely, the cultivation of the power of imparting his Culture to others, and thus creating for himself an extensive field of influence and activity. It does not follow that all such descendants of the Normal People made equal progress in this new art, or were even capable of so doing; but each individual would develope this art in himself as his own character might permit: as little does it follow that those who remained behind in this progress, and could not so easily lay aside their innocence and simplicity, were on that account worse than those who found it easy to enter into the crooked byways of corrupt and depraved Races, or to employ force against them; — but it does follow that the latter, and not the former, would be the Counsellors, Leaders, and Governors, and that with the free consent and good-will of the former, who in such a state of things would not grudge them this privilege, but would willingly retire into silence and obscurity.

An outward circumstance should be mentioned here, which, in our opinion, is of the greatest importance in History — the possession of metals, and the art of their most suitable application: — of *metals,* I say, and I beg that you will not suppose that I mean gold alone. How the knowledge of these metals first arose, and how they were first brought forth from the bosom of the earth, and changed into the new and unexpected forms imposed upon them by art; — with this inquiry, in our opinion, no History need trouble itself; such Knowledge undoubtedly existed anterior to all History, and from the very beginning of the world, as a possession of the Normal People; which possession, after the intermixture with Barbarism, only the skilful knew how to employ wholly otherwise than the simple. The value which these metals would acquire by their durability, by their usefulness in strengthening the feeble powers of man, and by the difficulty of discovering them; and in particular, the dreadful importance which they would acquire in the hands of those who first converted them into

destructive weapons, is sufficiently apparent in itself. Indeed these metals are found to be, from the very commencement of History, the most universally coveted commodities; they are even to the present day the most highly prized things which the civilized man can bring to the savage; and the perfecting of arms, and the fabrication of newer and more suitable instruments of murder out of these metals, is a leading element in our whole History.

By these means there could now ensue the subjugation, under one or more leaders, of the inhabitants of those countries throughout which the Normal People were in the first instance dispersed, unmixed with the Barbarians at the outset, although surrounded by them. Were they, at first, united only for the purposes of active warfare against the wild animals, or against the savage men who were not as yet subjected to the purposes of Culture; still this union could occur only on the supposition of the need of such a warfare. The Ruler would not be under the necessity of expending any peculiar care on the maintenance or preservation of his subjects, who being themselves descended from the cultivated race, could provide for their own support had they only external peace: as little would he be called upon to make large demands upon their energies and labour, since their union had only a temporary and easily attainable purpose in view. Soon, however, this simple relation became more complex. The power of governing others, possessed by the Ruler,—of legislating for them, particularly of legislating for them through the agency of others, became an object of ambition, and in proportion as the capacities of those who were at first willing and obedient subjects were developed, they must have begun to regard with envious eyes the power of government exercised over them by other men. Thus communities united by common descent, and inhabiting a common country, separated themselves from the general mass, and, when fortune favoured them, sometimes even attained a dominion over the whole.

In this manner had the State, in our opinion, its beginning in Central Asia, as the cradle of the historical existence of the Human Race. He who first subjected the will of other Freemen to his own, in this quarter of the World, may indeed have been, according to a well-known tradition, a mighty hunter; but the troops of men once assembled, were afterwards employed for other purposes than the chase. At a later time, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and other nations whose names are unknown to us, made their appearance upon this stage, and one after another assumed the sovereignty over their former Rulers, as well as over their former companions in servitude. It is only of these governing nations, and of their chief leaders, that History makes mention: of the subdued, and those who never attained to sovereignty, — of their knowledge, their domestic relations, their manners, their Culture, — she is silent; their existence passed away in obscurity, unnoticed by Political History. That these nations, however, may have been essentially not worse, but probably far superior to their conquerors, is proved, — by the history of civilization among the Jews, who for the first time, during their dispersion among these people, were emancipated from their former rude superstition, and elevated to better conceptions of God and of the Spiritual World; — by that of the Greeks, who acknowledge that they have received the sublimest elements of their philosophy from these countries; — and finally, by the history of Christianity, which, according to a previous remark, ascribes to itself not a Jewish, but an Asiatic origin. The greatest share in the public undertakings, as well as the honour arising from them, fell to the lot of the governing people, the members of the subdued nations being generally excluded from all participation in the government; but the ruling power was still far from being even thoroughly acquainted with all the powers of the governed, and still further from being able to lay claim to their services without restriction or forbearance. That the so-called great

King of the Persians, the ruler of this immense territory and of these countless nations, was yet almost wholly unaided by them, is evident from the long series of years which were requisite to complete the armament against Greece; and still more from the disgraceful result of that expedition.

This condition of things was, in our opinion, the first form of the State:—*The subjugation of free nations for certain purposes of a governing nation;*—not as yet a complete subjugation proceeding upon any regular and fixed rule; but only as suggested by the pressure of necessity, the facility of enforcing it, or the accidental presence of a satrap or a pacha; in other respects combined with perfect freedom, or at all events with anarchy, in their other relations, on the part of the governed people:—or in one word, DESPOTISM; the essential nature of which does not consist in mere barbarity of conduct, but only in the existence of a governing race, and of subdued nations excluded from participation in the government and, with reference to the means of their subsistence, left wholly to themselves; whose participation in the burdens of this relation, as well as in the direction of civil policy and legislation, is determined only by caprice and not by rule; there being consequently no established law whatsoever:—Despotism, as this relation still exists in Europe, under the eye of the observer, in the Turkish Empire, which, amid the general progress of surrounding nations, remains to this moment in the very earliest Epoch of the development of the State.

In Europe, originally the seat of Barbarism, the State had its commencement in efforts for the accomplishment of another object. Here it was not whole masses of the descendants of the Normal People, who became intermixed with the savage Races, but only a few individuals banished from the realm of Culture which already existed in Asia, perhaps with few followers, and without hope of return; among whom I shall only call to mind Cecrops, Cadmus, Pelops,—many other names being now lost to History.

Well skilled in all the Arts and Sciences of the ancient oriental world, provided with unwrought metals, with arms and implements of husbandry, perhaps with useful seeds, plants, and domestic animals, — they landed first on the coasts which at a later period bore the name of Greece, amid imbecile Savages, who with difficulty maintained their existence, who *perhaps* had not yet abandoned cannibalism, and who, according to historical narrative, had *certainly* not yet abandoned human sacrifices; — in exactly the same way, as an English Colony at the present day might make a permanent settlement in New Zealand, though with better intentions. By gifts; by the communication of manifold advantages, and instruments whereby the means of subsistence might be more easily acquired; by the storing up of food for all from one harvest to another; — these colonists attracted the Savages around themselves and gathered them into tribes; by their means erected towns, and in these held them together; introduced more humane manners, and established customs which gradually assumed the character of laws; and thus imperceptibly became their rulers. As these strangers came accompanied only by their own families, or at all events by few attendants, they could neither superintend nor unite around them large masses. Moreover, there came, from time to time, other emigrants like themselves, who in the same manner founded states in other localities; and thus it happened, that in this, the first cultivated region of Europe, there arose, not a great and widely extended empire as in Asia, but a number of small neighbouring states. It was impossible for them to avoid engaging in war with those Savages who made inroads upon their borders and disturbed their undertakings; those who could not be expelled would be forced into servitude, and thus Slavery in this region may have arisen.

The free subjects of these new States were, even from the commencement, treated with kindness, and afterwards carefully instructed and trained; not, as in Asia, under the

government of a dominant race, but for the most part under that of a single foreign family, whose lives were, at all times, open to the inspection of their subjects:—these subjects would doubtless not be blindly satisfied with all the demands and arrangements of their Rulers, but would examine for themselves how these tended to the general welfare; and therefore the Ruler would be necessitated to maintain towards them a very circumspect and upright course of conduct. And out of these circumstances there arose, for the first time, that keen sense of Right, which in our opinion is the true characteristic of the European nations, in contrast with the religious submissiveness to authority which is peculiar to the Asiatics.

These governing families at length lost their authority over the remoter public undertakings, or they died out, or were banished; and thus, since the ideas of Right were already pretty generally diffused, Republics naturally arose in place of the previous petty Monarchies. We have nothing here to do with the form of Government, or the Political Freedom of these States. In the popular political belief of the Greeks, the essential was confounded with the accidental, and the end with the means; King and Tyrant were synonymous words, and the memory of their ancient ruling families was only regarded with terror:—a confusion which has even come down to us, their latest political descendants, and against which we have here guarded ourselves by the preceding distinctions. This, I say, does not concern us at present:—what the Greeks sought, and what they obtained, was *Equal Rights* for all Citizens. In a certain sense, we might even say *Equal Privileges,* for there was no race favoured by the constitution more than another;—but there existed a great inequality of power, which indeed arose only by accident and not by the constitution of the State, but which nevertheless the State could not remedy;—and in so far there did not exist Equal Privileges.

In this way, that which we have set forth as the second

stage in the development of the State,—*Equal Rights for all*, —has arisen in Europe; not by a previous passage through the first stage, that of Despotism, but only because the State began its existence in Greece under other conditions than those amid which it first appeared in Central Asia.

In a still wider circle and under the most interesting circumstances, was this condition of Equal Rights developed in the second country of Europe which became civilized,—namely, in Italy. Here, in our opinion, the first founders of civilization were not individual families, as in the early history of Greece, but actual Colonies;—that is, assemblages of many families from Ancient Greece. Where these Colonies remained by themselves, as occurred in Southern Italy, forming exclusive States out of elements furnished by their own people, they were but a mere prolongation of Grecian existence, and had nothing new about them; and on that account have no place in our inquiry. But where these Colonies mingled with the savage native tribes, and joined with them in the formation of States, as occurred in Central Italy, wholly new phenomena necessarily ensued. By exactly the same means which were employed by the individual emigrants in Greece, and which enabled them gradually to assume the government in that country, did the whole race of the Colonists here acquire authority and power among the Savages with whom they associated themselves,—and whatever political arrangements these Colonists might have introduced among themselves, there arose nevertheless, so far as the natives were concerned, an Aristocratic Government. The ancient manners, and even the original language of the country, were changed by the new comers. The Colonists became the ruling Tribe, just as we found ruling Nations in Central Asia. Here also, as in Asia, an extensive empire might have arisen, had not new Colonies arrived, while yet the first Colonists had scarcely been able to cultivate sufficiently for their purposes the natives who had been already subdued, and these new Colonies again subjugated

other portions of the original inhabitants. So long as the Aristocracy were not forced to dwell too closely under the eye of their subjects; so long as they were not urged by necessity to lay upon the latter burdens which were beyond their strength, and these latter were not compelled by the same necessity to resist them,—matters might remain in this position. As soon as these conditions were at an end, a strife between the two parties was inevitable. In one of the States composed of these two ingredients in the population of Central Italy,—in Rome, namely,—the conditions under which alone this state of things was tolerable, first disappeared. We here lay aside the consideration that at first Rome was governed by Kings: these Kings always belonged to the Aristocratic races, who were scattered over the whole of Central Italy; they were in fact the heads of the Aristocracy, and fell as soon as they attempted aught against it. Thus much however is clear, that in Rome there were, from the first, two leading classes of Citizens:—the Patricians, or descendants of the Aristocratic colonist-races, and the Plebeians, or descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of Italy. These two most dissimilar ingredients we see crowded together within the narrow limits of a city, constantly exposed to the observation of each other, and shut up from the possibility of extension on any side by the universal and well-deserved hatred of the neighbouring States;—in this emergency, the Aristocracy firmly combining amongst themselves, and desirous of living at the expense of the People whom they treated like slaves;—this People, on the other hand, rising against them, but yet, with the true European national sense of Right, not desiring the subjugation of the oppressors, but only Equal Rights and Equal Laws;—the Aristocracy, again, in need of the strength of these People for the defence of the State against outward enemies, and hence conceding, under the pressure of necessity, what, when the necessity was past, they would willingly have recalled:—and hence there arose, between these two parties, a struggle

of several centuries in duration; which began with the Aristocracy declaring all affinity with the families of the People to be a degrading contamination, and refusing to the People, by denial of the privileges of the Auspices, all portion in the sympathy of the Gods; and ended by this same Aristocracy sharing the possession of the highest dignities of the State with men from the ranks of the People, and being compelled to admit that these offices were as beneficially and ably filled by the latter as by themselves. Nevertheless the Aristocracy could not for many centuries forget their former Privileges, and neglected no opportunity of again overreaching the People; who, on the other hand, never failed to find the means of protection:—and this endured until all power fell into the hands of a single individual, and both combatants were at once, and in like manner, subdued. In this contest, prolonged for many centuries, between the effort for Equal Rights, maintained with the greatest ability, and the desire for Inequality, sustained with no less ability, there arose a proficiency in civil legislation, and in the internal and external administration of the State, and an almost perfect comprehension of all the possible expedients by which the laws might be evaded, such as were possessed by no nation before the Romans; so that we ourselves have still much to learn from them in this department.

Here, too, we have *Equal Rights* secured in the most skilful manner; but as yet no *Equal Privileges;* partly on account of the restless struggles of the Aristocracy, and partly on account of accidental circumstances, which the constitution was unable to remove.

We remarked in a former lecture that the State regards itself as the exclusive realm of Culture, and in this character stands in natural warfare with Barbarism. So long as Humanity received but a one-sided Culture in different States, it was to be expected that each particular State should deem its own Culture the true and only civilization, and regard that of other States as mere Barbarism, and their inhabitants

as Savages;—and thus feel itself called upon to subdue them. In this way a war might easily arise between the three great States of the ancient world which we have mentioned; and indeed a true and proper war,—a war of subjugation. In the first place, with respect to the Grecian States;—they at an early period constituted themselves as Greeks,—that is, as a nation united together by definite views of Civil and Political Rights, by a common language, feasts and oracles, and by means of a national confederacy, and national Rights universally recognised among themselves,—constituted themselves as Greeks, I say, into a peculiar realm of Culture, from which they excluded all other nations under the name of Barbarians. If, notwithstanding this confederacy, they allowed themselves to engage in war with each other, still these wars were conducted in a manner different from those against the Barbarians;—they were prosecuted with moderation and forbearance, and never to the extinction of either State. If, at a later period, the two Republics who occupied the first rank in Greece were divided even in their policy towards foreign nations, and made war on each other on that account; still the Greeks were again united in one purpose by the Macedonian Hero, so as to play out their own peculiar part in the drama of World-History. Their Culture was wholly calculated for the State and its purposes,—Legislation, Government, War by land and sea,—and in this they unquestionably far excelled their natural opponents in Asia. Among the latter, however, the true Religion lay concealed, unknown perhaps to the ruling nation themselves; and to this the Greeks were never able to attain. What it was in particular which entitled the predominant nation of the East,—the Persians,—to arrogate for themselves a superiority over the Greeks, at the time when this antagonism broke forth into open rupture, is not quite clear; but it is certain that they did regard the latter as Barbarians; *i.e.* as a people far inferior to themselves in the arts of political existence, and the science of

their application; and indeed it would not otherwise have occurred to them to attempt the subjugation of Greece.

Invasion followed on the part of the Greeks, and the Asiatic dominion was destroyed;—a conquest which must have been easily accomplished by the first nation of actual Citizens, over an empire wherein there was properly but one Race possessed of true freedom, and enjoying real citizenship, while the rest were mere subjects, to whom, after the fall of their leaders, who fought only for their own dominion, it might be a matter of indifference into whose hands the supreme authority fell, which they in their own person were wholly unaccustomed to exercise.

In the mean time the acquired supremacy of the Greeks in Asia did not produce those farther revolutionary consequences which might have been anticipated;—the spirit of the conquerors, which alone might have been capable of holding together this immense empire, and of moulding it according to the Grecian Ideal, forsook its ancient abode, and the victorious generals divided the conquered countries, as a spoil, among themselves. As each had an equal right, or want of right, to the whole, there arose endless wars between these new kingdoms, with alternate expulsions and restorations of the reigning families, leaving little time for the cultivation of the arts of peace, and producing universal enervation. The old common Fatherland was, at the same time, depopulated by the emigration of its young and warlike manhood to the military service of these Kings, and thus rendered powerless for its own undertakings;—so that after all, the commencement of the supremacy of the Greeks was also the beginning of their fall. Scarcely a single significant result of this event has found a place in World-History, excepting this: that thereby the Greek Language was spread over all Asia;—an important consideration in explaining the subsequent diffusion of Christianity throughout Asia, and from thence into other lands;—further, that in consequence of this squandering of strength and energy

in internal wars, the conquest and peaceful occupation of all these countries was made an easy matter for the Romans.

It was these Romans who re-united in one State the Culture which had now been produced by the intermixture of different races, and thereby completed the period of Ancient Time, and closed the simple course of Ancient Civilization. With respect to its influence on Universal History, this nation, more than any other, was the blind and unconscious instrument for the furtherance of a higher World-Plan; after having formed itself, by its internal destiny indicated above, into a most fit and proper instrument for that purpose. These Romans had no thought of diffusing Culture by means of the subjugation of other nations:—mindful of their own obscure beginning, they were scarcely conscious of their superiority in the arts of government, which indeed was of slow and gradual development; nay, with simple and true-hearted candour they styled themselves Barbarians, and were ever ready to adopt the arts and manners of foreign nations, with whom they became acquainted, so far as applicable to their own circumstances. At first the pressure of the neighbouring Italian States and nations, and then the fear of the advancing power of the Carthaginians, had made them able warriors; while by their internal quarrels they had acquired, even at an earlier period, that policy which enabled them to direct and order their military power. After victory had freed them from uneasiness on account of foreign enemies, their own leaders began to seek war for its own sake. In order that they might be enabled to distinguish themselves, and rise above the crowd; to replenish their treasures exhausted by feasts given to the over-wrought people; to withdraw the attention of the Citizens from the constant internal machinations of the Aristocracy, by directing it towards outward emergencies, triumphal processions, and captive monarchs, war soon came to be prosecuted without intermission, and as a matter of necessity; for only by external war could internal peace be

secured. After the conquest of the realms of Ancient Culture by the Romans, — new conquests among the Barbarians being far more difficult to accomplish, — there remained no other means of preserving order in the State, than the subjugation of both the contending parties to the dominion of one single power. It could be no difficult task for the Romans to subdue the enfeebled nations of the former Macedonian monarchy, who were united by no permanent tie to their Rulers; and Ancient Greece, no less enfeebled, would as readily fall into the arms of the conquerors, who spared its inhabitants everything which they valued, — even their vanity.

By means of this universal dominion of the Romans, there were spread abroad over the whole civilized world — Civil Freedom, participation in Civil Privileges for all free-born men, Justice according to a fixed law, Financial Administration upon settled principles, actual care for the existence of the people, milder and more humane manners, respect for the customs, the religion, and the ways of thinking of other nations: — all this in constitutional theory at least, although these principles might be repudiated in the actual administration of Government.

This was the fulness, the maturity of Ancient Civilization: — *a state of Right*, at least in form; to which Humanity must first be raised before a new development could begin. Scarcely, however, had Humanity attained this state, than this new development appeared. The True Religion of the Normal People, hitherto preserved in an obscurity which concealed it from the eye of History, now came forth to the open day, and spread itself, almost unimpeded, over the realm of Culture, which was now fortunately embraced in one single State. It was among the first maxims of this State to take no note of the religious opinions of subject nations; and thus it was impossible that it should thoroughly understand this Religion, and foresee the consequent fate

which awaited itself. Had not the new Religion been accidentally placed in antagonism to the worship claimed for the statues of the Emperors, it might undoubtedly have long remained unnoticed by the State.

In the contest which arose upon this ground, the new Religion finally attained even the outward victory, and became the predominant Religion of the State. But as the State did not produce the Religion, nor the Religion give birth to the State, it remained a foreign ingredient in the Constitution, which was never penetrated by its spirit. It was necessary that this Religion should itself become the creative principle of a new State; and hence the old Constitution, which was incapable of assuming a new form, must be destroyed; elements which, apparently for this very purpose, had lain concealed in darkness far removed from the eye of History, must be brought into play: for thus only could the new Creation, of which we have afterwards to speak, begin its existence.

LECTURE XIII.

INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY ON THE STATE.

The one True Religion, or Christianity, must and ought to become the creative and governing principle of a new State: —this we declared at the close of our last Lecture. Such was the actual course of events, and thereby arose an entirely New Era.

Before commencing the inquiry for which we have thus opened the way, and upon which we are now to enter, we must first of all direct your attention to one remark of the highest importance in any historical survey; namely, that it is only by a very slow and tardy course that the great events of History develope themselves and become visible in their results. The historical inquirer who, with regard to such an event, does not know how to anticipate experience, and to supply what is wanting in foresight by means of the laws of human development, only possesses fragments torn from their connexion, which he can never understand, being without a knowledge of the organic whole to which they belong. This is the case with the whole History of Modern Times, the true principle of which is the manifestation of Christianity. That the Old Time has passed away, and that we stand above its grave, amid an intricate and wonderful concourse of new elements, any one may observe by merely opening his eyes;—but what this concourse of elements may signify, and to what it may tend, cannot

be understood by mere external observation, but only by deeper insight. According to our opinion, which we have already frankly declared in another place, Christianity has never yet attained a general and public existence in its purity and truth, although it has, at all times, attained a true life, here and there, in individual minds. But this is not inconsistent with the assertion which we also make, that it has had an active and efficient life in History, in preparing the way for itself, and in bringing about the conditions necessary to its public existence. He who possesses a mere historical knowledge of this preliminary activity, but is ignorant of its real nature and tendency, necessarily confounds the accidental with the essential, and the means with the end; and he can never arrive at a true comprehension even of this preliminary activity itself. The part which Christianity has to play in the History of the World,—for of this only have we now to speak,—is not yet concluded; and whoever cannot enter into the meaning of the whole vast Drama, should not presume to pass any judgment upon it. In like manner, to avail ourselves of a kindred example, the part which has been assigned to the Reformation in human History, of which we have already had occasion to speak in a very limited connexion, is by no means concluded.

After this preliminary remark, the application of which shall soon become apparent, let us now proceed to our task. Christianity itself must and ought to become the governing or creative principle of the State, as exemplified in a New Era. We must, in the first place, answer this question,—In what way can Christianity accomplish this, and on what ground does it rest its claim to do so? I reply,—This influence may be regarded in a double aspect:—it is partly *absolute,* as that of true and genuine Christianity; and partly *contingent,* determined by the position of things amid which it strives at first to raise itself to purity and perfectness. In the first place, as respects the former view of this activity of True Religion;—this Religion is precisely simi-

lar to the Love of Goodness which we have described at the close of a former lecture; which Goodness appears to the religious sense as the immediate work of God within us; while we, in the accomplishment of this work, are regarded as the instruments of God. We formerly remarked that this Love of Goodness sets itself entirely free even from the Perfect State, and raises itself completely above all compulsive Authority; and for the same reasons this may also be said of the True Religion. That which the God-devoted man may not do for any consideration, is indeed also outwardly forbidden in the Perfect State; but he has already cast it from him in obedience to the Will of God, without regard to any outward prohibition. That which alone this God-devoted man loves and desires to do, is indeed outwardly commanded in this Perfect State; but he has already done it in obedience to the Will of God. If, then, this religious frame of mind is to exist in the State, and yet never to come into collision with it, it is absolutely necessary that the State should at all times keep pace with the development of the religious sense among its Citizens, so that it shall never command anything which True Religion forbids, or forbid anything which she enjoins. In such a state of things, the well-known principle, that we must obey God rather than man, could never come into application; for in that case man would only command what God also commanded, and there would remain to the willing servant only the choice whether he would pay his obedience to the command of human power, or to the Will of God, which he loves before all things else. From this perfect Freedom and superiority which Religion possesses over the State, arises the duty of both to keep themselves absolutely separate, and to cast off all immediate dependence on each other. Religion must never lay claim to the compulsive power by which the State enforces its purposes; for Religion, like the Love of Goodness, exists, inwardly and invisibly, in the heart, and never appears in

outward actions, which, although in accordance with the Law, may yet have proceeded from other motives altogether; —while the State can only order the visible actions of men. Religion is Love, while force is the instrument of the State; and nothing can be more perverse, than the desire to enforce Love by outward constraint. On the other hand, the State must never attempt to use Religion for the furtherance of its purposes; for in so doing, it would place reliance upon an element which is not within its power, and which on that account might not fulfil its expectations; in which case it would have calculated falsely, and thus have failed in its purpose;—it must be able to enforce what it commands, and must command nothing but what it is able to enforce. This is the *negative* influence of Religion on the State, or rather the negative reciprocal influence of both on each other:—that by the existence of the first, the State is confined within its own proper limits, and both are strictly separated from each other.

According to the meaning of True Religion, and in particular of Christianity, Humanity is the one, visible, efficient, living, and independent existence of God; or, if the expression be not misunderstood, the one manifestation and effluence of that Existence;—a beam from the Eternal Light, which divides itself, not in reality, but only to mere earthly vision, into many individual rays. Therefore all which truly belongs to this Humanity is, according to this doctrine, essentially one, and throughout equal to itself; and is, in all its elements, destined in the same way lovingly to return to its Original, and therein to be blessed. This vocation, thus set before man by Religion, must not be disturbed or hindered by the State; which must therefore allow to all men, and—as the administrator of the purposes of the Human Race—must provide for all men, equal access to the existing sources of the Culture by which they may be prepared for this vocation. This is only possible by the establishment of an Absolute Equality of all men in *Personal* as

well as *Civil* Freedom; in respect of *Privileges* as well as *Rights*. Thus the same purpose which belongs to the State as such, it receives anew from the hands of Religion; and this is the *positive* influence of Religion on the State,—not that it gives a new purpose to the State, which would be inconsistent with the separation from each other which we have already required, but that it summons up deeper sympathies in aid of the purpose which already belongs to the State, and impels it more powerfully towards the attainment of that purpose. Both of these developments, indeed,—that of the true Religious sense, as well as that of Political order,—only proceed by slow and gradual movements, and to a certain extent keep pace with each other; but there is nothing to prevent the former, at least in Individuals, from preceding and partly guiding the latter.

Such is the case with this relation when the State is considered only in itself and in relation to its own Citizens. But should it happen that several independent and sovereign States were to arise within the circle of the one True Religion; or, what is the same thing, that the one State of Culture and of Christianity were broken up into a Christian Republic of Nations, in which individual States should be, not indeed constrained, but incessantly observed and judged by the others;—then there would be found laid down in the Christian Doctrine, a universally applicable Canon for the determination of what is praiseworthy, what tolerable, and what censurable, in the intercourse of one State with another, as well as in the conduct of private Citizens;—and the otherwise absolute Monarch, even after he had silenced his own subjects, would still, if any sense of honour dwelt within him, have to stand in dread of the testimony and judgment of neighbouring States, and of posterity whose opinion will be guided by that judgment; or, should he even have cast aside this feeling, he would still have to fear the consequences of the loss of general confidence. There would arise by means of this Religion a Public Opinion

throughout the whole realm of Culture, and in it, a Sovereignty of no mean importance over Sovereigns, which would leave them at full liberty to do good, while it would often effectually restrain the desire of wrong-doing.

Such is the influence of Christianity on the State, when this Religion and its influence are considered *absolutely*. Another influence is that which this Religion may exercise *contingently*, determined by the temporary conditions amid which it, as yet, only strives to attain an independent existence and fitting sphere of action. This contingent influence, which it did actually exercise and in part does exercise even to the present day, was determined by the condition of the men upon whom it was first directed. At that time, the superstitious dread of the Godhead as a hostile being, as well as the feeling of personal sinfulness, weighed more heavily and universally than at any other, upon the inhabitants of civilized countries; and there existed a secret looking towards the East, and particularly towards Judea, for some means of atonement and expiation which were expected to proceed thence. Many circumstances in History prove this:—for example, the attachment to Oriental Mysteries, which was so generally diffused even in Rome itself; and the immense treasures which found their way from all parts of Asia, and even from Europe, to the temple at Jerusalem. Christianity, as we have shown in the proper place, is no method of atonement and expiation: Man can never disunite himself from the Godhead;—and in so far as he *desires* to do so, he is a *Nonentity*, which on that very account cannot sin, but on whose forehead the imaginary brand of Sin is placed, that he may thereby be directed to the True God. In the hands of such Ages, however, Christianity was necessarily changed into a means of atonement and expiation, and assumed the form of a New Covenant with God; because these Ages had no need of a Religion, and indeed no capacity for receiving one, except in this shape. And thus, that Christian System which, when I formerly spoke

of this subject, I called a degenerate form of Christianity, and the authorship of which I ascribed to the Apostle Paul, was also a necessary product of the whole spirit of that Age as directed upon Christianity; and that this man and no other should have first given expression to that spirit, was quite accidental; for had he not done so, some one else who had not risen superior to his Age by the intimate transfusion of his spirit in True Christianity, would have done the same; as every one does, even to the present day, who has filled his head with these pictures, and who dreams of a necessary mediation between God and men, and cannot even conceive of the contrary.

After Christianity had assumed this form, and particularly after the external act of initiation—Baptism—had become a mysterious purification from Sin, whereby the disciple was immediately released from the eternal punishment consequent thereon, and without farther effort obtained access to heaven; it could not but follow that the administrators of this rite should acquire the highest reputation among men; that the guardianship of this purity, which they had conferred by means of the sacrament, should likewise devolve upon them; and that thus no human occupation should be exempt from a jurisdiction, criticism, and guidance exercised by them under this pretence. When this superstition at last laid hold of the Roman Emperors themselves and the highest officers of their State, these, too, necessarily fell under the general discipline of the Ecclesiastics, who were, consequently, incited to exercise their office towards these persons with unusual and public zeal, which necessarily produced the most pernicious consequences on the authority and freedom of the Government. These Ecclesiastics themselves were by their mental tendencies far removed from any sound political views; and had scarcely another idea, in any earthly emergency, than that of the propagation of their faith, and the maintenance of what they called its purity;—they were therefore incapable either of wisely

guiding the Rulers whom they had deprived of freedom, or of governing in their room; and thus nothing else could ensue but the total enervation and final destruction of the Kingdoms in which they held sway.

Should there ever again arise a State to which this pernicious influence might prove innocuous, and which should be able to repel its insidious advances; then must such a State be itself established upon Religion, in order thereby to propitiate an influence which was only able to destroy that which existed without its aid. In consequence of this necessity of returning to the original and native principles of a State, Religion was also compelled to fall back upon her own principles, and so to reform herself within her own domain. She was obliged, in the first place, to succeed in converting the elements of which the new State was composed, in order that both Citizens and Rulers might be wholly her own creation. In this business of conversion she had not, as formerly, to do with superstitious, terrified men, who, full of hereditary dread of the Gods, were ready, upon any condition, to throw themselves into her bosom; for similar causes would again have produced similar effects: but she had to do with those who in their open character and simple relations,—for it is only the complexity of relations produced by partial Culture which gives birth to great crimes, the horror of inward sinfulness, and dread of the Gods;—who, I say, in their open character and simple relations, had not hitherto much concerned themselves about the Divinity, and in particular were very far from fearing Him. The conversion of such men gave to the Church, in her old character of an expiator of Sin and a propitiator of God, a wholly new task which she had never as yet attempted;—this, namely, to excite and produce by means of art, among this second class, that superstitious fear of God and need of an atonement, which she found already existing among her first converts. Unquestionably this latter was a much more difficult business, and,—with the exception of

single Individuals who may have felt particularly conscious of Sin, and certain Epochs which may have been particularly favourable to the dominion of Ecclesiastical Power,—it has never been, in my opinion, so perfectly and so universally accomplished among the nations of modern Europe as it was in the Roman Empire; for proof of which the student may examine in particular the history of the Byzantine Monarchy, in which the Ecclesiastical Power played its part throughout a long series of years. In Modern Europe the religious superstition was at all times allowed the privilege of unwearied preaching, and annexed itself to the community as a foreign ingredient; but it never struck its root so deeply in the heart, and whenever a more powerful interest arose, it was shaken off. The whole course of Modern History proves this; and particularly the Age since the Reformation, in which the national character of Modern Europe has developed itself more freely. The Church has indeed almost ceased to preach this doctrine; and even where it still does so, it is without fruit, for no one lays it to heart.

It was necessary that the fundamental elements of the New State should farther bear the general European National Characteristic,—a keen sense and love of Right and Freedom,—in order that they might not return to Asiatic despotism, but willingly admit the principle of equal Rights for All, which had been previously developed among the Greeks and Romans. They would have to combine with this general characteristic the particular feature of a delicate sense of Honour, in order that they might be accessible to the legitimate influence of Christianity upon Public Opinion which we have already pointed out. Precisely such elements as we have described were found among the Germanic Races, as if they had been expressly reserved for this great purpose. I mention only these; for the devastating inroads of other Races had no enduring results, and those kingdoms of other origin who are incorporated with

the Republic of Nations now existing in Europe, have for the most part received Christianity and Culture by means of the Germanic tribes. These Germanic tribes,—who were apparently of similar descent to the Greeks, and must have held intercourse with them at an earlier period, as a strict examination of the respective languages might incontestibly prove,—probably occupied the same stage of Culture in their forests, as the Greeks in their Heroic Age. Many a Hercules, Jason, or Theseus, may there have assembled around them bands of willing associates, and achieved wonderful adventures with them, unnoticed by History. Their worship was simple as their manners, and they were seldom disturbed by scruples about their moral worthiness. Independence, freedom, and universal equality, had become natural to them by the usage of centuries. To fix the regards of all men by bold and hazardous enterprises, and after death to live in the songs of later times, was the aim of the more noble among them;—faithfulness even unto death, on the part of the free follower towards his leader, was the glory and honour of others;—and any breach of faith was universally regarded as so insupportable a disgrace, that even the younger and stronger, who had forfeited the freedom which they had laid at stake, voluntarily surrendered their persons to the disposal of the older and feebler winner, and even to slavery. These were the elements out of which Christianity had to build up its new State. If, in addition to this, it happened accidentally, that several races of similar descent established new States, at the same time and upon the same foundation of Christianity and the Ancient Empire, these States would even by that common descent be bound more closely to each other than to foreign nations; and the most favourable circumstance which could possibly arise both for Religion and the State, was when Religion attained a central point in external political power, and that power obtained an independent territorial possession. Not, as formerly, seating herself in authority within the Empire, and inces-

santly censuring the government;—it was now the business of this Central Power to hold together from without the various States of the One Empire of Christianity, and to become the Arbiter between them;—she was now, by her actual position, rather the Guardian of the rights of nations, than, as formerly, the Head of internal government. Since that time, it had become of much greater importance to Religion that the Empire of Christianity should be divided, and all the parts of it maintained in equal and independent power, for in these circumstances her aid would be needed,—than that it should again return to the form of One State, which event, had it occurred among these untamed spirits, might have brought with it dangerous consequences even to the Spiritual Power itself. So it actually happened;—and, under the protection of this power, individual Christian States were enabled to develope themselves according to their separate character and with a considerable degree of freedom; and the Christian Republic of Nations, which arose and was maintained by means of this Power, was further extended and enlarged partly by the armed conquest of single States from the dominion of Non-Christianity, partly by the peaceful conquest, by means of conversion, of new Empires to Christianity, and by the consequent subjugation of these to the Central Spiritual Power.

The fundamental principles of this Christian Empire were, and for the most part are to the present day, the following: First, with respect to the Rights of Nations:—A State, because it is a Christian State, has a right of existence in its actually present condition; it is possessed of a perfectly independent Sovereignty, and no other Christian State, the Spiritual Central Power in its own peculiar office excepted, may demand a voice in the arrangement of its internal affairs. All Christian States stand towards each other in the position of reciprocal recognition, and of original peace:—of *original* peace, I say; that is, there can no war arise with respect to the existence of a State, although

war may well arise as to the fortuitous modifications of that existence. By means of this principle, a war of extermination between Christian States is strictly prohibited. Not so as regards Anti-Christian States;—these, according to the same principle, have no recognised existence, and they not only *may*, but *ought to be*, expelled from the circle of Christian dominion. The Church gives them no peace; and should such a peace be conceded by Christian powers, this could only happen from necessity, or because the Christian principle is extinguished, and other motives have taken its place. Secondly, with respect to Civil Rights:—Before God all men are free and equal;—in every Christian State all men without exception must have the means and opportunity conceded to them of devoting themselves to God, and in this respect at least be assured of Personal Freedom; and from this there readily follows complete Personal Freedom, and the principles, that no Christian can be a slave, and that a Christian soil confers Freedom. On the other hand, according to the same principle, the Non-Christian, or Heathen, may legitimately be made a slave.

An outward event, of too much importance to be passed over in silence, served to urge this Christian Republic of Nations into closer union with each other, to compel them to regard themselves as members belonging to one Whole, to pursue common interests, and to commence new undertakings in their common character as a Christian Republic. In Asia, which, except that it probably had been the abode of the Normal People, had otherwise done nothing for Humanity since the production of the True Religion, there arose a second and younger branch of this True Religion,—namely Mohammedanism,—obviously from one and the same source as Christianity, but by no means admitting the entire abrogation of the Ancient Covenant with God; hence accepting from Judaism whatever was applicable to its own condition, and thus bringing along with it the germ of its gradual corruption and final ruin, and rejecting the inex-

haustible source of outward perfection which Christianity contains within itself. Zealous in prosyletism, like Christianity; expert at the sword, by which from the first it had spread itself abroad; vainly arrogating a superiority over Christianity on account of a distinction of little importance in itself, this namely, that it distinctly declared the Unity of God, a doctrine which was essentially pre-supposed in Christianity; and being not wholly imbued with such gross superstition as the Christianity of the Time; otherwise dogmatically inculcating Despotism, and that mute and unquestioning submission which is peculiar to the East, as its political principles;—this Mohammedanism waged war with Christianity, and proved a victorious assailant. Besides extinguishing Christianity altogether in a considerable extent of territory, and establishing itself as the dominant Religion, there was yet a circumstance connected with these triumphs which made them peculiarly painful to Christianity,—namely, that among the countries thus lost, there was that Land especially, to which Christianity owed its birth, and towards which the romantic piety of the new Christians devoutly turned its regards. To indignation succeeded a burning desire of action; and with a free enthusiasm like what might have animated them in their native forests,—not as Citizens of this State or of that, but only as Christians,—hosts of the Germanic tribes precipitated themselves upon that Land to win it back from Saracen domination. However unsatisfactory may have been the result of these undertakings; whatever evil may have been said of the Crusades by critics who have never been able to forget their own Age, and transplant themselves into the spirit of other times, and so obtain a complete survey of the whole; they still remain an ever-memorable manifestation of power on the part of One united Christian World as such, wholly independent of the individuality of the several States into which it was broken up. The knowledge of many important peculiarities of these enemies; as well as

observation of the crimes of which they were themselves accused, and accused others in return, was no unimportant fruit of the undertaking.

At a later period Mohammedanism, which had already in the early times of the Christian State penetrated into those countries which seemed to be set apart as the exclusive possession of Christianity, namely into Europe, and had been driven thence in feebleness, now re-appeared there on another and more dangerous side, and under a new nation,—the Turks,—with the undisguised purpose of its gradual conquest and subjugation. Then awoke again, for the last time, at least in discourses and public writings, the idea of Christians forming but One State and possessing one common interest; until, at last, the dreaded enemy, involved in the meshes of European policy, grew old in itself, and began its course of decay towards internal dissolution.

These are, in my opinion, the external conditions under which the Christian State-system of Modern Europe has begun and continued its development. How the true State-Constitution developes itself in individual States under these outward conditions, hindered or furthered by them; how it has received within itself, and further cultivated, whatever it has found already existing in the world; we shall see in the future lectures;—if we may venture to hope that these inquiries continue to possess an interest for you, and can still attract and hold together the remaining body of our accustomed hearers.

LECTURE XIV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE IN MODERN EUROPE.

It was Christianity which assembled together the social elements of a New Age, and wrought out their spiritual regeneration;—it was the administrators of this Christianity, now become a Politico-Spiritual Central Power, who upheld the New State, now broken up into a Republic of Nations, in this condition of separation; who ordered the reciprocal relations of Individual States, and even constrained them by outward motives to coalesce into one acting power; and under whose protection each particular State enjoyed and exercised its independence, and the liberty of developing its own resources and of acquiring new strength.

The nations of Modern Europe,—partly because they could never be thoroughly penetrated by the principle upon which the authority of the Spiritual Power depended,—*i.e.* that to it the office of Mediator between God and men belonged,—partly on account of their original and hereditary love of political independence;—these nations, I say, could only submit to this guardianship so long as the individual States were still occupied in strengthening their own internal authority, and, amid the daily pressure of conflicting elements, could not attain a distinct consciousness of their own strength.

This internal conflict was stimulated by a peculiarity in the social relations of the Germanic Races, as well as by

their national character, and it was carefully maintained and employed by the Spiritual Central Power, which was well aware of the conditions of its own influence. The firmest, and only permanent relation, among these otherwise inconstant and ever-changing masses, was unquestionably, in the case of the Germanic Races, the personal connexion between the willing and faithful Follower and the Leader to whom he had freely attached himself.

The Germanic conquerors and founders of States were essentially such Leaders, and in their loyal Followers, personally devoted to them in life and death, the true strength and efficiency of their hosts consisted, to which other wandering masses only attached themselves. Pledged to the maintenance of their Followers, the conquerors bestowed lands upon them, and transferred to the possession of the land that bond which had previously been a mere personal agreement; so that the reciprocal obligations of both the parties to this covenant afterwards even became hereditary. The former voluntary and personal bond became a permanent political bond, and the Feudal System arose. But this state of things could not continue. The Germanic nations might indeed subject themselves voluntarily, out of admiration for the personal superiority of their Leaders, but their love of independence could not brook a political subjugation. The vassals struggled to acquire this independence; the Rulers opposed them with the aid of recognised authority, and the Spiritual Central Power, supported in like manner, sought to hold the balance between both parties, and thus to perpetuate the struggle, and therewith the necessity of its mediation, and the internal insufficiency of the individual States. This struggle ended, the outer rampart of its empire would be thrown down. There were two ways in which the struggle might come to a close: — either by the overthrow of the vassals, as occurred in one of the leading States of Christendom (France); or by the defeat of the ruling power, as occurred in another leading State (Ger-

many.) In the latter case, considerable masses remained united, so that the former vassals now associated themselves into States, and could bind their vassals in turn, and therefore general anarchy did not ensue. In the latter country, the Church-Reformation united itself as by a miracle with these victorious beginnings, and those who struggled for emancipation received in it a new confederate, whom they knew well how to employ against the power of the Empire, which desired their subjugation; and against the Spiritual Power, which did not indeed desire their subjugation, but looked with as little favour on their complete independence.

The *political* principles of this Reformation, in so far as they were directed against the influence of the Spiritual Central Power, found admission in quarters where they could not be employed against the highest power of the State, and where the *dogmatic* principles of the Reformation were rejected. And in this way the political influence of that Spiritual Central Power was brought to a close, and it retained only its dogmatic and disciplinary Ecclesiastical sway in those places to which the Church Reformation did not extend.

By means of this complete reform of the realm of Culture, its bond of union as the one and undivided Christian Republic received an entirely new foundation and support, as well as new modifications. This union was no longer clearly recognised and distinctly acted upon as a principle, but it, as well as the fundamental conceptions which proceeded from it, and which we have set forth in our last lecture, became rather a dim instinct,—an accustomed supposition, made and acted upon without distinct consciousness;—and it passed from the guardianship of the Church, to that of Public Opinion, of History, and of Authors in general.

In the first place:—There is a necessary tendency in every cultivated State, to extend itself generally, and to include all men within the unity of its Citizenship. Such is

the case in Ancient History. In Modern Times a barrier was opposed to this tendency by the internal weakness of the States, and by the Spiritual Central Power, whose interest it was that the Realm of Culture should remain divided. As the States became stronger in themselves, and cast off that foreign power, the tendency towards a Universal Monarchy over the whole Christian World necessarily came to light; and this so much the more since it was but one common Culture which had developed itself in the different States, though with various modifications; and in reference to these particular modifications they had all received but a partial cultivation; while in such a state of partial culture, as we have already remarked, each State is tempted to consider its own civilization as the best, and to imagine that the inhabitants of other countries would esteem themselves very fortunate, were they but Citizens of its Realm.

This tendency towards Universal Monarchy, as well as the conquest of other Christian States, was rendered so much the easier in this realm of Christendom, inasmuch as the manners and customs of the European Nations and their Political Constitutions are almost everywhere alike; besides there are one or two Languages which are common to the cultivated classes among all nations, while those which are not so generally known may, in case of necessity, be easily acquired; and on this account the conquered, finding themselves in nearly the same position under their new government as under the old, take little interest in the question who shall be their ruler; while the conquerors can thus in a short time, and with little trouble, recast the new provinces in the form of the old, and use the former as freely as the latter. Through the Reformation, indeed, many forms of the one, essentially indivisible Christianity have arisen; and among these, in part, a most hostile aversion. Against this source of distraction, however, each State has the easy remedy of peaceful Toleration and equal privileges to all; and thus once more, as formerly in the Heathen

Roman Empire, Religious Toleration, and accommodation in particulars to the manners of other nations, have become an excellent means of making and maintaining conquests; while at the same time, the union of several creeds in one political body efficiently promotes the purpose which, in our former lecture, we have described as the absolute purpose of Christianity,—the complete separation of Religion from the State,—since the State must thus become neutral and indifferent towards all creeds.

This tendency towards a Christian-European Universal Monarchy has shown itself successively in the several States which could make pretensions to such a dominion, and, since the fall of the Papacy, it has become the sole animating principle of our History. We by no means seek to determine whether this notion of Universal Monarchy has ever been distinctly entertained as a definite plan;—the Historian may even lead a negative proof, and attempt to show that this thought has never attained a clear and distinct acceptance in any individual mind, without our principle being thereby overthrown. Whether clearly or not,—it may be obscurely,—yet has this tendency lain at the root of the undertakings of many States in Modern Times, for only by this principle can these undertakings be explained. Many States, already powerful in themselves, and indeed the more on that account, have exhibited an extraordinary desire for yet more extensive dominion, and have constantly sought to acquire new provinces by intermarriage, treaty, or conquest;—not from the realms of Barbarism, which would give another aspect to the business, but within the empire of Christianity itself. To what purpose did they propose to apply this accession of power, and to what purpose did they actually apply it, when it was attained? To acquire yet more extensive possessions. And where would this progress have had an end, had matters but proceeded according to the desire of these States? Only at the point where there was nothing more left to satiate the

desire of acquisition. Although no individual Epoch may have contemplated this purpose, yet is this the spirit which runs through all these individual Epochs, and invisibly urges them onward.

Against this desire of aggrandizement, the less powerful States are now compelled to contrive means for their own preservation;—one condition of which is the preservation of other States, in order that the power of the natural enemy may not be increased by the acquisition of any of these States to the prejudice of the rest:—in one word, it becomes the business of the less powerful States to maintain a Balance of Power in Christendom. 'What we ourselves cannot acquire, no other shall acquire, because his power would thereby obtain a disproportionate addition;' and thus the care of the great States for their own preservation is at the same time the protection of the weaker communities:—or 'If we cannot hinder others from aggrandizing themselves, then we must also secure for ourselves a proportionate aggrandizement.'

No State, however, strives to maintain this Balance of Power in the European Republic of Nations, except on account of its being unable to attain something more desirable, and because it cannot yet realize the purpose of its own individual aggrandizement, and the plan of Universal Monarchy which lies at the foundation of that purpose;—whenever it becomes more powerful, it surely embraces this design. Thus each State either strives to attain this Universal Christian Monarchy, or at least to acquire the power of striving after it;—to maintain the Balance of Power when it is in danger of being disturbed by another; and, in secret, for power, that it may eventually disturb it itself.

This is the natural and necessary course of things, whether it be confessed or not,—whether it be even recognised or not. That a State, even when taken on the very point of warfare, should solemnly assert its love of peace and its aversion to conquest, is nothing;—for, in the first place,

it must make this averment and so hide its real intention, if it would succeed in its design; and the well-known principle, 'Threaten war that thou mayest have peace,' may also be inverted in this way—'Promise peace, that thou mayest begin war with advantage;'—and, in the second place, it may be wholly in earnest with this assurance at the time, so far as it knows itself: but let the favourable opportunity for aggrandizement present itself, and the previous good resolution is forgotten. And thus, in the ceaseless struggles of the Christian Republic, do weak States gradually raise themselves first to an equality, and then to a superiority, of power; while others which before had boldly strode onwards to Universal Monarchy, now contend only for the maintenance of the Balance of Power; and a third class, who perhaps have formerly occupied both of these positions, and still remain free and independent with respect to their internal affairs, have yet, in their external relations, and as regards their political power in Europe, become mere appendages to other and more powerful States. And so, by means of these vicissitudes, Nature strives after, and maintains, an equilibrium, through the very struggles of men for superiority.

A less powerful State, simply because it is less powerful, cannot extend itself by foreign conquest. How then shall it attain any considerable importance within this necessary limitation? There is no other means possible but the Cultivation of internal strength. Should it not even acquire a single foot of new ground, yet if its ancient soil be better peopled, more rich in all human purposes,—then, without gaining territory, it has gained *men* as the strength and muscle of its State; and should they have come to it from other States, it has won them from its natural rivals. This is the first peaceful conquest, with which each less powerful State in Christian Europe may commence to work out its own elevation;—for the Christian Europeans are essentially but one people; recognise this common Europe as their one true Fatherland; and, from one end of it to the other, pur-

sue nearly the same purposes, and are actuated by similar motives. They seek Personal Freedom; Rights and Laws under which all men shall be equal, and by which all shall be protected without exception or favour; they seek opportunity to earn their subsistence by labour and industry; they seek Religious Toleration for their creeds; Mental Freedom, that they may think according to their own religious and scientific opinions, express these openly, and form their judgments thereby. Where any one of these elements is awanting, thence they long to depart; where these are secured to them, there they gladly resort. Now all these elements already belong to the necessary purposes of the State as such:—in the present position of individual States towards each other, these purposes are also forced upon it by necessity, and by the care for its own preservation; for the fear of subjugation compels it to self-aggrandizement, and it has, at first, no other means of aggrandizement than that which we have pointed out.

But there is another way by which the State may attract to itself, if not the men of neighbouring States, yet the powers of these men, and may make these powers tributary to itself; and this method plays too important a part in Modern History to be passed over in silence. It consists in a State monopolizing universal Commerce, acquiring exclusive possession of commodities which are generally sought after, and of gold, the universal medium of exchange;—thenceforward determining prices for the rest of the world, and so compelling the whole Christian Republic of Nations to pay for those wars which it has from time to time undertaken *against* the whole Christian Republic, for the purpose of maintaining this superiority; and to defray the interest of a National Debt contracted for the same purpose. It might possibly be found upon calculation, that when the inhabitant of a country thousands of miles distant, has paid for his daily meal, he has spent one-half or three-fourths of the produce of his day's labour for the purposes of this foreign

State. — I mention this method, not for the purpose of recommending it; for its success is founded only on the imbecility of the rest of the world, and it would return with fearful retribution upon its inventors, were this imbecility removed; but I mention it only in order to point out the remedy against it. This remedy consists in rejecting the use of these commodities; in ceasing to think that the gold of this State is the only gold; and in believing that a State which has made itself independent in a mercantile respect can make gold of what it pleases. But upon this point there is a veil over the eyes of the Age which it is impossible to remove; and it is in vain to waste words on the subject.

When a less powerful State has in the first place acquired internal strength by the methods which we have pointed out, and perhaps thereby become sufficiently powerful to attempt foreign conquest, and, it may be, has succeeded in this undertaking; it then encounters a new difficulty: — it has entirely destroyed the previous Balance of Power, and the order of things then existing; and the new-comer excites the jealousy and distrust of other States more strongly than those powers with which they are already familiar. It must henceforward be always on its guard, maintain its energies in a state of constant readiness and efficiency, and leave no means unemployed to add at least to its internal strength, when no favourable opportunity presents itself for outward extension. With reference to external affairs, it is a part of this policy to take the weaker neighbouring States under its protection, and thereby make its interest in its own preservation likewise theirs, so that, in succeeding wars, it may be able to calculate upon their power as well as its own. With reference to internal affairs, there are likewise other cares which belong to this policy, — besides the methods which we have already pointed out, of attracting new dwellers to the country, and retaining its old inhabitants; — namely, the care for the preservation and increase of the Human Race, by encouraging marriage and

the rearing of children, by sanitary regulations, &c.,—the promotion of the dominion of man over Nature, which we have already sufficiently described, by the systematic and progressive improvement of Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce, and by the maintenance of the necessary equilibrium between these three branches of Industry; in short, by all that may be comprehended in the idea of Political Science, when that idea is thoroughly understood. Those who deride such endeavours under the name of *Economy*, have only looked upon the outward vesture, and have not penetrated to the essential nature and true meaning of these forms of Industry. Among other questions, this one too has been proposed:—Whether the population of a State may not become too large? In our opinion, the indolent and unproductive Citizen is at all times, and in every state of the population, superfluous and unnecessary; but when, with a growing population, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce also increase in suitable proportions to each other, then the country can never have too many inhabitants; for the productiveness of Nature, when systematically cultivated, is inexhaustible.

All these measures are, as we have shown above, the proper and natural purposes of the State;—in the present Political System, however, they are even forced upon it by necessity. It is quite possible that, in what we have now set forth, we may have merely described that which existing States, who lay claim to high culture, actually do and practise; but we have set it forth with a new significance. We have seen that these things are not done by mere chance, but that these States are compelled to do them by necessity; and we have thereby pointed out the guarantee which we possess that they must continue to do these things, and to do them more and more thoroughly, if they would not lose their place in the crowd of Nations, and be finally vanquished and overthrown.

Finally, there is, in the present Political System of Europe,

another purpose given to the State by the same necessity, — namely, that establishment of Equal Rights for all men which has never yet been realized in the world, and the gradual abolition of those social inequalities which still exist in Christian Europe, as remnants of the Feudal System. I touch upon this subject in my present position without fear; I believe that I should do wrong to the honourable assembly whom I address, were I to harbour the slightest doubt of their willingness to have this subject discussed. Who is there among us, who thinks himself superior to the People, who, possessing these distinctions, has not, directly or indirectly, reaped advantage from them? It is right that we should accept whatever is offered to us by our Age, but we ought also to be content at all times to relinquish Privileges which the Age can no longer confer.

The necessity which is thus imposed on the State arises in the following way: — Compelled, constantly and regularly, to call forth and appropriate as much of the power of its less favoured Citizens as they can devote to it consistently with their own personal freedom and subsistence, it cannot, when there is need of still greater effort, exact more from them than it has already received. There remains no other way of escape from the difficulty, than to call upon the Privileged Races and Classes. If this occur once, even in a passing emergency, then the desire to command, at all times, and by right, the power which it has once commanded, will easily be excited; and the way to its accomplishment, once discovered, will be readily found again. Add to this, that even the unprivileged members of the State would render more efficient service to it if they were not forced to be subservient to the Privileged Classes. A State, which constantly seeks to increase its internal strength, is thus forced to desire the gradual abolition of all Favouritisms, and the establishment of Equal Rights for all men, in order that it, the State itself, may enter upon its own true Right, — *to apply the whole surplus power of all its Citizens, without ex-*

ception, for the furtherance of its own purposes. The truest and most fruitful view of these Privileges would thus, in our opinion, be the following:—They are a public treasure, committed by the infant State, which neither required to employ its whole powers, nor knew how to employ them, to the hands of its more cultivated Citizens, to be freely employed by them, according to their best judgment, for the promotion of Natural Culture. The more fully and ably this purpose has been carried out, the more is the internal strength of the State gradually increased by means of the services of these Citizens, and the longer may they continue in possession of the trust which they so faithfully administer. But should a time arrive when this Natural Culture is no longer needed, but must give place to an Artificial Civilization, proceeding according to Laws; and when the State must undertake the direct administration by its own hands, of this capital hitherto deposited with them; then it must demand restitution of these Privileges, but in such a manner that no sudden overthrow of existing relations may ensue, —and therefore a *gradual* restitution. The truly Free and Noble will readily make this sacrifice as an offering on their country's altar: those who need to be compelled to this restitution, only prove thereby that they have never been worthy to hold the trust committed to them.

To preclude the possibility of any misconception on this point, I shall at once set forth the highest principle of my views upon the Equality of Human Rights. The common trivial theory supposes the State to have been preceded by an imaginary lawless state of Nature, in which mere force was the master;—the stronger appropriating all that fell within their grasp, and the weaker going away empty. The results of this state of lawlessness are afterwards confirmed by Law, which makes that just which in itself was absolutely unjust; and the State only exists for the purpose of protecting the powerful in the enjoyment of their hoards, by whatever means these may have been accumulated, and of

preventing those who went away empty from the division, from ever acquiring any possession. Apart from the fact that this view is wholly unhistorical, at least so far as regards Modern History, and that here all right of property has arisen out of the *previous* establishment of the State; it is also opposed to Reason, and its opposition to Reason is very obvious in the expression which we have given to it above. Every man *as such* has a title to the possession of property; this title is equal in all men; all that exists, and is convertible into property, ought therefore *by Right* to be equally divided among all; and it is the gradual accomplishment of this Equal Division of that which Nature and Accident have divided unequally, towards which the State is impelled by necessity, and by the care for its own preservation, under the guidance of Nature itself.

All that I have now set forth in detail is that *gradual interpenetration of the Citizen by the State* which I have laid down as the political characteristic of our Age; and it is now your business to determine whether such is the actual state of things, at least in those countries where the State has attained the highest degree of Culture, *i. e.* the greatest internal strength, and the greatest amount of legitimate influence upon the Christian Republic of Nations. We have explained unequivocally enough, and so as to place our meaning beyond the reach of misconception, that this interpenetration of the Citizen by the State, and the changing of his whole outward activity into an instrument of the State, is not here made the subject of censure, as it has been by a certain visionary scheme of unrestricted freedom, which sometimes calls itself Philosophy; but, on the contrary, we have shown it to be a necessary purpose of the State, and of Nature. We do indeed desire Freedom, and we ought to desire it;—but true Freedom can only be obtained by means of the highest obedience to Law. How it necessarily arises therefrom, we have, I think, clearly shown on two different occasions, in the course of these lectures. And we have not

forgotten to show likewise, that the State having once obtained possession of the National Power,—a possession which indeed it will never relinquish,—it will yet not always employ this Power for the narrow and exclusive purpose of its own preservation,—a purpose imposed on it only by the necessities of the time;—but when that Endless Peace shall be born to which we must surely come at last, it will then direct it towards worthier aims.

The most cultivated State in the European Republic of Nations is, in every Age without exception, the most active and enterprising; and each State strives most energetically in that Epoch of its existence when it is no longer under the necessity of struggling to maintain its relative position among other Nations, but now rather endeavours to acquire sufficient strength itself to direct and modify the general Balance of Power; which latter is impossible without the former, *i.e.* the power of destroying this Equilibrium at pleasure;—and these efforts will be the more profitable for the advancement of Culture, the less such a State is favoured by accident, and the more it on that account requires, and continues to require, the exercise of sagacious policy for the increase and application of its internal resources. A State which has yet anxiously to struggle for the maintenance of Equilibrium, must be deficient in internal Freedom and Independence, and in all its proceedings, must be too frequently under the necessity of taking into consideration the purposes of neighbouring States. A State which feels itself in possession of secure and undisputed Superiority, easily becomes careless; surrounded by enterprising competitors, it is gradually deprived of its superiority; and it may perhaps require the discipline of grievous losses to bring it back to the recollection of its own interests.

In these collective peculiarities of our Age, lies the guarantee which Nature herself has given us for the continued excellence of our Governments, and the compulsion

which, without our assistance, she exercises over the constraining powers of Government, for our advantage.

Throughout Christian Europe, almost every independent State now pursues its purpose with all the energy it possesses, and the means both of internal and external aggrandizement are not unknown. In this general struggle of Powers, it is necessary that no advantage should be allowed to escape, for, in that case some neighbour would surely seize upon it at once, and besides depriving us of it, would assuredly employ it against us;—that no single maxim of good Government, and no possible branch of Administration should be overlooked, for it is also a maxim of our neighbour to take every possible advantage of our neglect. In this contest, that State which does not move onwards, falls behind, and declines more and more, until at length it loses its Political Independence altogether, becomes in the first place a mere make-weight to some other State in the general Balance of Power, and is ultimately broken up into provinces under the dominion of Foreign States. Every Political Error carries with it the punishment of ultimate ruin, unless the neighbouring States are equally unwise; and the State that would not meet destruction must avoid such Errors.

But should it be unwise, and fall into Error? I ask, in return, where then is the Fatherland of the truly cultivated Christian European? In general, it is Europe;—in particular, it is that State in Europe which occupies the highest rank of Culture. The State which commits a fatal Error must indeed fall in course of time, and therefore cease to hold this rank. But although it falls, and must fall,—nay, on this very account,—others arise, and, among these, one especially which now occupies the rank which the other held before. Let, then, mere Earth-born men, who recognise their Fatherland in the soil, the rivers, and the mountains, remain Citizens of the fallen State,—they retain what they desire, and what constitutes their hap-

piness;—the Sun-like Spirit, irresistibly attracted, will wing its way wherever there is Light and Liberty. And in this cosmopolitan frame of mind we may look with perfect serenity on the actions and the fate of Nations, for ourselves and our successors, even to the end of Time.

LECTURE XV.

PUBLIC MORALITY OF THE PRESENT AGE.

We begin this lecture with a remark, which properly closes the inquiry which we brought to a termination in our last address, and opens that which we have to enter upon to-day, and is thus the point of transition from the one to the other;—a remark, the import of which we have all along tacitly assumed, but which we now desire clearly and distinctly to set forth.

From Christianity we have deduced the whole character of Modern Time, and the form and manner of the development of this character. But everything which becomes the *Principle* of Phenomena, is, on that very account, lost in the *Phenomena* themselves; becomes invisible to mere outward sense, and only recognisable to the piercing eye of reflection. Thus in so far as Christianity has become a true *Principle,* it is no longer present in clear consciousness to the men of the Age; on the contrary, that which they regard as Christianity has, precisely on that account, never become a Principle, nor is it truly accepted and received into the inward, essential, and peculiar Life of the Age. Christianity was to us synonymous with the One True Religion; and we carefully distinguished it from the various accidental modifications which this True Religion received at the time of its first appearance in the world. In so far as the consequences of these accidental modifications have

taken firm root in the actual condition of the Human Race,—and we have already shown how far this has taken place in the existing Constitution of the European Republic of States,—in so far are their true sources no longer known or recognised, and that is frequently ascribed to chance, which is the result of Christianity.

It could not be otherwise with those relations of the Human Race which lie beyond the jurisdiction of the State. To mention at once that which ranks highest among these after Religion,—*Science;*—and to instance that branch of it which has at all times had the most powerful influence on the form of the whole domain of Science, and has, tacitly at least, and apparently with justice, assumed the legislative function in that domain,—*Philosophy;*—by what has the love of Philosophy in modern times been kindled, but by Christianity? what has been the highest and ultimate task of Philosophy, but thoroughly to explore and vindicate the profound depths of Christian Doctrine?—by what means has Philosophy, in all its shapes, acquired its most wide-spread influence, and, emerging from the narrow circle of its own disciples, flowed forth over the whole Human Race, but by means of the Symbols of Religion, and in the communication of this Religion to the People? In all Modern Times, the present history of Philosophy has been the future history of Religious Symbols. Both proceed in the same course towards a higher purity, and an original harmony; and the Religious Teacher is thus the permanent Interpreter between the Learned and the Unlearned Public. Thus has the whole of Modern Philosophy *directly*, and by means of it the whole form of Science *indirectly*, been the creation of Christianity;—and this is also the case with other elements of civilization;—so that it may be found that the One Permanent and Immutable Element in the perpetual current of Modern Time, is Christianity, in its pure, unchangeable form; and that this alone shall remain so to the end of Time.

In pursuance of the plan which we have formerly indicated, we have to-day to set forth the character of the General and Public Manners of the Present Age. After what has been previously said, you will not be surprised if here again we revert to Christianity, as the principle of all Public Morality in Modern Times.

In the first place, what is meant by Manners? and in what sense do we use this word? To us, and according to our opinion in every intelligible use of language, it signifies, —*the accustomed Principles which regulate the mutual intercourse, and reciprocal influence, of men, and which have become a second nature throughout the whole domain of Culture, but on that very account are not distinctly recognised in Consciousness.* The *Principles,* we have said;—and therefore by no means the *fortuitous actual course of conduct,* determined, it may be, by mere accidental circumstances; but, on the contrary, that *concealed Principle of conduct* which always remains the same, the existence of which we always presuppose in Man, whenever left to his own instincts, and from which we can, with so much apparent certainty, calculate beforehand the course of conduct which will be its necessary result. *The Principles,* I said, *which have become a second nature, but on that very account are not distinctly recognised in Consciousness:*—and hence there are to be excepted from this definition, all those impulses and motives influencing the general course of conduct, which are founded upon Freedom,—such as, the inward impulse of Morality, as well as the outward motive of Law;—that which Man must in the first place excogitate and afterwards freely resolve upon, does not fall within the category of Manners; and, in so far as a fixed standard of Manners may be ascribed to an Age, in so far is it to be regarded as an unconscious instrument of the Spirit of the Time.

We have already ascribed to the introduction of Universal Equality among Men before the tribunal of Right, and before a Legislation which should discover with certainty every

transgression, and with equal certainty inflict the threatened punishment,—which Legislation has only been introduced in Modern Times through the influence of Christianity;—we have ascribed, I say, to such a Legislation, a most important and highly beneficial influence upon the Manners of the Citizens. Were every inward temptation to injustice towards others,—so we accidentally expressed ourselves,—were every such inward temptation crushed, even in its birth, by the consciousness that no other result could follow this course but certain punishment and suffering, then would the People gradually lose the habit of even entertaining thoughts of injustice, or of exhibiting such desires even by the most trifling outward manifestation:—all would appear virtuous; although it were yet the menaces of Law, which scared back evil desire even in the most secret recesses of the heart; the remembrance of these menaces would have become a part of the Manners of the People, and thus it would have likewise become a part of these Manners to give way to no thought of injustice. These Manners, as merely restraining from evil, but not as yet impelling towards good behaviour, would be *negatively* good; *i.e.* they would not be Bad Manners,—and their production would be the negative influence of Legislation, and through it, of Christianity, upon Public Morality.

This influence of Legislation upon Manners is necessary and infallible:—Is there in no case any advantage to be expected from injustice, but at all times only loss and detriment?—then no one, if he but love himself and seek his own welfare, can desire to be unjust. Should this influence upon Manners fail to show itself to the anticipated extent in some actual and legitimate Legislation, then we should only have to inquire whether this defect be not founded upon some existing uncertainty as to the execution of the Law; either because the guilty may with great probability hope to remain undiscovered, or because the course of Justice and of Judicial Inquiry and Evidence is intricate and obscure,

and presents many opportunities of escape. In this case, the subject of temptation might thus argue with himself: —'Ten others, or more perhaps, around me, have done this thing, and go unpunished; why should I, the eleventh, be discovered?'—or thus: 'I myself have done this thing already ten times; let me venture it again this eleventh time. Should I unfortunately be discovered, I have already the gain of ten to set against the loss of one;'—and no exception could be taken to this mode of reckoning. In the first case, the probability of no accusation being made would indicate a want of strict surveillance, despite the good Legislation; in the second case, the hope of escaping conviction, even should an accusation take place, would indicate a deficiency in the requisite number of acute and sharp-sighted judges. In both cases, our next task would be to discover the cause of this deficiency; for example,—whether it did not arise out of the necessity which we have already described, of the State employing all its powers directly for its *outward* protection; and whether such a State, were the augmentation of its Police or the improvement of its system of Judicial Inquiry demanded of it, would not be the first to lament its inability to provide the means for the accomplishment of these purposes. In this case, it would be necessary to represent to such a Government, that *inward* security and strength is yet more important than *outward*, and that the former is the firmest foundation for the latter; that the means for the attainment of the former must first be provided, before we have any need of the latter condition: and should we not dare to make these representations to the State, and were still less able to enforce our views upon its attention, it were at least *much to be desired* that internal disorder, carried to the highest extreme, and the frustration of its most cherished and well-considered schemes by means of this disorder, should force it to return to the path of Wisdom.

It may be remarked, with reference to Judicial Procedure, that whatever respect may be due to the endeavour absolutely to prevent the possibility of an innocent person being convicted, and although this endeavour must never cease to be made; yet the opposite duty,—to take care that no guilty person remain undiscovered and unpunished,—is by no means a less important task; that the solution of the one does not impede that of the other;—nay, that without the solution of the latter, that of the former cannot be attained, but on the contrary that, in such a case, the State would be found hindering and obstructing the accomplishment of its own purposes.

At this point, I, as an individual, have nothing further to say, but you yourselves have to judge how far this influence of Legislation upon Manners has actually proceeded in Europe, and particularly in those parts of Europe where the State is most thoroughly cultivated; wherein the defect, if defect there be, consists; and thus in what direction the New Age must proceed in its onward course.

But be it as it may with this influence of Legislation upon the negative side of Public Morality, yet Public Manners, wherever they exist, in turn exert a powerful influence upon the State, and upon the mode and form of its Legislation. This, which we shall immediately prove, being presupposed, it is obvious that a course of action thus directed, adopted by the State in its Legislation, is itself but a part of the Morality of the Age, since it proceeds solely from the Manners of the Citizens, and is determined by them, and not by Legislation as such; and,—since it is not even the means of restraining the State from injustice, such injustice being already wholly inconsistent with Legislation, but only guides this Legislation in a different course,—it thus becomes the *positive* Morality of the State. Positive Good Manners, however, consist herein, that in every individual we recognise and honour the representative of the Human Race. This Morality, I said, is made possible for the State, in the way of its Legis-

lation, by means of the *negative* Good Manners of its Citizens. Thus, we may lay down the following as the permanent fundamental principle of Criminal Legislation:—The more certain it is that punishment will follow crime, and the more the Manners of the Nation are formed upon this certainty, so much the milder and more humane may punishment itself be made. This amelioration, however, is not on account of the transgressor, towards whom, as such, the State entertains no ulterior purpose; but it is on account of the Race whose image he still bears in his person.

For example:—He who is accustomed to consider this matter not superficially, but in its profounder aspects, will unquestionably admit that an individual may become so dangerous to Society, that it is impossible for the State thoroughly to protect Society from his aggressions without removing him from the world. It will, however, be likewise admitted—unless indeed we were to proceed upon the barbarous Mosaic principle,—'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,'—it will, I say, be admitted that the State ought to adopt this method only in cases of extreme necessity, and where there is actually no other course available; for the transgressor still remains a member of the Race, and as such possesses the right to live as long as he can for the purpose of self-improvement. But admitting this course to be necessary in particular cases, yet for the Government to employ a pompous ceremonial in the execution of the condemned, to sharpen the agonies of death by torments, to expose the remains of the dead in a disgusting public spectacle, is at most only to be justified where the great mass of the Nation stand in need of such frightful exhibitions, in order that they may be rendered less prone to deeds of horror upon other occasions. In a cultivated Age, not addicted to bloodshed, it would, in our opinion, be sufficient if the death-judgment were only pronounced in public, but carried into effect in secrecy and silence, and thereafter, the body left open to inspection, so that any one, who de-

sired to do so, might convince himself that the sentence had been actually completed. In short, the more civilized a People becomes, the punishment of death, and generally all punishments, must become milder and less frequent among them.

This gradual amelioration of Criminal Legislation, we have said, is rendered possible to the State, by means of the improvement of Manners among the People. But, after this possibility has been created, what shall move and impel the State actually to realize that which has thus merely become possible? I answer: The general opinion of Europe, as well as, in particular, the voice of its own Citizens. Until it has become a part of Public Manners to recognise and honour in each individual Man, the representative of the Race, the People are yet disposed to deeds of violence, and must be held in check by means of severe and, in part, terrible punishments. After this principle has entered into Public Manners, and consequently deeds of violence have become less frequent, it can no longer be endured that any one who bears the human form, whatever offence he may have committed, should be tortured as an exhibition to the crowd; the civilized man turns away his eyes with horror from the spectacle, and the whole world despises, as barbarous, a Government and a Nation which still sanctions such enormities;—and thus the Government is impelled by its own love of honour, as well as that of the Nation, to keep its Criminal Legislation in harmony with the Spirit of the Time, and in so doing itself to adopt Good Manners.

And here once more we have attained a point where I must appeal to your own judgment, and leave it to yourselves to compare the Past with the Present in this respect, to determine at what point our own Age has arrived, and and in what direction we must now proceed onwards.

The inquiry which we have thus brought to a close, has afforded us an opportunity of ascertaining and pointing out in what *positive* public Good Manners consist. They con-

sist in habitually regarding each individual, without exception, as a member of the Race, and in being so regarded by him; in desiring to treat him as possessing that character, and to be so treated by him in return. To regard and to be regarded, to treat and to be treated in return, I have said;—for both are inseparably united, and he who does not desire the latter, will not fulfil the former condition. He to whom it is a matter of indifference what others think of him, and how they treat him, in those matters as to which no course of duty is prescribed by the Law, far from accepting their judgment as the judgment of the Race, despises them, and casts them from him as worthy of no consideration. It is indeed unquestionably true, that any one by his own bad conduct may place others in such a position that they can entertain towards him no feeling save that of most profound contempt, and they would be quite justified in doing so;—but this contempt must not be an original habit of mind; it must be called forth and deserved, and in that case clear conviction takes the place of mere habit.

The chief feature in our conception of Good Manners as above set forth is this,—that every individual, without exception, merely as such, and on account of his bearing the human form, ought, in the event of his not having forfeited this character by his own misdeeds, to be recognised as a member and representative of the Race;—or, in other words, that the Original Equality of all men ought to be the predominant and fundamental idea in all our intercourse with our fellow-men. Now this Equality of all men is the peculiar principle of Christianity; hence the universal but unconscious dominion of this Christianity, and its acceptance as the essential actuating principle of public life, would be also the foundation of Good Manners, or rather would itself be Good Manners. The *unconscious* dominion, I have said;—that is, when it should be no longer publicly proclaimed, 'Christianity *teaches* this or that;'—but when the PRINCIPLE should

itself possess a true and living existence within the minds of men, and manifest itself in all their actions.

Now, this presupposed principle has assuredly had a recognised existence in the world since the origin of Christianity, and no man acts in opposition to it, because no man has power to do so. 'Before God we are all Equal,' say many;—and they readily admit that *in another life* we shall actually be placed upon an Equality, because they cannot dispute this certainty. Nevertheless, he who is dependent upon the inequality of men *in this life*, maintains this inequality with all his power, and endeavours to draw from it the greatest possible advantage to himself. The principle of Equality must therefore be applied to the earthly relations of men, if it is to become the source of true, active Good Manners among them. This can only be effected through the influence of the Perfect State, which penetrates all men in the same manner, each in his own place, and employs them all as its instruments. Thus it is not the mere ideal dominion of Christianity, but the dominion which it acquires by means of the State, and which is realized in the State, which is true Good Manners; and the idea of such Good Manners may now be further defined in this way:—Each Individual is recognised as a member of the Race when we regard him as an instrument of the State, and desire to be so regarded by him; when we treat him as such, and desire to be so treated by him in return. We must desire to be so considered and so treated by him, I have said; but we are not entitled to expect or demand from him any error in this judgment, and therefore we must actually be, and desire to be, instruments of the State, and that to the same extent as he, although, it may be, in another sphere.

The complete interpenetration of all its members by the State, and therewith the Equality of all men in the State, is first effected by means of the perfect conformity of the Rights of all; and thus perfect Good Manners consists in the supposition of this Equality of Rights, as at least some-

thing which ought to come to pass, and which must come to pass, — and in acting towards every man as if this must be the case; and likewise in desiring to be treated in return upon this supposition, and not otherwise. It is thus clear that Inequality of Rights is the true source of Bad Manners; and the tacit assumption that we must continue in this state of Inequality is itself Bad Manners.

To make this clear by farther explanation: In the first place, there stand opposite to each other in Society the powerful and cultivated Citizen-class, and the Privileged Races. Among the former, it is Bad Manners, either, on the one hand, to set too high a value on the distinctions of the latter, and, going beyond those ordinary conventional forms of respect which every reasonable man concedes, to put on a slavish, submissive, and cringing behaviour towards these Races; or, on the other hand, enviously to grudge them the distinctions which they enjoy, to indulge in bitterness of expression towards them, and to represent these distinctions in false and hateful colours, either from real antipathy, or from want of mature reflection. These forms of Bad Manners on the one part, naturally produce other forms of Bad Manners on the other; either by the Privileged Races not spurning the unseemly homage with fitting indignation, but satisfying themselves with holding in little esteem those who by their own conduct invite contempt; or by strictly repulsing every approach of the other Class, and carefully shutting themselves up from such contact in a system of narrow exclusiveness.

How shall these two estranged Classes of the same State now peacefully reunite and harmonize in one and the same system of Good Manners? The most advantageous means of attaining that end would be, that they should be bound together by Science; and indeed that the Citizen-class should first find themselves in possession of this Science, and that the communication of it should proceed from them. Were it to take its rise among the Privileged Races, it

might be feared that they would seek to retain exclusive possession of it to themselves, and so add to the accidental distinctions of fortune, the far more important superiority of true worth. Of the Citizen, educated by the light of true Science, it may be expected that he will rightly understand and appreciate the real meaning and value of these distinctions of the Privileged Classes, — probably as we have set these forth in our preceding lecture, — and just upon that account will be as far from over-estimating, as from grudging them. The Scientifically educated man of the Privileged Races would receive a new, peculiar, and personal value, which would powerfully dispose him to open his eyes to the light which true Science throws upon his fortuitous and hereditary Privileges. To both of these, the distinctions which exist between them in matters of small moment would readily disappear before their Equality in those higher Privileges upon which they set supreme value.

Both Classes, now united by this tie, still stand opposed in Society to the great mass of the People who are engaged in mechanical and manual labour, and who on that account are almost universally without that perfect instruction of which they stand in need. This large Class feels the oppression of its daily toils; it sees that the higher Classes, in their copious and comfortable enjoyment of life, do not participate in its mechanical labours: — but how these have also their labours and toils in other spheres; how they are useful and necessary for the general welfare, and even indispensable for the People themselves; and in particular, what important advantages are secured to the community by its own labour; — all this it does not know, and cannot comprehend. Under these circumstances it is impossible that Bad Manners should assume any other form, among these Lower Classes, than that of regarding the Higher Classes as oppressors who live upon their toils, and looking upon every proposition which comes to them from that quarter as an attempt to gain some new advantage over them. There are no means by which these

Lower Classes may be assisted, or their Bad Manners improved, except by their attaining a living conviction that they are not made subservient to the arbitrary will of an individual, but to the Community as a Whole, and even this only in so far as that Whole needs their services; and that all their Fellow-Citizens, without exception, to whatever Class they belong, stand in the same position:—but, in order that they may arrive at this conviction, it is necessary that this should actually be the case; for it is in vain to indulge the hope of deceiving the Lower Classes in matters which affect their interests. Hence either Equality of Rights must be actually introduced; or else the Privileged Classes must constantly, publicly, and before the eyes of all men, act as if this Equality were introduced. This condition of things must be brought distinctly under the notice of the Lower Classes, and be made evident to them by their Instructors, who are the mediators between them and the Higher Classes, and who ought to be well acquainted with the close connexion between their thoughts and their language;—in one word, the People ought to receive instruction, and indeed fundamental, solid, and convincing instruction, not in Religion alone, but also regarding the State, its purposes and its laws.

To make my views clear by a distinct example: The great Proprietor must be able thus to speak to his dependents, or to enable their Instructors thus to speak for him, and that with truth, calling to witness the daily testimony of their own eyes:—'Although I possess as much as hundreds or perhaps thousands of you do together, yet I cannot, on that account, either eat, drink, or sleep, for a hundred or a thousand. The undertakings in which you see me daily engage; the experiments on a great scale with new methods of husbandry; the introduction of new and nobler races of animals, new plants and seeds from distant lands; the study of their proper treatment, which, being hitherto unknown, has now to be patiently sought out;—these demand great immediate outlay, and the means of defray-

ing the loss consequent upon possible failure. You cannot afford to do this, and hence it is not required of you: but, that wherein I am successful you may learn from me, and imitate; what proves unsuccessful, you may avoid, for I have already encountered the risk for you. From my herds there will gradually extend to yours those nobler races of animals already domesticated with me; from my fields there will be propagated to yours those more profitable fruits already inured to the climate, with the art of their cultivation, already acquired and tested at my expense. It is true that my granaries are plentifully filled with stores of every kind; but to whom among you, who stood in need of aid, have they ever been closed?—who among you all has ever been in difficulty, and I have not succoured him? What you do not require, shall, at the first signal given by the State, flow forth freely to any province of our Fatherland that may feel the iron hand of want. Grudge me not the gold which I receive;—it shall be so expended as I have hitherto expended, before your eyes, all that ever I had; there shall not be, with my will, a single farthing of it applied without some gain to the cause of Human Culture. Moreover, if the State shall require my money for the pay of its armies or the support of its provinces; or the division of my goods for the maintenance of a larger population; I shall be ready, at all times, to deliver them up into its hands. I promise you, you shall not see me shrink from my duty. Should the State not require this sacrifice at my hands, and should I leave my possessions to my children; then I have educated them so that they shall use these possessions as I have used them, and shall teach their successors to act as I have done, even to the end of time.'

Such is public and universal Good Manners. How far such Manners have attained dominion in our own Age, in those countries where the State and its Citizens have attained the highest point of Culture, in comparison with earlier Ages; in what respects the Age is yet defective, and

how our Race must next proceed forward to higher attainments;—this I leave to the judgment of those among you who have opportunities of making observations upon this matter, and I do so the more readily that I myself have not possessed such opportunities, particularly as regards the relation of the Cultivated Classes to the People, for a long series of years,—and in certain countries have never possessed them at all. I had nothing more to do than to set forth in general the principles upon which such a judgment ought to proceed. Briefly to recount these once more:—Herein consists the true vocation and worth of Man,—that he, with all he is, has, and can do, should devote himself to the service of the Race,—and since, and in so far as, the State determines the form and mode of the service which this Race does actually need, that he should devote himself to the service of the State. In what mode, chosen by himself, or assigned to him by the State, each man may do this, is of little moment, but only *that he do it:* and each one is to be honoured not according to the mode in which he performs this service, but according to the extent to which he performs it in the mode assigned to him. Even he who may not have performed it at all, or may have performed it most imperfectly, is yet to be respected at least as one who ought to perform it, who can perform it, and who perhaps one day will perform it; and he is to be treated according to this view. So also no one can lay claim to the honour and respect of others upon any other ground than this, and no pretension can justly be made to any value or influence with others, save only in this respect. Thus would the influence of the distinction of Classes in Society upon the conduct of those Classes towards each other be wholly extinguished, and all the Citizens of the State, and at last the whole Human Race, be united in equal and reciprocal esteem, and in a mode of conduct founded upon this esteem; because such conduct would spring from a common source in which all partake in the same manner and in the same degree.

LECTURE XVI.

PUBLIC RELIGION OF THE PRESENT AGE.

According to the plan which we laid down in an early part of these lectures, we have to-day to set forth the principles whereon this question may be answered:—'At what point of development does the Present Age stand, with reference to Public and General Religion?'

We have already, for a considerable time, regarded the True Religion, or Christianity,—which two expressions we avowedly hold to be synonymous,—as the peculiar and ultimate ground of all the Phenomena by which our Age is characterized; and, in this view, the whole character of the Age is nothing else than this its ascertained standing point in respect of Religion. The question which we have proposed has therefore either been already answered by all which we have previously said; or if it has not been so answered, and still demands a special solution, then we must here use the word Religion in a sense different from that in which we have hitherto employed it.

The latter is the case:—Hitherto we have regarded the True Religion as the *concealed Principle* of Actual Life; to-day we have to speak of it, not in this sense, but as itself an independent and substantial Existence. Hitherto, having represented it as the *Principle* of all Phenomena, we have, on that very account, also represented it as an *unconscious* Principle, and in this connexion we have called by the name

of Religion, not that which men put forth in public declarations, but that which has become their very inmost Life,—the root and spring of all their Speech and Action. To-day we have to consider this Religion as it reveals itself in clear Consciousness; for the independent Existence of Religion is no outward matter, and reveals itself in no outward manner, but is an inward Consciousness, and indeed a wholly self-sufficing and self-comprehending Consciousness.

In this sense the word Religion is also employed in the common judgment which the Age passes upon itself with reference to its religious condition,—in the well-known and almost universal lamentations over the decay of Religion, especially among the People. It might well be imagined that the mere existence of such lamentations was itself a refutation of the complaint,—for do not the complainers, in the very act of lamentation, manifest their respect and love for Religion?—were it not that their complaints are accompanied by certain suspicious assumptions, from which it appears to follow that it is not their own Irreligion which they deplore, and that it is not for themselves, but for others, and especially for the People, that they desire a revival of Religion: behind which desire there may perhaps lurk some interested purpose. Be this as it may, let us examine these complaints, and with this examination carry forward our own inquiry.

Without anticipating the results of your own observation, we may lay down, as elements which are unquestionably true, and which must necessarily manifest themselves in the external phenomena of Society, whatever necessarily follows, with reference to public Religion, from the principles which constitute the characteristic features of the Age. Now, we have shown in passing, in our previous lecture, that the principles from which the Public Religion of an Age proceeds, are to be found in the Scientific, and particularly in the Philosophical character of the *preceding* Age. In the Schools of Philosophy

and Science, the popular teacher, the popular author, and the public opinion of the cultivated classes, are formed, and through these channels the influences of the Schools spread themselves abroad, by teaching and example, among the People. The Philosophico-scientific character of the Third Age has been already set forth at the commencement of these lectures;—this, namely,—*to accept nothing as really existing or obligatory but that which it can understand and clearly comprehend,*—in which the Age is right; and further,—*to connect therewith mere empirical and sensuous Experience as its sole measure of the Conceivable,*—in which the Age is wrong. It is quite clear, that by means of the prevalence of these principles everything mysterious and inconceivable must be banished from Religion; and—since the fear of God, as well as the means of propitiating him, are founded on the Inconceivableness and Unsearchableness of the Divine Counsels, and we can therefore only be made acquainted with these means by direct Revelation,—that everything awful in Religion, as well as blind Faith and unquestioning Obedience in its concerns, must wholly disappear. An Age, therefore, which is formed upon those principles, and thoroughly penetrated by them, will no longer be moved by the fear of God, nor employ any effete and worn-out means of propitiating him.

But is this fear of God, and these efforts to propitiate him by means of mysterious oblations,—are these Religion and Christianity? By no means:—they are Superstitions, remnants of Heathenism which have mixed themselves up with Christianity, and have not yet been wholly thrust out from it;—and these remnants are wholly destroyed by the Philosophy of the Age wherever it has free play. Along with them, True Christianity itself is, not indeed destroyed,—for, except in individuals, it has never yet attained a Public and recognised Existence,—but the Age is thereby rendered incapable of comprehending True Christianity, or of introducing it into the world.

Does any one lament this downfall of Superstition, as the decay of Religion?—then he violates the true use of language, and laments over that in which he ought to rejoice, and which is indeed a brilliant proof of the advancement of our Age. On what account, then, are these lamentations made? Since the thing which has fallen has nothing in itself to recommend it, it must be only the outward consequences of its fall which are deplored. In so far as these lamentations do not proceed from the Priests themselves,—(in this connexion we may call them Priests without fear of misapprehension,)—whose grief at the loss of their dominion over the minds of men we can well understand, but from the Politicians,—the whole matter may resolve itself into this, that Government has thereby become more difficult and expensive. The fear of the Gods was an excellent resource for an imperfect Government; it was a convenient thing to watch the doings of the Subjects through the eyes of the Divinity, where the Government either could not or would not exercise this surveillance itself; the Judge was spared the exercise of his own sagacity and penetration, when, by threats of relentless damnation, he could induce the accused to communicate to him willingly the information he desired to possess; and the Evil Spirit performed, without reward, the services for which, at later times, Judges and Police had to be paid.

To declare frankly what we clearly perceive to be true, let us here say that, even if the maintenance of such a method of facilitating Government were allowable, which it is not, yet this increase of the burden of Government is no Evil, but a precious Good, in which Humanity at large must sooner or later become partaker. Government itself is an Art founded on the laws of Reason, which ought not to be prosecuted at random, but must, on the contrary, be rightly and fundamentally studied;—but to this fundamental study we are only impelled by Necessity, and only at a time when it is no longer attainable by Superficiality.

Thus the philosophical and scientific Knowledge of the Age overthrows that form of Superstition which is thoroughly recognised and understood by the Age, but cannot as yet establish True Religion in its place in distinct Consciousness. Hence in such an Age there is no longer to be found any clear and distinct conception of a Super-sensual world, either true or false.

Suppose, then, that such is actually the case,—that these inferences are confirmed by observation, which here again I leave to yourselves to follow out,—would it necessarily follow, because the Super-sensual is nowhere *clearly comprehended*, that the *indistinct feeling* of the Infinite, and the struggling and striving after its attainment, no longer exist; in one word, that with Religion itself, the sense of Religion or Religious Feeling has likewise disappeared? By no means. It may be laid down as an incontestable Principle, that where Virtue and Good Manners still prevail,—philanthropy, the charities of social life, sympathy, benevolence, domestic affections, the faithful and self-sacrificing attachment of husband and wife, parents and children,—there Religion still exists, whether recognised or not; and there the capacity still exists for its attaining a full and conscious being. Such a People can indeed no longer entertain those Superstitions whose empire has passed away; but let the attempt be made to awaken in them clear and true Ideas of Religion, and it will soon be seen that they will be moved by these as by nothing else. And has not this, in fact, occasionally occurred in Modern Times?—and has it not been remarked upon such occasions that men of all Classes, who seemed to be dead to every other spiritual influence, have been attracted and aroused by this? Very far, therefore, from joining in the lamentations over the decay of Religion in our Age, I hold this rather to be the character of the Age,—that it would be more ready than any other to receive and appreciate True Religion when this should be presented to it. The empty and ineffectual babble of Free-thinking has had time

enough to utter itself in all possible ways;—it has uttered itself and we have listened to it;—and on this side there is nothing *new* and nothing *better* to be said than what has been said already. We are weary of it; we feel its emptiness and its perfect nothingness with reference to that Feeling of the Eternal which is not yet wholly uprooted from our souls. This Feeling remains, and urgently demands its rightful exercise. A more manly Philosophy has since then attempted to silence this Feeling, by asserting the claims of another,—that of Absolute Morality,—under the name of the Categorical Imperative. Many a powerful mind has entrenched and established itself upon this Principle: but this can only endure for a time, for precisely on account of a kindred feeling being cultivated, does that which is unsatisfied feel more strongly the want of its satisfaction. Let Truth at last present itself to such a mind;—then, just because it has already proved and passed through so many Errors, will it the more keenly discern, and the more cordially accept, the Truth which is now offered to its view. That such Truth will one day present itself to the Public Mind, we may securely predict; for it is already prepared in the secret workshops of Philosophy, although still in the obscurity of Formula,—and already exists in the primitive records of Christianity, although as yet not understood. How, and by what means, it shall be introduced into the world, we must leave to Time, looking forward with quiet confidence, and not expecting to see the Harvest ready for the reaper, while as yet the Seed is but being sown.

Wherein, then, does this True Religion consist? Perhaps I shall be able to describe it most clearly if I show what it accomplishes, and if I do this by declaring what it does not accomplish. All previous outward forms of Christianity have had the effect of bringing Mankind, and in particular Nations and States, thus far,—that they have done many things which they would otherwise have left undone, and have left undone many things which otherwise they would

have done; and in particular, Superstition has constrained its subjects to abandon many pernicious practices and to adopt many useful purposes. In one word: these outward forms of Christianity lie at the bottom of many Phenomena and events which would otherwise never have occurred. It is not so with inward True Religion; it does not come forth into the world of outward Appearance, and impels man to no outward act which he would not otherwise have done. But it completes his own internal being, makes him wholly at one with himself, and intelligible to himself, thoroughly Free and Blessed:—in one word, it perfects his Dignity.

Let us consider the Highest which man can possess in the absence of Religion; I mean, *Pure Morality*. He obeys the Law of Duty in his breast, absolutely because it is a Law unto him; and he does whatever reveals itself as his Duty, absolutely because it is Duty. But does he therein understand himself?—does he know what this Duty, to which at every moment he consecrates his whole existence, really is in itself, and what is its ultimate aim? So little does he know this, that he declares loudly it *ought* to be so, absolutely *because* it ought; and makes this very impossibility of comprehending and understanding the Law,—this absolute abstraction from the meaning of the Law, and the consequences of the deed,—a characteristic mark of genuine Obedience. In the first place, let not the impudent assertion be here repeated, that such an Obedience without regard to consequences, and without desire for consequences, is in itself impossible, and opposed to Human Nature. What does the mere sensuous Egoist, who is himself but a half man, what does he know of the power of Human Nature? That it is possible, can be known only by its actual accomplishment in ourselves; and before its possibility is recognised in this way, and man has elevated himself in his own person to Pure Morality, he can have no entrance whatever into the domain of True Religion; for Religion also annexes no visible consequences to individual acts of Duty.—So much for

the refutation of that portion of Error which arises from the calumnious slander of Pure Morality.

Again, he who faithfully obeys the Law of Duty, as such, does not understand the ultimate aim of this Law. It is clear,—since he, notwithstanding this ignorance, maintains an unvarying and unconditional Obedience; since, further, the Law of Duty, although not understood, speaks forth constantly and invariably within him,—that this want of comprehension causes no difference in his actions;—but it is another question whether such a want of comprehension is consistent with his Dignity as a rational being. He indeed no longer follows the concealed Law of the Universe, nor the blind impulses of Nature, but a Conception,—and in doing so he acts, thus far, a nobler part. But this Conception itself is not clear to him, and, with reference to it, he himself is blind; his Obedience therefore remains but a blind Obedience; and—by a noble instinct indeed, but still with bandaged eyes,—he is led on to his Destiny. But if this position be inconsistent with the Dignity of Reason, as it unquestionably is, and if there lie in Reason itself a power, and therefore an impulse, to penetrate to the meaning of the Law of Duty, then will this impulse be a source of constant disturbance and dissatisfaction to him, and if he still continue to hold by blind Obedience, he will have no other course than to harden himself against this secret desire. However perfect may be his conduct,—that is, his outward and apparent existence,—there is still at the root of his Inward Being, discord, obscurity, and bondage, and therefore a want of absolute Dignity. Such is the position even of the purely Moral Man, when regarded by the Light of Religion. How displeasing, then, as seen by this Light, must be his condition who has not even attained to True Morality, but as yet only follows the impulses of Nature. He too is guided by the Eternal Law of the Universe; but to him it neither speaks in his own language, nor honours him with speech at all, but leads him on with dumb

compulsion, as it does the plant or the animal; employs him like an unreasoning thing without consulting his own Will in aught, and in a region where mere mechanism is the only moving power.

Religion discloses to Man the significance of the One Eternal Law which, as the Law of Duty, guides the free and noble, and, as the Law of Nature, governs ignoble instruments. The Religious Man comprehends this Law, and feels it living within himself, as the Law of the Eternal development of the One Life. How each individual moment of our Earthly Life is comprehended in that Eternal development of the One Original Divine Life, he cannot indeed understand, because the Infinite has no limit, and therefore can never be embraced by him; but that every one of these moments does absolutely lie contained within this development of the One Life, he can directly perceive and clearly recognise. What was the Law of Duty to the Moral Man, is to him the *inward* progression of the One Life, which directly reveals itself as Life; what is the Law of Nature to others, is to him the development of the *outward*, and apparently inanimate, manifestation of that One Life.

This One clearly recognised Life now becomes thoroughly established in the Religious Man, reposing upon itself, sufficient for itself, and blessed in itself;—dwelling there with unspeakable Love; with inconceivable rapture bathing his whole Being in the Original Fountain of all Life, and flowing forth with him, and inseparable from him, in one Eternal stream. What the Moral Man calls Duty and Law,—what is this to him? The most Spiritual bloom of Life,—his element, in which alone he can breathe. He wills and can do nothing else than this;—all else is to him Misery and Death. To him the commanding "*Thou shalt*" comes too late; before it can command, he has already resolved, and cannot resolve otherwise. As all external Law vanishes before Morality, so before Religion the internal Law also disappears; the Lawgiver in our breast is silent, for Will,

Desire, Love, and Blessedness, have already superseded the Law. The Moral Man often finds it difficult to perform his Duty; the sacrifice of his deepest desires and his most cherished feelings is demanded of him. He performs it notwithstanding:—it *must* be done; he subdues his feelings and stifles his agony. The question, Wherefore is there need of this suffering, and whence arises this disunion between the desires which have been implanted in him, and the commands of a Law from which he cannot escape?—this question he dares not permit himself to entertain; he must offer himself up with mute and blind Obedience, for only under the condition of such Obedience is the offering genuine. For the Religious Man this question has been once and for ever solved. That which thus strives against our Will, and which cannot be crushed into nothingness, is imperfect Life; which, even because it is Life, struggles for continued existence, but must cease to be as soon as its place is occupied by a Higher and Nobler Life. 'Those desires which I must sacrifice,' thinks the Religious Man, 'are not my desires, but they are desires which are directed against me and my Higher Existence; they are my foes, which cannot be destroyed too soon. The pain which they cause is not my pain, but the pain of a Nature which has conspired against me; it is not the agonies of Death, but the pangs of a New Birth, which will be glorious beyond all my expectations.'

It would be unworthy of our picture of Religion were we still to insist, and set forth specially, that to it there is no longer anything displeasing and deformed in the World, but that all things, without exception, are to it a source of the purest Blessedness. Whatever exists, *as* it exists, and *because* it exists, labours in the service of the One Eternal Life, and in the system of this development so it must be. To desire, wish, or love anything otherwise than as it is, would be either to desire no Life at all, or else to desire Life in a less perfect manifestation.

Religion elevates him who is devoted to her service above

Time as such, above the Transient and the Perishable, and puts him in immediate possession of Eternity. On the One Original Divine Life his eye reposes; there his love is rooted; whatever meets his view and seems to be beyond this One Original Life, is not beyond it, but within it, and is merely a temporary form of its development according to an absolute Law which likewise lies within itself; he sees all things only in and through this One Original Life, and in this Life he sees the whole Infinite Universe of Being. His view is thus always the view of the Eternal, and what he sees, he sees as Eternal and in the Eternal: nothing can truly *be* which is not, even on that very account, *Eternal*. Every fear of perishing in Death, and every effort to discover an artificial proof of the Immortality of the Soul, lies far beneath him. In every moment of his existence he has immediate possession of the Eternal Life with all its Blessedness; and he needs no argument or inference to prove the truth of that which he possesses in ever-present Feeling and Consciousness. There is no more striking proof that the Knowledge of the True Religion has hitherto been very rare among men, and that in particular it is a stranger in the prevailing systems, than this, that they universally place Eternal Blessedness beyond the grave, and never for a moment imagine that whoever will, may here, and at once, be Blessed.

This is the True Religion. What we maintained above, —that this Religion never comes forth in outward manifestation, nor reveals itself in external results, but is only the perfection of man's Inward Being,—this has been thoroughly confirmed by our delineation. The Religious Man, indeed, does all those things, without exception, which the Law of Duty enjoins; but he does them, not as a Religious Man, for he was already bound to do them, independently of all Religion, as a purely Moral Man;—as a Religious Man he does the same things, but he does them with a nobler, freer mind. We must, however, necessarily pass through Pure

Morality before we can attain Religion, for Religion is the Love of the Divine Life and Will, and he who obeys this Will reluctantly, can never love it. Morality accustoms us to Obedience; and from habitual Obedience Love arises, as its sweetest fruit and reward.

But how shall our poor perplexed and harassed Human Race ever attain this Religion, and by its means be brought into this haven of secure repose? Some conditions which must previously be brought about, we can easily indicate. In the first place, the Civil condition of the State and its internal and external peace must be firmly established. The empire of Good Manners must have commenced; the State must have no longer to struggle with its own necessities, or to impose them on its Citizens; this is necessary in order that quiet and leisure may be obtained. According to what we have said in our previous discourses, all this has already come to pass by means of Christianity, as the fundamental Principle of Modern Times; and by the same means, we may confidently anticipate that this will still continue and be carried out into farther and yet more perfect results. In this respect, Christianity itself, by means of its external relations, has fashioned and prepared the world on which it is destined to burst forth with all its inward and essential Nobleness; and our whole view of Modern Times has thus acquired a new significance, and the keystone has been placed on the completed structure of our inquiry.

In this state of order and tranquillity, Mankind, or at least a large portion of them, must necessarily elevate themselves, in the first place, to Pure Morality. At this point, the power of the State, and the unconscious influence of Christianity in its external relations, come to an end. The State, as we have already seen, can impel its Citizens to *negative* Good Manners by means of Legislation and Government, and to *positive* Good Manners by means of the establishment of Equal Rights for all; and it may thus remove the most powerful obstacles to the development of

Pure Morality; but it cannot impel them to this Morality itself, for the source of this lies within themselves, in their own minds, and in their own Free Will.

How much less then does it lie within the power of the State again to raise the great mass of its Citizens, or at least a large portion of them, from this generally diffused Morality to the higher dignity of True Religion. Whatever may be done in Future Times for the diffusion of this True Religion by great men whose hearts may be powerfully animated by its presence,—whatever these may do as Individuals,—the State, as such, must never propose this purpose to itself; for its efforts would unavoidably prove abortive, and produce something quite different from the end desired. Indeed, I may add that no State will propose this purpose to itself, for the maxim which we have laid down above, will one day be universally recognised.

How then shall an Impulse arise, by which Mankind may be moved to the acknowledgment and diffusion of True Religion? I answer, in the same way that all progress in Religious Knowledge has hitherto been brought about; by Individual Men, who, although as yet but partially and imperfectly, have still by one point or other of Religion been attracted, animated, and inspired, and have possessed the gift of communicating their inspiration to others. Such, in the beginning of Modern Times, were the Reformers:—such, in later days, when almost the whole of Religion was placed in the maintenance of Orthodox systems of Theology, and the inward Religion of the heart was cast forth and neglected, were the so-called Pietistic Teachers, who gained an unquestionable victory; for what is the whole modern Theology, which would reduce the Bible to the level of its own shallow and superficial understanding, but a corruption of the former view, in which the contempt which these Teachers entertained for the Orthodox systems of Theology is preserved, but the Holiness of Feeling, by which they were guided, is cast off? And so in our own Age, when it

has somewhat recovered and composed itself from the manifold Errors with which it has been perplexed and harassed, will Inspired Men arise, and bring to it that of which it stands in need.

We have finished the task which we proposed to ourselves:—we have delineated, briefly and succinctly, as was our purpose, the Characteristics of the Present Age, contemplated from those essential Principles which belong to all Time. There remains nothing further for us to do, but to add a conclusion to the whole. Permit me, for this purpose, to invite you here once again.

LECTURE XVII.

CONCLUSION.

In the preceding Lectures we have delineated the Present Age as a necessary part of the great World-plan on which the Earthly Life of our Race is arranged, and have endeavoured to disclose its secret significance; we have sought to understand the phenomena of the Present by means of this Idea, to bring them forth as the necessary results of the Past, and to predict their immediate consequences in the Future;—and if we have succeeded in this our undertaking, we have then understood our Age. We have plunged into these contemplations, without thought of ourselves or of our own position. Speculation warns every inquirer, and with good reason, against this self-forgetfulness. To show the justice of this warning in our own case:—Should our view of the Present Age prove to have been a view taken from the standing-point of this Age itself, and should the eye which has taken this view have been itself a product of the Age which it has surveyed, then has the Age borne witness to itself, and such testimony must be cast aside; and so far from having explored its significance, we have only added to the number of its phenomena a most superfluous and unproductive one. Whether this has been our position or not, let us now determine by a retrospect of our previous inquiry; and this we can only do by placing it before us, as itself a phenomenon of Time, and indeed of that Age in which it has occurred, namely,—the Present.

But however indispensable it is, in every mental occupation, that we should not lose sight of ourselves, it is yet most difficult to do this, particularly to do it aloud; that is, to speak of ourselves. Not indeed that I should find any serious difficulty in speaking of *me,* the particular individual who now addresses you. In the Introductory Lecture, when I first sought to combine and establish this audience, I spoke without hesitation of myself, what I believe no one has ever doubted, and what I do not regret having spoken; but now, at the conclusion of my task, I know not how to utter one word respecting myself, which shall be worthy of utterance. The question is not of me; it is not I who have desired to think and to inquire:—had *my* thought or inquiry been a matter of any moment, I could have accomplished that without saying aught to any one on the subject; but from such contemplations no results for the world could ensue; for what the Individual thinks, or does not think, constitutes no event for his Age;—but it is We, as one Community (so we have often already termed this outward phenomenon, and so we may now term it), devoted to this purpose, and borne on to unity of thought in absolute forgetfulness of our own individual persons,—it is We who have desired to think and to inquire;—and it is to this *we,* and by no means to myself, that I refer, when I speak of this mental retrospect of ourselves, and of the difficulty of accomplishing it aloud and in public speech. So much must in that case be forced into utterance which each of us would more fitly think for himself, that an incautious man might be misled into touching upon subjects which modesty would rather leave untouched, and into urging upon the attention considerations which are offensive to the cultivated mind,—not on their own account, but because they are spoken on the supposition that those to whom they are addressed cannot make them for themselves. As I have hitherto, I believe, preserved myself free from this sort of eloquence,—which indeed is permitted only to one Class, to

which I do not belong,—I hope I shall continue to avoid it, even to the end.

I have said that we shall to-day take a retrospect of our previous inquiry, and of the Theory which has been its result,—*our* Theory, not *mine*, as I have already explained,—particularly in order that we may be assured that this Theory is not itself a product of the Present Age;—the influence of the Age upon us being hidden from our own view. To this end I maintain, that this Theory is assuredly no product of our own Age; if, *in the first place*, it be not a product of any Age whatever, but stand superior to all Time; and also (since in that case it might prove absolutely empty and without significance, and so disappear in mere vacuity and nothingness), if, *in the second place*, it become the root and principle of living vitality in a New Age.

In the first place, that we may be able to determine whether our now completed Theory do actually stand superior to all Time, let us inquire what has been the nature of this Theory, considered in its essential elements, and to what chief department of Human Thought it has belonged? I answer:—It was a Religious Theory; all our contemplations were Religious contemplations, and our view of things, and the eye which embraced that view, were Religious.

According to the Thought which, directly or indirectly, distinctly or obscurely, has animated all our previous discourses, and, in our last discourse especially, has been considered on all sides;—according to this Thought, I say, Religion consists in regarding and recognising all Earthly Life as the necessary development of the One, Original, Perfectly Good and Perfectly Blessed, Divine Life. Now, it is first of all quite clear that this view does not consist in the mere perception or contemplation of Life, or of anything else, and that it cannot arise from such perception or contemplation. By the most careful observation of Existence, we can go no further than to know that so and so is the case, but by no means be led to pass beyond this mere Appearance, and to

seek a Higher Significance behind it. The Religious mode of Thought can thus never be produced by mere observation of the World, since, on the contrary, this mode of Thought consists, according to the maxim which we have already laid down, in refusing to accept this World, and all Earthly Life in it, as in itself true and essential Existence, and in accepting another Higher Existence, superior to the World. This maxim must be developed in the mind itself, as an essential element originally implanted there;—and no man can ever arrive at this truth by mere empirical observation, since it entirely abolishes empirical observation as the highest and decisive test of valid Existence. It is clear that this maxim stands in direct opposition to the principle which we have indicated as that which guides the Thought of our Age; that this Thought can never attain to it; and that, by means of the very first supposition of something Higher than the World, we raise ourselves above such an Age, and cease to be its product. In short, not mere Observation, but Pure Thought, in itself and by itself, is the first element of Religion. In the language of the schools:—Metaphysic, that is, the Super-sensual, is the element of Religion. From the beginning of the world, down to the present day, Religion, whatever shape it may have assumed, has been Metaphysic; and he who despises and derides Metaphysic,—that is, everything *a priori*,—either knows not what he does, or else he despises and derides Religion.

Are we set free from this limitation and bondage in the Actual?—then the next step towards the attaiment of True Religion is our second maxim:—To place the foundation of the World neither in Chance, which in other words is to accept a foundation of the World and yet not to accept it; nor in blind Necessity, which in other words is to accept an absolutely inconceivable and dead foundation of the World, and of all the Life in the World; nor yet in a Living, but evil, capricious and man-hating, Cause, as Superstition has done at all times in a greater or less degree;—but in

the One, absolutely and unchangeably Good, Divine Existence. We said that our first maxim,—not to accept Actual Existence in Time as in itself true and valid, but to seek a Higher Existence beyond it,—must be developed within the mind itself; and even so our second maxim,—to regard this Higher Principle as Life, and as a Good and Blessed Life, —must likewise be developed in the mind itself as an inherent element originally implanted there. At most, we can only receive help from without, by the communication of such thoughts from others with the invitation to test them by our own sense of Truth, by which, if it be but rightly interrogated, and if the mass of preëxisting errors and prejudices be not too powerful, they will doubtless be confirmed. There is no logical means by which this insight may be forced upon man, for even the dullest and coarsest form of mere Egoism is consistent in itself, and he who determines with stiff-necked obstinacy to abide there, cannot be compelled to quit it.

In a word,—as we have already clearly set forth in our last Lecture,—In the view of Religion, all the Phenomena of Time, without exception, are regarded as necessary and progressive developments of the One, Ever-blessed, Original Divine Life, and hence each individual Phenomenon is regarded as the necessary condition of a Higher and more Perfect Life in Time, which shall arise from it. Now,—and this is to be particularly remarked,—this one, essentially abiding and unchanging view of Religion, is itself divided *in its form*, and assumes a double aspect. Namely, —we may either possess only a general insight into the *fact*, that, since all Life manifested in Time can be nothing else than the development of the Divine Life, so also the particular Phenomenon which may be in question is necessarily a development of this Divine Life:—the *fact*, I say, that such *is* the case, without any conception of *how* and *in what way* it is so; and this form of Religion we may name the Religion of Reason, which lies beyond all

Understanding and all Conception, although its clearness and certainty do not on that account suffer the slighest prejudice:—The Religion of Reason, we style it, for it is the mere acceptance of the *fact*, without comprehension of the *manner of the fact*. Or, in the second place, we may understand and conceive *how* and *in what way* the Phenomenon in question may be the development of a Higher Life; the more perfect Phenomenon which is to proceed from it may present itself to sight, and the preceding Phenomenon may be recognised, clearly and distinctly, as the necessary foundation from which the ascertained progression has arisen;—and this latter form of Religion may be named the RELIGION OF THE UNDERSTANDING. These two forms embrace the whole domain of Religion; the Religion of Reason encompassing both its extremities, while the Religion of the Understanding occupies the centre. How each individual Human Being, as such, and his particular fortunes, connect themselves with the Eternal,—this, as the *lower* extremity of the domain of Religion, cannot be comprehended; and as little, how this whole Present and Introductory Life of our Race is related to the Infinite series of Future Life, and determined thereby,—as little, I say, can this, as the *higher* extremity of the domain of Religion, be comprehended by us; but that they are altogether Good, and necessary for the Perfect Life, is distinctly apparent to the Religious Man. On the contrary, whatever is comprehended in this first Earthly Life of the Race, considered in itself and apart from all other Life, and as the Life of the Race, not individual Life,—this, as the *middle* sphere of this domain of Religion, may be conceived, and has been conceived by us; and on the same ground, it may be conceived how each of the necessary Epochs of this Earthly Life is related to the whole, and what is the particular significance of each in itself. Here, therefore, lies the domain of the Religion of the Understanding;—and this domain we have traversed in our inquiry, putting forward the Epoch in which we live, as its clearest and most intelligible point.

The question, What has been the nature of our inquiry, is answered. What we have done, is this:—we have elevated ourselves into the Ether of Religion by that way which is the most easy and accessible to our Age,—the way of Understanding. So surely as our inquiry has been a Religious inquiry, it has been no product of our own Age, but has transcended all Ages and all Time; so surely as it has applied itself especially to the dominant principle of our own Age, it has raised itself from the level of this particular Age above all Time. The greatest obstacle to reflection is when a man no longer hesitates or stumbles at anything, no longer wonders at anything, and no longer seeks any explanation of surrounding Phenomena. Of all the wonders that surround a man in this condition of indifference, whatever moves him, however slightly, because it has a direct influence on his own personal weal or woe, is that which lies nearest to him among the events of the Time. But what cultivated mind has not, sometimes at least, pondered in astonishment over those wonderful Phenomena, demanded the meaning of them, and earnestly longed for a solution of its questionings? Without allowing ourselves to be occupied with trifles, which often fall within the domain of the absolutely Unintelligible, or, even when they are intelligible, lead to nothing great, we have considered and characterized the Age as a Whole; but so that not one of the members of this assembly will be apt to find anything passed over which specially interests him. We have characterized it in a rational and religious frame of mind, regarding all things as necessary parts of the Whole, and as securely leading to nobler and more perfect results.

Thus there can be no doubt that our inquiry has transcended the limitations of Time. But this alone does not satisfy us. That it is no product, no favourite opinion, no mere prejudice of our Age, is well:—but is it not perhaps a mere nonentity, a deceptive show, a dream disappearing in the empty void of Time, and having no existence in True

and Real Time? We have already set forth the principles upon which this second question must be answered.

In this empty void of Time everything disappears which is adopted for the purpose of mere amusement, or, what is the same thing, for the satisfaction of curiosity founded upon no earnest desire of Knowledge. Amusement is altogether a void and empty waste, which intervenes between the periods of Time devoted to earnest occupations. At the opening of these Lectures I undertook nothing more than that I should occupy your thoughts for a few hours of this winter in a manner neither unseemly nor disagreeable:—more I could not promise, reckoning on myself alone; and to promise even this unconditionally, was itself a hazard, for communication upon my part presupposed the power of receiving such a communication upon yours, and a definite communication presupposed a definite degree and form of this receptive power. If you have taken me altogether at my word in this matter, then you may now congratulate yourselves that you have, in the course of this winter, got rid of sixteen or seventeen hours of idleness, by means of a new amusement which has always proved good, profitable, and wholesome;—and against this I have nothing to say. But in this case, it is quite certain that these sixteen or seventeen hours have been to you not True, but mere empty and vacant, Time.

In True and Real Time everything is comprehended which becomes the necessary Principle, foundation, and cause of new and hitherto unknown Phenomena in Time; for the first characteristic of true Life is to create other Life from itself. That which we set forth as such a Principle in these inquiries was the necessary tendency and direction of all things without exception, as contemplated from the Religious point of view. Now it is impossible that this Principle should have been implanted within us, for the first time, by means of the contemplations which have occupied us for a few hours of this winter. In the first place, we have already

remarked that this Principle cannot be communicated to man from without, but must have its root originally within his own Being, and has actually such an inward existence in all men without exception;—and in the second place, we have not been able to avail ourselves of nearly the whole of the means which might have been employed to awaken and call forth this Principle. The whole artificial training of the school, the systematic rise and overthrow of each objection, the gradual upturning of every branch of Error by the roots; further, the profound and lengthened course of study, and the artificial development of the power of thought which are presupposed in these things;—all these could not here be employed; and thus, the Religious Sense could not here be implanted, nor even for the first time awakened and called forth. It was presupposed that this Religious Sense had already made its appearance, and manifested its genial and invigorating influence in all the minds who have taken a part in our inquiries, and only slumbered under the concealment of the numerous and incessant occupations and distractions of life, and its every-day occurrences. To this Sense, asleep but not dead, we were able confidently to appeal, just as each of you might have done for himself, had he had time and opportunity for meditation on matters of this description. It became my business to apply a portion of my time to the production and adjustment of such a discourse as each of you might have addressed to himself, and which he must actually address to himself at last, testing it by his own sense of Truth, if it is really to be addressed to him at all. At most, I could thus only lend some assistance to my hearers, by removing the opposition between their spiritual condition at the time when the Religious Sense first developed itself within them, and that in which they now stand; by separating distinctly and forcibly this Religious Sense itself, which is at all times essentially one and the same, from the accidental and temporary limitations which surrounded its first development, and by trans-

planting it, beyond these limitations, into their present state of Mental Culture.

There is, in the first place, one good criterion by which we may arrive at a preliminary solution at least, of the question we have proposed,—Whether the considerations which we have here set forth have been mere empty verbiage, or intellectual conceits, serviceable, at most, to pass away an idle hour?—or whether in them utterance has been given to something already Living within ourselves?—this, namely,—that if it has appeared to us that our own long-cherished presentiments and feelings have here been distinctly spoken forth, and that we ourselves had previously thought of the matter, as it were by accident, exactly as it has been here expounded;—then we may be sure that utterance has here been given to something already Living within ourselves. This, I say, is but a preliminary, and even but a partially decisive criterion. It is indecisive on the following account:—one man may cordially assent to it, in whom only a fugitive Scientific, or Æsthetic pleasure has been excited, which indeed may manifest itself in a more consistent view of the World, or in more inspired productions of Art, but can never enter into the inmost recesses of the mind:—another man may gainsay it, because he goes to its consideration full of scientific prejudices,—and may gainsay it the more vehemently, the more he is irritated and chagrined by the secret harmony which reigns between his own mind and that which, according to his theory, must be Error,—who does nevertheless give his assent to it at bottom, and whose whole character and mode of thinking being penetrated with this harmony, his conduct is placed in opposition to his theory; until at last this theory itself, no longer receiving any nourishment from the heart, fades and falls away like withered leaves.

But the sure and perfectly decisive criterion whether something already Living within us has here found an utterance, and that so powerful an utterance that it can

never again fall back into slumber,—in which case the present awakening would again need a new and future revival, which could never be anticipated with certainty; the present being only valuable on account of this future awakening, without which it would disappear in mere empty Time;—the sure and perfectly decisive criterion of this question, I say, is this:—Whether the Life which has thus been called forth do ceaselessly extend itself, and become the source and foundation of New Life.

In our last lecture, we have clearly shown that True Religion does not manifest itself outwardly, and impels man to no course of external conduct which he would not otherwise have adopted, but that it only completes his true Inward Being and Dignity. It is neither an Action, nor an incentive to Action, but a Thought:—it is LIGHT, and the One True Light, which bears within it all Life and all the forms of Life, and pervades their innermost substance. Once arisen, this Light flows on spontaneously for ever, spreading itself forth without term or limit;—and it is as idle to *bid* it shine, as it would be to address such a command to the material sun when it stands in the noon-day heavens. It does this without our bidding; and if it shine not, then has it not arisen. At its uprising, Darkness, and the brood of spectres and phantasms which are born of Darkness, vanish of themselves. It is in vain to say to Darkness,—'Let there be Light!'—no Light can come forth from it, for there is none within it. As vain is it to say to man, lost in the Transitory and Perishable,—'Raise thine eyes to the Eternal!'—he has no eye for the Eternal;—his eye is itself transitory and perishable, and reflects only the Transitory and Perishable. But let the Light itself burst forth, then the Darkness becomes visible, retires, and draws off, like shadows across the field. The Darkness is the Thoughtlessness, the Frivolity, the Fickleness of men. Where the Light of Religion has arisen, there is no longer need to warn men against these things, or to struggle against them;—

they have already vanished, and their place is no longer known. Are they still there?—then the Light of Religion has assuredly not arisen, and all warning and exhortation is in vain.

Thus,—the proposed criterion being applied in the first place *negatively*,—the answer to the question, Whether these contemplations in which we have been engaged have belonged to vacant, or to True Time? must depend upon this,—Whether Thoughtlessness, Frivolity, and Fickleness, have disappeared from our Life, and continue to disappear therefrom more and more?

Pure Thoughtlessness,—that is, mute and blind surrender of ourselves to the stream of Phenomena, without even entertaining the thought of any Unity or foundation therein,—is mere Animalism, and thereby possesses a certain conformity to Nature, which we must allow to have its value. It is seldom that Man is so fortunate as to possess it. Those questionings after Unity still present themselves, and demand their reply. He who cannot enter upon the inquiry, has no alternative but to harden himself against this impulse, and assume with his own will, and as the principle of his life, that absolute Thoughtlessness which Nature has denied him as a natural condition, and place his true wisdom therein. There is no lack of distinguished appellations under which this maxim may be entertained:—Common Sense of Mankind, Scepticism, Struggle against Fanaticism and Superstition, &c. According to these doctrines, the Animal is the hereditary Philosopher and Sage; Folly belongs to Man, and consists in demanding a foundation and reason of the Visible. This Folly the wise man subdues as well as he can, and thus by Art brings himself back again to the condition of the beast. But should these maxims, with all their distinguished appellations, prove unable to subdue this impulse, which demands a secure foundation for our Knowledge, then other means are sought to put it to silence. We pretend to rally ourselves on

making this effort, and to laugh at ourselves for indulging in this folly, while it is in truth the effort itself which we desire to make ridiculous, in order that we may thereby take revenge upon ourselves for having once suffered this impulse to surprise and lay hold of us, and also in order that others may not believe us capable of such weakness. We fly from no society more willingly than from our own; and in order never to be left alone with ourselves, we endeavour to fill up with amusement every portion of time unemployed by those occupations which most effectually remove us from ourselves. This condition is unnatural. Children may by nature desire play, because their powers are not yet ripe for earnest employment:—but when grown men can do nothing but play, then this is not for the sake of play itself, but because there is something else which in their amusement they would willingly forget. 'Does an earnest thought come in thy way, which thou mayest not entertain? Let it alone, and pursue the path thou hast begun! This, however, thou doest not, but turnest towards it, and summonest up all the resources of thy wit to cover it with ridicule. Wherefore dost thou give thyself this labour? For this cause:—thou canst not bear the presence of this thought in its original and earnest form; thou hast no rest till thou hast clothed it in another, and to thee more agreeable, shape.' Fickleness and Frivolity are unerring signs,—and the more so the greater their degree,—that there is something gnawing within the heart, from which we would willingly escape; and just upon that account they are proofs which cannot be mistaken, that the noble nature which they disguise is not wholly dead. He who can cast a searching glance into such souls must feel the deepest commiseration for their state; living in an atmosphere of lies, while they would make all men believe that they are in the highest degree happy and contented; seeking from others the confirmation of that which they themselves know to be false; and with a most sorrowful laughter at

their own efforts, seeming to be even worse than they really are.

Have these follies wholly disappeared from our minds? do we no longer shun earnest reflection, but now begin to love it above all things else?—then our contemplations have assuredly belonged not to vacant, but to True Time.

Has the Light of Religion arisen within us?—then it not only dispels the previous Darkness, but it has also had a true and essential existence within us, even while it could not dispel this Darkness;—now it spreads itself forth until it embraces our whole World, and thus becomes the source of New Life. In the beginning of these Lectures we have traced everything great and noble in Man to this,—that he lose sight of his own personal existence in the Life of the Race; devote his own Life to the purposes of the Race; labour, endure, suffer, and if need be die, as a sacrifice to the Race. In this view it was always Deeds,—always that which could manifest itself in outward and visible Appearance, to which we looked. In this way it was necessary for us to open our communication with the Age. Now, ennobled by our progress from this point of view, as I foretold, we use this language no longer. The one thing truly noble in Man, the highest form of the one Idea which reveals itself within him, is Religion;—but Religion is nothing external, and never clothes itself in any outward manifestation, but it completes the Inward Life of Man: it is Spiritual Light and Truth. The true course of action is now discovered of itself, for Truth cannot act otherwise than according to Truth; but this true course of action is no longer a sacrifice, no longer demands suffering and endurance, but is itself the manifestation and effluence of the highest inward Blessedness. He who, although with reluctance and in conflict with internal darkness, yet acts according to Truth, let him be admired, and let his heroism be extolled: he upon whom this Inward Light has arisen has outgrown our admiration and our praise; there is no

longer any doubt, hesitation, or obstruction in his Being, but all is the one, clear, ever-flowing Fountain of Truth.

Formerly we expressed ourselves in the following language:—'As when the breath of Spring enlivens the air, the strong and fixed ice, which but a few moments before imprisoned each atom within its own limits, and shut up each neighbouring atom in similar isolation, now no longer holds Nature in its rigid bondage, but flows forth in one free, animated, and glowing flood; so does the Spirit-World ever flow at the breath of Love, and is and abides in eternal communion with the mighty Whole.' Let us now add:—'This atmosphere of the Spirit-World, this creating and combining element, is Light—this originally: Warmth, if it do not again exhale, but bear within itself an element of duration, is but the first manifestation of this Light. In the Darkness of mere earthly vision, all things stand divided from each other; each individual thing isolated by means of the cold and unillumined Matter in which it is embraced. But in this Darkness there is no Unity. The Light of Religion arises!—and all things burst forth and rush towards each other in reciprocal order and dependence, and float on together, as a united Whole, in the One, Eternal, and All-embracing flood of Light.

This Light is mild, silent, refreshing and wholesome to the eye. In the Twilight of mere Earthly vision the dim shapes which crowd in confusion around us are feared, and therefore hated. In the Light of Religion all things are pleasing, and shed around them calmness and peace. In it all unlovely shapes disappear, and all things float in the glowing Ether of Love. Not that man devotes himself to the high Will of Fate, which is unchangeable and unavoidable;—in Religion there is no Fate, but only Wisdom and Goodness, to which man is not compelled to resign himself, but which embrace him with Infinite Love. In these contemplations in which we have been engaged, this joyful and friendly view ought to have spread itself over our own Age,

and over the whole Earthly Life of our Race. The more closely this mild influence has embraced us, the deeper it has penetrated all our thoughts and aspirations, — in a word, the more we have attained to peace with the whole World, and joyful sympathy with every form of existence, the more sure may we be, and the more confidently may we affirm, that our previous contemplations have belonged not to vacant, but to True Time.

This Light spreads itself forth by its own native energy, and widens the sphere of its influence, until at last it embraces our whole World. As when the Earthly Light breaks forth in one point, the shadows retire, the limits of Day and Night are separated, and Darkness itself becomes visible, though not the particular objects which it veils; so is it with the Light of Religion. In one sphere, that is, in the contemplation of our Earthly Life, this Light ought here to have arisen upon us. Has it truly arisen upon us? — then do we already know, firmly and surely, that also beyond this sphere, Wisdom and Goodness reign, because nothing else can possibly attain dominion; — but we do not understand *how* they rule there, nor what are the purposes which they there unfold. Penetrated with firm and immovable conviction and insight with respect to the *fact*, there remains to us beyond this sphere, and with reference to the *manner of the fact*, only Faith. The one sphere is illumined by clear and intelligible Light; the farther region is also surrounded by Light, but Obscurity still rests upon the supersensual objects which it contains. But this Light, thus intelligible and clear in itself, does not remain shut up in its original limits, but, as its own brightness increases, it lays hold of the nearest surrounding phenomena, and from these again proceeds to those beyond; the sphere of the Religion of the Understanding is extended, and embraces one portion after another of the realm of Faith. If, therefore, we shall gradually attain to a right understanding of that one thing which alone is worth understand-

ing,—the plans of Divine Wisdom and Goodness—then is this a certain proof that our contemplations have belonged not to vacant, but to True Time.

In one word, only our future growth in inward Peace and Blessedness, as well as in inward Understanding, can furnish the proof that the doctrine which has been here set forth is True, has been truly accepted by us, and has attained an actual Life within us.

You see that this proof does not show itself outwardly; that no one of us can answer for the other, but each only for himself, and from his own soul; and indeed that each can do this best when he answers only within his own soul. You see, that in no case can these questions be answered to-day or to-morrow, but that the answer must be deferred for a quite indefinite period of Time. You see, that here to-day, standing at the conclusion of our labours, we are absolutely unable to tell whether we have accomplished Something or Nothing; and that upon this subject we can only appeal to the consciousness of our honest intention, if we are able to lay claim to such an intention, and must pass over from the region of Understanding to that of Faith and Hope.

And suppose that we could answer these questions, and answer them in accordance with our own wishes;—what, even in that case, were this assembly, in comparison with the populous city in which we stand? and what were this city in comparison with the whole realm of Culture?—a drop of water, perhaps, in a mighty stream. Would not this drop of water, animated by a new Life-element,—if indeed it were really so animated,—would it not mingle with the stream, and disappear in it, so that scarcely a single trace of the superadded element should remain? Here again we have nothing left us but the Hope that if it be Truth which we have here announced, and if it have assumed a form intelligible to our Age, this same Truth, in the same form, though without our knowledge, shall also

elsewhere and through other organs, make itself manifest to the Age; so that many drops in this great stream may be interpenetrated by the same Life-element, and gradually combining, at last communicate their mutual vitality to the Whole.

Let us cherish this Hope, and with this joyful anticipation before us, let us part.——Farewell!

FINIS.

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